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Abstract 
 
The scant literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in developing countries 
where CSR is relatively underdeveloped, has recently suggested that CSR in 
developing countries is different and reflects specific social and political background. 
So far, empirical research on this topic has been scarce. The purpose of this thesis is 
to discover how CSR practices can be implemented in a developing country such as 
Iran by exploring the role of the economy, state and societal culture. Qualitative 
research and semi-structured interviews were conducted with managers of some of the 
largest publicly held companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The analysis of 
data established that in developing countries, such as Iran, markets are imperfect and 
incomplete with lack of competition and strong government interference. This thesis 
also revealed that good-law-on-the-books does not necessarily ensure economic 
development but rather economic development comes before the rule of law. Other 
mechanisms such as competition, trust, legal compliance level and government 
interference level are more influential. The results of these data also provided that 
stakeholders have very limited impact upon the decision-making process in Iranian 
companies and the attitude of the managing director is the most important driver of 
CSR policies. It was recognized that Western style of economic development may not 
happen in Iranian business environments. Business strategies that depend on 
influencing the strengths of the existing market environment outperform those that 
focus on overcoming its weaknesses. The interesting finding was that despite the 
strong agreement amongst the interviewees on weak performance of the government 
in all aspects and constant call for lowering its interference level, all of them believed 
that the government plays the most important roll in promoting CSR policies. Finally 
it was concluded that Iran is not still ready and does not have necessary economic and 
cultural level for promotion of CSR policies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is one of the most important issues and 
developments of the 21st century. The 21st century has put forward a series of issues 
and challenges that are global and outside the authority of one state. These involve a 
set of common governance and regulatory issues such as the global economic crisis, 
climate change, human rights and sustainable development. CSR can provide an 
important part of the answer to these problems. 
 
CSR has generated widely divergent reactions since, as it has been argued, 
corporations can be “both good and evil, making them appear as both responsible and 
irresponsible actors”.1 Corporations have been called “the Frankenstein monster that 
the State has created by their corporation laws”.2 Similarly, “The Report of the 
Citizen Works Corporate Reform Commission” argued that large public corporations 
are dangerous to society “because as profit-making machines, they know no limits 
and boundaries”.3 On the contrary, Madsen argues that taking corporations as the 
main source of evil on the world is incomplete. He maintained that corporations are 
“the backbone of our current global web of institutions”.4 Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge argue that the corporation is “the most important organization of the 
world” and “the basis of the prosperity of the West”.5 
 
                                                
1 Peter Madsen, ‘Professionals, Business Practitioners, and Prudential Justice’ 39 McGeorge Law 
Review 835842 
2 Louis K. Liggett Co v Lee  US  564-565-567 
3 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export (Yale University Press 
2001) 94 
4 Madsen841-842 
5 John Micklethwaite and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea 
(Modern Library 2003) xv 
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G8 leaders further highlighted the importance of CSR. They directly addressed the 
need for CSR and suitable related standards in a new way that went beyond simply 
emphasising the desirability of voluntary CSR initiatives. Speaking directly to 
companies and those responsible for them, G8 leaders targeted corporate CSR 
disclosure and corporate engagement with particular CSR standards: “(w)e call on 
private corporations and business organisations to adhere to the principles in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises”. 6 
 
While there seems to be an agreement on the need for CSR, there is a huge 
disagreement as to what constitutes responsible behaviour and what limitations are 
placed on such responsibility, but there seems to be a consensus on the value of a 
socially responsible corporation in society. Corporations operate within a societal 
context; therefore, inevitable interaction and intersection with legal, economic and 
moral domains will occur. Still, much disagreement remains about the range of 
limitation “on corporate profit-making beyond legal compliance, market forces and 
business ethics” and “the ultimate sources and justifications for any limitations”.7 
 
The volume of studies on CSR is extensive but, strangely, comparative studies on 
CSR are relatively rare and tend to mostly focus on bigger regions such as continents 
and focus less on individual countries. One reason for this is the fact that corporations 
are rapidly growing and going global. Studying individual countries might not give 
the researcher the comprehensive understanding of the challenges that CSR might 
face while being implemented. 
                                                
6 Marc Gunthe, ‘The Mosquito in the Tent’ 149 Fortune 68 91-92 
7 Bryan Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2010) 7 
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In order to debate the implementation of CSR policies in a developing country, this 
thesis will start with a discussion about the relationship between politics and 
corporate governance in Chapter 2. In developing countries, in most cases, politics 
plays an important role in how corporations are run. In this section, efforts will be 
made to show the relationship between politics and corporate governance.  
 
In order to demonstrate this, first “path dependence” theory will be discussed; this 
holds that a country’s pattern of ownership structure at any point in time depends 
partly on the patterns it had earlier followed. Then “convergence theory” will be 
discussed. This theory argues that systems of corporate governance around the world 
are converging towards the Anglo-American model. Then the “globalization of 
capitalism” theories claiming that capitalism is the bedrock of most of the advanced 
economies will be examined. Moreover, the effects of politics on different systems of 
corporate governance will be debated. Politics generally determines conditions under 
which changes in different systems are likely to happen. That is why politics should 
be seriously taken into account by international institutions trying to bring about 
changes. Finally, the role of corporate law in the relationship between politics and 
corporate governance will be discussed.  
 
In this section key proposition 3.2 will be debated. This proposition maintains that 
transitional economies, such as Iran, present major obstacles to the adoption of a 
dispersed ownership model (Anglo-American model). 
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Second, attempts will be made to demonstrate the difficulties of defining CSR and 
what constitutes socially responsible behaviour.  
 
Third, dominant CSR theories will be demonstrated. In this section two of the most 
important CSR theories will be identified and discussed: first, Shareholder Value 
Theory will be examined. Milton Friedman’s opinions, as the paramount 
representative of this view, and his opponent’s views will be debated. Second, 
Stakeholder Theory will be discussed. 
 
In this section, key proposition 2 will be examined. This proposition argues that the 
impact of CSR values upon corporations in transitional economies, such as Iran, is 
likely to be shaped by internal norms in these corporations. 
 
Further on this chapter, the role of law in CSR debates will then be discussed. CSR 
has been considered as going beyond what is required by law. Attempts will be made 
to demonstrate the importance of the role of law in the CSR debate. This section is 
related to Key proposition 1.1 where this thesis try to identify whether the connection 
between legal rules and CSR principles is a reflexive one.  
 
Additionally, globalization’s role in CSR debates will be examined. McBarnet has 
argued that CSR is a rapidly “developing business strategy” and it is “a response to 
globalization and the extension of global multinational enterprises”. The importance 
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of the discussion on globalization is the fact that State control over multinational 
companies has considerably decreased.8  
 
In Chapter 3, comparative law as a tool of law reform will be debated. Comparative 
law is an important branch of law; both as a tool of research and as a tool of 
education, but using comparative law as a tool of law reform in developing countries 
gives rise to concerns about the effect of foreign legal models in the process of law-
making.  
 
The extent to which one legal system may develop its own principles and procedures 
or adopt those of foreign jurisdictions (legal transplantation) has been recently the 
subject of an abundant literature.9  
 
Scholars in different fields agree that over a period of 200 years the development of 
complex legal systems and the amelioration of “rule of law” have played a crucial 
role in modernization and industrialization, and are key determinants of economic 
growth, while the corporate form has been regarded as a very important factor in the 
creation of viable market economies.10 
 
In this section, key proposition 1.3 will be discussed. This proposition argues that the 
act of borrowing is usually simple; on the other hand, building up a theory of 
                                                
8 Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: the New 
Corporate Accountability (Cambridge University Press 2007) 453 
9 Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ 45 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 52 and Pierre Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture (W. E. J. Tjeenk Willink, 
Schoordijk Institute 1999) 
10 Yoram Keinan Katharina Pistor, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark D. West, ‘Evolution of Corporate 
Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries’ 18 The World Bank Research Observer 89 
92 
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borrowing is more complex. Additionally, key proposition 1.2 will be examined. This 
holds that the so-called “law-matters” thesis needs to be assessed by reference to what 
has been referred to as “functional equivalents” to law in transitional economies such 
as Iran. 
 
Contemporary comparative law scholars, however, take the view that law is culture-
specific and cannot be transferred from one society to another and have exactly the 
same effect. The transplanted law will change as it interacts with local laws and 
conditions.11 A series of studies by Katharina Pistor and others have shown the 
deficiencies of transplanted laws in their new legal environment. They have 
concluded that legal institutions in transplant countries were less developed when 
compared with those in the origin countries due to lack of complementarities, 12 and 
that transplant countries were less innovative than the origin countries. 13 Pistor has 
further argued that law should be developed by society and made “part of the 
institutional fabric of society”.14  
 
This chapter will also discuss the first Key proposition. This Key proposition 
examines whether the process of transplanting into another legal system is likely to be 
affected by local socio-economic-legal conditions, cultural values and institutional 
arrangements. This chapter will also discuss Key proposition 3.3. This involves 
determining whether the relationship between the legal rule to be transplanted and the 
                                                
11 Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ 37 The Cambridge Law Journal 313 313 
12 Katharina Pistor Yoram Keinan Katharina Pistor, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark D. West 
‘Innovation in Corporate Law ’ 31 Journal of Comparative Economics 676 7 
13 Yoram Keinan Katharina Pistor, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark D. West ‘The Evolution of 
Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison ’ 23 University of Pennsylvania, Journal of International 
Economic Law 791 791 
14 Katharina Pistor, ‘Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six 
Countries’ 90 and 93 
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socio-political structure of the “origin” jurisdiction will determine the rejection or 
acceptance of legal transplants.  
 
In this chapter, attempts will be made to define legal transplants, their development 
and influence in the study of legal culture and legal systems, taking into account the 
variation of transplantation process based on social, legal, economic, fiscal, financial 
and technical circumstances prevailing in each country’s legal culture and legal 
system.15 
 
In order to do this, the definition of legal transplants will first be presented. Second, 
attempts will be made to show how legal transplants are applied. Third, different 
series of arguments will be presented to demonstrate the role of legal transplants. 
Fourth, the costs of legal change and its effect on legal transplantation will be 
discussed. Fifth, the influence of culture on legal transplants will be presented and 
finally the development of legal transplants in developing countries will be discussed. 
 
Analysis of CSR policies has a particular nature. The normative analysis of corporate 
governance16 falls into two categories: first, the analysis of corporate governance 
responsibilities within the context of a given system or model of corporate 
governance; and second, the comparative evaluation of different models of corporate 
                                                
15Irma J. M Valderrama, ‘Legal Transplants and Comparative Law’ 002 International Law: Revista 
Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 276 274 
16 Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the 
way a corporation (or company) is directed, administered or controlled. Corporate governance also 
includes the relationships among the many stakeholders involved and the goals for which the 
corporation is governed. The principal stakeholders are the shareholders, the board of directors, 
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers and the community at large. 
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governance. Analysing CSR17 policies in developing countries will encompass both 
categories. While one needs to analyse the contingencies of corporate governance in a 
given country, comparison should be made with the more successful implementation 
in other countries. 
 
In Chapter 4, globalization and its effect on the developing country will first be 
discussed. In the first section, the different nature of CSR policies in developing 
countries will be demonstrated and attempts will be made to define a conceptual 
framework for studying comparative CSR. Second, the Anglo-American nature of 
reforms and the two factors contributing to development of this model of corporate 
governance will be discussed. These will involve an examination of: the failure of 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and the influence of international financial 
bodies. Third, three main social reporting theories18: legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory and institutional theory will be presented. In stakeholder theory, team-
production theory as a credible challenge to the principal–agent model of corporate 
law and the arguments for and against it will be discussed. Fourth, the relationship 
between social development and economic development will be demostrated while 
drawing attention to cultural dimensions influencing society’s CSR agenda. Fifth, 
attempts will be made to see if corporations have the responsibility to promote 
                                                
17 “CSR” is a term that defies precise definition. But nearly everyone can agree that it is about the 
business contribution to sustainable development - how business can take into account the economic, 
social and environmental impact their operations will have on the society. 
It is a form of corporate self-regulation integrated into a business model. Ideally, CSR policy would 
function as a built-in, self-regulating mechanism whereby business would monitor and ensure its 
support to law, ethical standards, and International norms. Consequently, business would embrace 
responsibility for the impact of its activities on the environment, consumers, employees, communities, 
stakeholders and all other members of the public sphere. Furthermore, CSR-focused businesses would 
proactively promote the public interest by encouraging community growth and development, and 
voluntarily eliminating practices that harm the public sphere, regardless of legality. Essentially, CSR is 
the deliberate inclusion of public interest into corporate decision-making, and the honouring of a triple 
bottom line: people, planet, profit. 
18Muhammad Azizul Islam and Craig Deegan, ‘Motivations for an organisation within a developing 
country to report social responsibility information: Evidence from Bangladesh’ 21 Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal 850 
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development. In this section the “private government” characteristics of corporations 
will be discussed. 
 
In this chapter key proposition 3.3 will be further discussed where it is argued that 
transitional economies, such as Iran, present a major obstacle to the adoption of the 
dispersed ownership model of the corporation. Additionally, key proposition 1.2 will 
be further examined. This holds that the so-called “law-matters” thesis needs to be 
assessed by reference to what has been referred to as “functional equivalents” to law 
in transitional economies such as Iran. 
 
In this part of the thesis, key propositions which have evolved out of the theoretical 
literature review and discussion of relevant legal issues will be demonstrated. 
 
The thesis will then continue with an analysis of Iran. Iran is located in a politically 
troubled and unstable region of the Middle East and has unique environmental 
characteristics. Moreover, Iran as a strict Islamic country, bases its social and 
commercial activities on fundamentalist religious regulations. The 1979 Iranian 
Revolution changed the Iranian people’s social values and corporate culture. For 
example, being religiously faithful is one of the conditions to be selected as a high-
ranking board member or director. In addition to religion and culture, the Civil Law 
of France and Belgium also influences corporate culture in Iran. 
 
The corporate governance system in Iran is not similar to those in Western countries. 
Several obstacles are embedded in the Iranian corporate governance system that 
makes the development of western-style corporate social responsibility policies very 
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difficult, if not impossible. Two of the most significant obstacles are the lack of a 
proper private sector and the lack of a proper taxation system.  
 
In order to see how CSR polices can be implemented in Iran, one needs to study how 
a new socio-legal system can be instituted in Iran.  
 
In Chapter 5, Key proposition 3 will be debated. This key proposition argues that the 
political determinants of CSR are fundamental to explaining its impact. These will 
vary from developed to transitional economies. 
 
In order to demonstrate this, the recent historical-political process in Iran, as well as 
aspects of Constitutionalism Revolution, in Iran will be discussed. Constitutionalism 
in Iran is a historically tested experience of introducing a new system in the legally 
under-developed Iran of that time. It brought many contradictory social and political 
issues to the surface. How Iran of that time responded to that introduction might tell a 
lot about how it might respond to the introduction of other new systems. Moreover, 
Constitutionalism was a quasi-successful movement in Iran. How it gained its success 
and where it made mistakes that led to not-very-successful results can be very helpful 
in identifying what obstacles CSR will encounter while being introduced in Iran and 
how it will be dealt with. Additionally, studying the Constitutionalism Revolution, as 
a way of limiting State power, will help us understand how the Iranian government 
can be influenced; for example, whether the pressure for change comes from inside or 
from external forces such as globalization.  
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In this section attempts will be made to discuss key proposition 2.1, arguing that the 
State has major influence in developing countries such as Iran upon the adoption of 
CSR in many companies. 
 
Second, the socio-legal dimension of Iran will be examined. “Iranian characteristics”, 
what make them do what they do, why they do it and how they can be influenced the 
most will be discussed. It has been suggested that there is an Iranian way of doing 
everything. Criticisms of this Iranian way will be made.  
 
Third, corporate law which is included in the Commercial Code and the corporate 
governance system will be examined. Attempts will also be made to assess whether 
Iran’s corporate law and corporate governance systems are an impediment to good 
governance and what changes should be made in order to encourage more socially 
responsible behaviour by corporations. 
 
In recent years, because of the increase in general knowledge, education, exposure to 
international communities of national corporations and the presence of international 
corporations, Iran’s market should have started becoming more competitive and 
gradually CSR should have started finding its way into the decision-making process. 
 
The nature of CSR in Iran is, however, different from its western conceptualization. It 
is mainly understood as a kind of philanthropy or sponsorship of different 
cultural/sports events and is characterized as such conduct as donating money in 
natural disasters. Few companies have a strategic approach to CSR and if they do it is 
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usually within the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM)19 
framework. 
 
Voluntary CSR in Iran is deeply interwoven with a strong cultural tradition of 
donating money to charities, building schools, mosques and hospitals. It is also 
profoundly embedded within Islamic religious customs of helping the poor by 
donating money under the Islamic concepts of Khums20, Zakat21, Waqf22. These 
Islamic concepts have not been specifically called Corporate Social Responsibility but 
socially responsible behaviour exists in Iranian culture and religious customs. Some 
argue that if these socially responsible cultural concepts combine with the new 
commercial concept of CSR better results will be achieved23, but this view is rather 
simplistic. The modern concept of CSR, like any other modern western concept, is 
likely to be affected by socio-economic-legal conditions. The socio-political structure 
of Iran will determine the rejection or acceptance of CSR concepts. This further 
proves that the act of borrowing from other legal systems is, however, a complex 
matter.  
 
The literature on Corporate Social Responsibility in Iran is somewhat limited. Such 
writings that do exist are very shallow and in many cases contradictory. Iranian 
authors do not explore CSR as an Iranian concept but rather try to explain why Iran 
                                                
19 EFQM (formerly known as the European Foundation for Quality Management) is a non-profit 
membership foundation based in Brussels. 
20 Khums is the Arabic word for One Fifth (1/5). According to Shia Islamic legal terminology, it means 
one-fifth of certain items which a person acquires as wealth, and which must be paid as an Islamic tax. 
21 Zakāt or "alms giving", one of the Five Pillars of Islam, is the giving of 2.5% of one's possessions 
(surplus wealth) to charity, generally to the poor and needy. The Shia double this to 5% of one's 
possessions. 
22 A Waqf is an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, typically denoting a building or plot of 
land for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. The donated assets are held by a charitable trust 
23 An interview with Bagher Namazi, the head of the Iranian Institute of Non-governmental Co-
operatives: http://csriran.com/?page_id=26  
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does not have CSR of a western style. They argue that Iran is not economically ripe 
for the western CSR concept. While this argument might be partially correct when it 
comes to securing investments for large corporations, not having a western style CSR 
is not in itself a bad thing. Implementing western concepts in Iran is a complex matter 
that requires considerable research on how foreign laws and regulations can be 
transplanted into Iran. Introducing CSR policies into Iran without taking into account 
the above-mentioned considerations might end in their rejection. At the same time, 
Iran has special characteristics, a very different culture and a very different socio-
legal system. Digging deeply into these elements might show that there exists an 
Iranian style of CSR that just needs to be strengthened and encouraged rather than 
changed or renewed. 
 
In Chapter 6, key players in CSR in Iran will first be identified. Second, the main 
CSR activities in Iran will be discussed. Third, examples of domestic and foreign 
company activities will be illustrated. Fourth, the State role in promoting CSR 
policies will be demonstrated. Fifth, the UN role in promoting CSR policies will be 
debated. Sixth, the Stock Exchange’s role in this matter will be examined. In this 
section a summary of the Iranian Code of Corporate Governance, as ratified by the 
Tehran Stock Exchange, will be presented. This chapter will conclude by showing the 
difficulties of promoting CSR policies in Iran.  
 
In Chapter 7, fieldwork data will be analysed in four parts: a) Key proposition 1, b) 
Key proposition 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, c) key proposition 2, and d) key proposition 3. The 
methodology and the interview questions are attached to this chapter as an index. 
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In the analysis of Key proposition 1, attempts will be made to analyse the effect of 
local socio-economic-legal conditions, cultural values and institutional arrangements 
in the process of transplanting CSR into another legal system.   
 
In order to assess this Key proposition, the interviewees were first asked if they 
believe there is a demand for CSR, where they think this demand comes from and 
what they believe would stand as the key feature of CSR in Iran. Then, the 
interviewees were asked about the extent to which they believe that successful CSR 
policies depend on the existence of elements of social structure (such as unions, 
professional associations, etc.) sometimes referred to as “civil society”. Additionally, 
in order to further assess the social and cultural aspect of this Key proposition, the 
interviewees were asked how flexible they believe Iran’s legal and cultural system is 
in response to changing economic and cultural conditions. 
 
In the analysis of Key propositions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, the interviewees’ opinion was 
initially sought on the impact of corporate law on economic growth in Iran and the 
extent to which economic growth is facilitated by adherence to the rule of law (Which 
comes first?). Secondly, the interviewees were asked for their opinion about the 
extent to which they believed that Iranian courts and regulators rely upon corporations 
to regulate their own affairs (e.g. self-regulation as opposed to government 
regulation), the extent to which they believed that corporate law principles are applied 
within courts and the effectiveness of Iran’s corporate regulators in enforcing 
corporate law. Finally, the interviewees were asked how effective they believed Iran’s 
corporate law was in dealing with self-dealing by corporate officials. The 
interviewees were also asked to describe the level of compliance upon the part of 
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Iranian companies with legal and regulatory rules (e.g. re disclosure). They were also 
asked what formal and informal institutions were available to make up for weak 
corporate law. 
 
In order to analyse key proposition 2 and assess whether the impact of CSR values 
upon corporations in transitional economies, such as Iran, is likely to be shaped by the 
internal norms in these corporations. It was of critical importance to see how CSR 
policies are actually implemented at lower levels in Iranian companies.  
 
In order to do this, the interviewee’s opinion was first sought regarding the extent to 
which they believed that different stakeholder groups were likely to impact upon the 
decision-making process of Iranian companies. This was directed at ascertaining 
whether support from multiple stakeholders is important for the success of companies 
in Iran. Furthermore, the interviewee’s opinion was sought as to who they believed 
were the most influential stakeholders in their company. 
 
Second, interviewees were also asked if and in what way positive public perception is 
important for the success of their company in Iran. 
 
Third, the interviewees were asked how they believe that CSR values within 
corporations are shaped by the internal norm in these corporations. The interviewee’s 
opinion was also sought as to the extent to which managers and directors of large 
Iranian companies are accountable to different stakeholder groups (e.g. employees, 
shareholders, consumers, etc). 
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Fourth, the interviewees were asked if they think more employee participation would 
further promote CSR policies in Iranian companies. 
 
Fifth, the interviewees were asked to explain if they see the company as an economic 
player or as a socio-political player. 
 
Sixth, the interviewees were asked why they think companies decide to get involved 
with CSR and how, if at all, companies benefit from CSR. 
 
Seventh, the interviewees were asked if they believe corporations have extra 
responsibility for social development beyond the development that arises incidentally 
from their responsibility to their shareholders to generate profit. 
 
In order to analyse key proposition 3, the State influence in developing countries, 
such as Iran, upon the adoption of CSR in many companies, attempts were made to 
see if the political determinants of CSR are fundamental to explaining its impact; if 
transitional economies, such as Iran, present major obstacles to the adoption of a 
dispersed ownership model of the corporation; and if the relationship between the 
legal rule to be transplanted and the socio-political structure of the “origin” 
jurisdiction will determine the rejection or acceptance of legal transplants. 
 
In order to assess this key proposition, the interviewee’s opinion was sought to see if 
CSR policies contradict any social/political values in Iran in a way that they would 
induce a backlash. They were also asked what local conditions have caused 
difficulties in transplanting commercial laws in Iran.  
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The interviewees were also asked to give their opinion about the role of the State (the 
government), if any, in promoting CSR policies. They were also asked what source, if 
any, the government has used to promote CSR policies and what the State has done to 
encourage CSR policies. The interviewees’ opinion was also sought as to how they 
believe the private sector/their company benefit from CSR partnerships with the 
government, and if they think that promoting CSR policies will increase the level of 
cooperation between the public and private sectors in Iran.  
 
Finally, the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the factors they 
believe promote the adoption of CSR values in Iran. 
Chapter 2: Corporate Social Responsibility Literature 
Review 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
 
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social 
goals and between individual and communal goals. The corporate governance framework is 
there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and societies”. 
(Sir Adrian Cadbury in the foreword to “Global Corporate Governance Forum”, World Bank, 
2003) 
 
The behaviour of corporations and their responsibilities towards the society they are 
operating in was one of the most contentious issues discussed during the last decade 
of the 20th century and had generated widely divergent reactions. It has been 
suggested that the reason for these opposing reactions lies in the duality of 
“corporations being both good and evil, making them appear as both responsible and 
irresponsible actors”.24 
 
Jones has argued that since the beginning of the 21st century, global debates about 
CSR have reached a new level, having moved from the question of “why corporations 
must be socially responsible” to the current question of “how they can become 
socially responsible”. 25 
 
Gunthe reports that:  
“According to a recent Deloitte global business survey on non-financial 
business information, almost 90 percent of CEOs and senior executives 
globally believed that their capacity to track the financial performance of their 
                                                
24 Madsen842 
25 Thomas M. Jones, ‘Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics’ 20 
Academy of Management Review 404 7 
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company was good or excellent, although slightly less than 30 percent of them 
could say the same about their tracking of their company’s non-financial 
performance, notwithstanding that more than half of them admitted that 
companies are under more pressure than ever before to measure their non-
financial performance, with more than 80 percent of these senior corporate 
executives admitting that this kind of performance information is increasingly 
emphasized by financial markets, investment fund managers, and others”.26 
 
In the G8 Agenda for cross-border investment and global economic development in 
their 2007 Summit Declaration, the world’s G8 leaders committed their countries to 
“promoting and strengthening corporate and other forms of social responsibility” 
through “internationally agreed corporate social responsibility and labour standards” 
as one of four priority areas for action.27  
 
G8 leaders also directly addressed the need for CSR and suitable related standards in 
a new way that went beyond simply emphasising the desirability of voluntary CSR 
initiatives. Speaking directly to companies and those responsible for them, G8 leaders 
targeted corporate CSR disclosure and corporate engagement with particular CSR 
standards: “(w)e call on private corporations and business organisations to adhere to 
the principles in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”. 28 
 
The leading questions have always been: what role corporations should play in 
society? Who should corporations be run for? And, consequently, to whom are 
corporations accountable? The different answers that have been given to these 
questions have been playing a leading role in the way corporations have been 
governed to meet their goal29. The aforementioned questions lead to deeper questions: 
“Is the company essentially a private association, subject to the laws of the State but 
                                                
26 Gunthe 90 
27 Jones 7 
28 Gunthe 91-92 
29 Horrigan 6 
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with no greater obligation than making money, or a public one which is supposed to 
act in the public interest?”30 or “How do we design the parameters for a profitable 
internationally competitive corporation for the 21st century that remains accountable 
to its shareholders while acting responsibly towards citizens affected by its actions?”31 
 
In recent years, the idea that corporations should also act for other stakeholders, rather 
than merely shareholders, has been growing rapidly. There seems to be a consensus 
that corporation need to take into account both shareholders and stakeholders’ 
interests since their interests are interwoven. But there is also a widespread 
disagreement as to how corporations should involve stakeholders’ interests in 
corporations’ decision-making process and the interests of different stakeholder 
groups relate to one another.32 
 
Similarly, there is a huge disagreement as to what comprises socially responsible 
behaviour and what the limitations of such responsibility may be, but there seems to 
be a consensus on the value of a socially responsible corporation in society. In other 
words, corporations operate within a societal context, therefore inevitable interaction 
and intersection with legal, economic and moral domains occur, but still much 
disagreement remains about “the range of limitation on corporate profit-making 
beyond legal compliance, market forces and business ethics, as well as the ultimate 
sources and justifications for any limitations”.33 
                                                
30 Wooldridge xv 
31 Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission (CDCAC), The New Balance 
Sheet: Corporate Profits and Responsibility in the 21st Century (Final Report of the CDCAC, 2002) 3 
32 Bryan Horrigan, ‘21st Century Corporate Social Responsibility Trends - An Emerging Comparative 
Body of Law and Regulation on Corporate Responsibility, Governance, and Sustainability ’ 4 
Macquarie Journal of Business Law 85 7 
33 Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business 7 
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The volume of studies on CSR is extensive but, strangely, comparative studies on 
CSR are relatively rare and mostly focus on bigger regions such as continents, with 
less focus on individual countries. However this gap in CSR studies might be 
somewhat understandable since corporations are rapidly growing and going global; 
therefore, studying individual countries might not give the researcher the 
comprehensive understanding of the challenges CSR might face while being 
implemented. 
 
In this chapter, first, the relationship between politics and corporate governance will 
be discussed. In developing countries, in most cases, politics plays an important role 
in how corporations are run. In this section, efforts will be made to show how politics 
affects corporate governance and vice-versa. In order to demonstrate this, first “path 
dependence” theory will be discussed, holding that a country’s pattern of ownership 
structure at any point in time depends partly on the patterns it had earlier. Then 
“convergence theory”, which maintains that systems of corporate governance in the 
world are converging towards Anglo-American corporate governance, will be 
discussed. We continue our analysis by “globalization of capitalism” theories 
claiming that capitalism is the bedrock of most of the advanced economies. to which 
convergence is happening towards their shareholding model. Moreover, we will try to 
present the effects of politics on different systems of corporate governance to 
determine conditions under which changes in these systems are likely to happen and 
therefore should be seriously taken into account by international institutions trying to 
bring about these changes. Finally, the role of corporate law in the relationship 
between politics and corporate governance will be discussed.  
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In this section Key proposition 3.2 will be debated. This proposition maintains that 
transitional economies, such as Iran’s, present major obstacles to the adoption of a 
dispersed ownership model. 
 
Second, attempts will be made to demonstrate the difficulties of defining CSR and 
what constitutes socially responsible behaviour. Despite the widespread discussion on 
CSR, one of the most controversial issues in CSR debates is its definition. For a 
concept that has been discussed for so long, it is strange that researchers still do not 
share a common definition or set of core principles. 
 
Third, dominant CSR theories will be presented. Different scholars have categorized 
CSR in different ways. One of the most complete categorizations of contemporary 
mainstream theories is: first, Corporate Social Performance; second, Shareholder 
Value Theory and Milton Friedman’s opinions as the paramount representative of this 
view; third, Stakeholder Theory; and Corporate Citizenship Theory.  
 
In this section, key proposition 2 will be examined. This proposition argues that the 
impact of CSR values upon corporations in transitional economies, such as Iran’s, is 
likely to be shaped by internal norms in these corporations. 
 
Fourth, in an attempt to further explain the business case for CSR, the relationship 
between CSR and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) will be discussed. The 
search for a positive link between CSR and related concepts such as social 
performance and financial performance has spawned an abundant literature, the 
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results of which remain somewhat inconclusive, with some authors discovering a 
positive relationship between social performance and financial performance, others 
encountering a negative relationship, and still others finding no relationship. 
 
Fifth, the role of law in CSR debates will be presented. CSR is considered to do more 
than what is required by law. Moreover, attempts will be made to demonstrate the 
importance of discussing the role of law in CSR debates.  
 
This section is related to Key proposition 1.1 where attempts will be made to see 
whether the connection between legal rules and CSR principles is a reflexive one.  
 
Sixth, globalization’s role in CSR debates will be discussed. It has been argued that 
“CSR as a rapidly developing business strategy is a response to: globalization and the 
extension of global multinational enterprises across countries: this implies that the 
State control over such enterprises has significantly decreased”.34  
 
2.2 Politics and Corporate Governance  
 
2.2.1	  Introduction	  
 
Politics generally plays an important role in transitional economies in regard to how 
corporations are run.  
 
In this section, efforts will be made to show the relationship between politics and 
corporate governance. In order to demonstrate this, first “path dependence” theory 
                                                
34 McBarnet 453 
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will be discussed. This theory holds that a country’s pattern of ownership structure at 
any point in time depends partly on the patterns it had earlier. Then we will look at 
“convergence theory” and the arguments for and against it. We continue our analysis 
by taking a look at the globalization of capitalism, with capitalism being arguably the 
bedrock of most of the advanced economies, to which convergence, it has been 
strongly claimed, is happening towards their shareholding model. Moreover, we will 
try to present the effects of politics on different systems of corporate governance and 
to determine the conditions under which changes in these systems are likely to happen 
and should therefore be seriously taken into account by international institutions 
trying to bring about these changes. In conclusion, the role of corporate law in the 
relationship between politics and corporate governance will be discussed.  
 
2.2.2 Path Dependence Theory 
 
“Path dependence” theory tries to show that history and politics matter, and simply 
matter more than the conventional wisdom of the legal and economic communities 
suggests.35 Roe36 and Bebchuck and Roe37 wrote that the patterns of history deeply 
influence the current patterns of politics which, in its turn, affects the law and social 
organizations that determine which corporations, which ownership structure and 
which governance arrangements survive and prosper and which do not. Therefore, 
studying political determinants of corporate governance will provide a deep insight as 
to why things are the way they are, and in which direction they are heading. 
                                                
35Christopher D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (Waveland 
Press 1991) 114 
36Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact 
(Oxford University Press 2003) 7 and 13 
37Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance’ in Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe (ed), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge University Press 2004) 77 
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Two types of path dependence have been recognized: first “structure-driven” path 
dependence, which holds that the ways of initial ownership structures in an economy 
directly influence subsequent ownership structures through developing 
complementarities38 and network externalities that make the economy more 
efficient.39 
 
The other type of path dependence suggests that substantial differences in corporate 
rules among countries might be sufficient to produce substantial differences in 
ownership patterns.40  
 
2.2.3	  Convergence	  Theory	  
 
In the light of the post-Enron corporate governance crisis in the United States,  the 
European Union’s repeated efforts at corporate integration and the effects of global 
economic integration of different systems, some have argued in favour of 
“convergence theory”, maintaining that corporate governance systems all over the 
world are reforming towards the Anglo-American model of shareholding. This theory 
accounts for a tendency towards the rules that are objectively best by some efficiency 
standard. It identifies the main purpose of corporate law as minimizing the costs of 
                                                
38 Complementarities are an attribute of elements of a given system such as a corporate governance 
system, a financial system, the organizational or production system of a firm, or the system that 
constitutes the strategy of the firm. By definition, complementarities imply that partial changes with 
respect to individual elements do not result in an improvement if the starting situation is a local 
optimum. In practice this could mean that the relevant legal and business communities do not accept a 
given new legal advice or a non-standard corporate governance practice. The innovation might be 
discontinued or abolished again or simply not adopted. Stone 123 
39 Oliver Hart, ‘An Economist's View of the Firm’ 89 Columbia Law Review 1757 77 
40 Ibid 78 
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raising capital and discovering “the optimal rules to achieve this purpose”41 either 
through parallel national developments or through the opening up of global markets. 
Advocates of this theory claim that it is important for nations who wish to enter the 
international arena – as exporters of goods or importers of capital – to adopt 
commercial and corporate rules similar to those of the leading players42. While they 
admit the efficiency of a number of corporate governance systems, they assume that, 
when dealing with a single larger market or “global” economy, corporations and their 
economies derive efficiency advantages if they have the same system of corporate 
governance as other participants in the market.  
 
Parker argues pressure for further convergence is rapidly growing. The dominant 
ideology of convergence theory considers corporate law’s principal task as increasing 
long-term shareholder value, since the best way to achieve social welfare is making 
corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholders’ interests.43 This 
shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance maintains that other corporate 
constituencies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers and customers should have 
their interests guaranteed by contractual and regulatory means rather than through 
participation in the corporate governance decision-making process.44  
                                                
41 Klaus J. Hopt and Gunther Teubner, ‘Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Their Beneficiaries. A 
functional approach to the legal institutionalization of corporate responsibility’ in Klaus G. Hopt and 
Gunther Teubner (ed), Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities (Walter de Gruyter & Co 
1985) 293 
42 Karin Buhmann, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: What Role for Law? Some Aspects of Law and 
CSR’ 6 Corporate Governance: An International Review 188  294 
43Christine Parker, ‘Meta-regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility’ in 
Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell Doreen McBarnet (ed), The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 33 
44Dodd and Berle conducted a classic debate on the subject in the 1930s, in which Dodd pressed the 
social responsibility of corporate managers while Berle championed shareholder interests. 
Madsen;(CDCAC); Wooldridge; by the 1950s, Berle seemed to have come around to Dodd’s 
celebration of managerial discretion as a positive virtue that permits managers to act in the interests of 
society as a whole; See Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart Publishing 2003). John 
Kenneth Galbraith takes a similar position in Halina Wrad, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Law 
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Various economists and legal academics argue that the tendency towards convergence 
if a good level of regulatory framework already exists. They hold that law “matters” 
because it allows the investors feel more comfortable about holding a small 
percentage of shares in a company. Cheffins argues that one should not exaggerate the 
importance of the role of the law in the US and the UK since widely held companies 
developed without a great help from the law.45 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman emphasized the failure of alternative models of corporate 
governance as a reason for the superiority of the shareholder-oriented model. 
According to them, the manager-oriented model fails due to the conventional wisdom 
that establishes that when managers are given great discretion over corporate 
investment policies they mostly end up serving themselves, no matter how well-
intentioned they may be.46  
 
As for the stakeholder-oriented model, the advocates of this model argue that 
stakeholders will be subject to opportunistic exploitation by the corporation if their 
rights are not included in and supported by the law. Based on this argument, 
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that if stakeholders’ rights are supported by the law, 
then it is a legal obligation for the corporation, not a model of governance.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
and Policy’ in Rachel Murray and Charlotte Villiers (Eds.) Nina Boeger (ed), Perspectives on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2008); In Parker 35 
45 Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely 
Held Public Companies’ 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 
46 Parker 37 
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The labour-oriented model47 also fails because of the diversity of the workforce that 
naturally leads to the diversity in their claims. In most cases, this wide diversity will 
end in either a long process of reaching consensus or no consensus at all. Due to this 
flaw, Hansmann and Kraakman conclude that the labour-oriented model is very 
unlikely to be able to make an effective governing body and impairs the corporate 
decision-making process.48 According to these two authors, the State-oriented model 
has lost attraction due to the sudden collapse of the leading presenters of this model, 
for example communism and the poor performance of Asian economies.49 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman account for the superiority of the shareholder-value model 
further by asserting that the best way to protect investors’ interests is through having 
the right to control since, unlike other participants’ interests, it cannot be protected 
through contracts and regulations. At the same time, this control power will make 
them more motivated to maximize the value of the corporation, leading to more 
competitive advantages for the corporation.50 They supported their arguments by 
examples such as the success of corporations that have followed the shareholder-value 
model – mostly incorporated in Common Law jurisdictions – as compared with the 
failure of corporations incorporated in East Asian and Continental European countries 
and which followed their corporate governance model.51 
 
                                                
47 Jeremy Moon and Wayne Visser Andy Lockett, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Management 
Research: Focus, Nature, Salience, and Sources of Influence ’ 43 Journal of Management Studies 115 
48 Parker 38; Some commentators, of course, continue to see co-determination as a core element of a 
unique Northern European form of corporate governance; See Mark S. Schwartz and Archie B. Carroll, 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach’ 13 Business Ethics Quarterly 503 
49 Parker 40  
50 Ibid 45 
51 Ibid 47; See also Stone  
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On the contrary, others challenge this predominant view among economists as well as 
law and economics scholars and support a continued diversity in corporate 
governance.52 They argue there are multiple sets of efficient corporate governance 
institutions and each set is supported by different sets of underlying rules, various 
legal and non-legal norms and sanctions. Given that there are multiple efficient 
systems, there is no prima facie functionalist reason for convergence to occur. 53 
 
Cheffins and Bank also added taxes as the potential determinant of the ownership 
structure in big companies in the UK. They argues that profit, investment and 
inheritance taxes explain the reason why many block holders sought to exit resulting 
in disperse ownership.54 
 
Cheffins and Bank give a historical overview with clear analysis of the role of taxes in 
social corporate governance. The conclusions that taxes play an important role in the 
ownership structure are very convincing and merit policy considerations at ministries 
of finance around the world. Capital gains taxes as well as dividend taxes play a key 
role in explaining corporate ownership and control. The introduction or changes of the 
tax treatment of entrepreneurs and closely held companies may trigger a sell-off, 
provided there is a capital market facilitating the change of ownership.55  
 
Additionally, Cheffins argues that merger activity matters with respect to the US style 
of capitalism leading to the evolution of systems of ownership and control. According 
to him mergers in the US in the twentieth century were an agent for change for two 
                                                
52 Stone 114-115 
53Teubner 293 
54 Brian R. Cheffins Steven A. Bank, ‘Corporate Ownership and Control in the UK: The Tax 
Dimension’ 70 MLR 778 18 
55 Ibid 40 
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reasons. Firstly, investor sentiment meaning that mergers caused the demand for 
corporate equity to go higher since investors were optimistic about the future 
prospects of newly founded companies. Secondly, anti-trust laws meaning that 
because of many anti-trust laws, companies were advised against cartel like 
businesses and advised to move towards mergers. Also, there were efficiency 
considerations as a result of the mergers.56 
 
The UK experience confirms the US experience suggesting that that mergers are 
important since they affect the evolution of systems of ownership and control and “the 
manner in which anti-competitive behaviour is regulated influences the extent to 
which “transformative” merger activity takes place. The competitive advantages 
associated with operating on a large scale and the buoyancy of the stock market can 
influence the pace of corporate amalgamation” but in the UK neither factor had a 
major influence on the evolution of share ownership structures.57 
 
Moreover, the developments regarding the regulation of anti-competitive behavior in 
the UK also provide a strong support for the argument that these regulations 
influences changes in ownership structure through mergers. “During America’s great 
merger wave of 1897 to 1903, a legal bias against collusive arrangements seemingly 
acted as a catalyst for the amalgamations which provided a platform for the 
subsequent switch to dispersed ownership”. The pattern was repeated in the UK.58 
 
                                                
56 Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century’ 51 The American Journal of Comparative Law 473 480-485 
57 Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership and Control: The 
British Experience’ European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) University of Cambridge - 
Faculty of Law 11 
58 Ibid 51 
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In the UK CSR was regarded as marginal, eccentric and largely dismissed by both 
proponents and critics of corporate capitalism became respectable from the early 
1980s and is now firmly mainstream. “The rise of CSR can only be explained in the 
context of other major changes in society, the economy and political ideology. 
Among those changes are the increased criticism of the corporation, of course, CSR is 
reflective of much more profound changes. Indeed, the CSR phenomenon illustrates, 
and provides evidence for corporate political power. Every mention of corporate 
social responsibility is simultaneously an affirmation of market power and hence a 
recognition that perfectly competitive markets are an illusion”.59 Unless it is 
recognised that corporations have economic power, which can be translated into 
social and political power, then CSR is, by definition, nonsense. In a world of perfect 
markets CSR is impossible. 
 
2.2.4 Globalization of Capitalism 
 
Capitalism has been considered the root of the western economy in which big 
multinational corporations have prospered. This analysis of the globalization of 
capitalism will bring business enterprise back into the centre of comparative political 
economy and provide a deeper insight into the bone of contention in convergence 
theory debate. 
 
Political economy is “a terrain populated by multiple actors, each of whom seeks to 
advance its interests in rational ways in strategic interactions with others”, and 
corporations are seen as “actors seeking to develop and exploit core competencies and 
                                                
59 Stephen Wilks, The Political Power Of The Business Corporation (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 
2013) 197 
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dynamic capabilities understood as capacities for developing, producing and 
distributing goods and services profitably”.60 
 
The conventional view of globalization, which argues that globalization is forcing 
nations to converge towards the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, is 
built on three pillars: First, this view assumes that corporations are almost similar, in 
terms of basic structure and strategy, and almost similar across nations. Second, it 
links up corporations’ competitiveness with their labour costs, contending that many 
will move production abroad if they can find cheaper labour there. And, third, these 
structural similarities and production movements form a particular model of political 
economy inspired by globalization61 and predicting substantial deregulation. 
 
On the contrary, some scholars argue against the notion of convergence due to 
differences in social and economic national policies. Buhmann holds that the 
internationalization of trade and finance has not been as extensive or unexampled as is 
often believed and that the national governments are not as defenceless when faced 
with these developments as it seems. Many developing countries’ governments have 
simply used international institutions to enter the global market and used the excuse 
of global pressure to propel reforms that they desired.62 
 
For political economy, the principal issue raised by globalization concerns the 
stability of regulatory regimes and national institutions in the face of heightened 
                                                
60 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press 2001) 6 
61 Buhmann 55 
62 Ibid 56 
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competitive pressure.63 This seems to be an especially important problem in nations 
where the powers of the State are highly concentrated in the political executive or 
where the influence of producer groups inside political parties is very limited.64 
 
At the same time, corporations are tied to national politics due to the need of political 
settlements in order to reach social peace. Social peace is considered as the 
preliminary condition for productivity. The desired result of social peace is to reach to 
a social level in which managers, even without direct shareholder control, would take 
care of distant and minority shareholders. The ways to achieve this political 
settlement vary in different nations and this explains the variety in corporate 
governance structures all over the world.65  
 
 One of the most significant differences in corporate governance systems arising from 
differences in political systems is the degree to which ownership separates from 
control. When the world’s richest nations are lined up on a left-right political flow and 
then on a close-to-diffuse ownership structure, the two correlate powerfully.66 In other 
words, the left political continuum has concentrated ownership structures featuring 
weakly competitive markets, social democratic politics and significantly less 
managerial agency costs that makes diffuse ownership more costly for shareholders; 
the right political continuum has diffuse ownership structures matching fiercely 
competitive markets, conservative, almost laissez-faire, politics and high managerial 
agency costs.67 
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Another significant effect of politics on ownership structures is the fact that “it can 
determine who owns corporations, how big it can grow, what it can produce 
profitably, how it raises capital, who has the capital to invest, how managers or 
employees sees themselves and one another, and how authority is distributed inside 
the firm”.68 
 
Additionally, many analysts argue corporations’ various economic performances or 
policies derive more or less directly from differences in the formal organization of the 
political economy.69 The organization of a nation’s political economy is inextricably 
bound up with its history in two respects: on the one hand, it is created by statutory-
legal implementation means and their operating procedures; on the other, repeated 
historical experiences build up a set of common expectations that leads actors in 
certain directions in order to co-ordinate effectively with each other.70 An illustrating 
example is the fact that the relationship between profit and a company’s success in 
liberal market economies71 allows firms to access capital, resist takeovers and lay off 
labour steadily due to a flowing labour market. By contrast, in co-ordinated market 
economies’72 firms have access to capital independent of their current profit while 
lay-offs are difficult.73 A highly developed stock market indicates greater reliance on 
market models of co-ordination in the financial sphere, and high levels of 
employment protection tend to reflect higher levels of reliance on non-market co-
ordination.74 
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2.2.5 The Role of International Agencies 
 
International agencies are often considered as a way of placing mechanical rules and 
basic institutional infrastructure for promoting international corporations in a nation; 
but these initiatives might induce a strong political backlash if that nation’s 
underlying politics is not in line with those of international agencies. These 
differences will eventually lead to political instability and, over time, less productivity 
and less efficiency; hence, in order to implement changes, international agencies 
should focus on what can be changed and not to examine the political bedrock if 
changing it, at least in the short term, is impossible.75  
 
International agencies should focus on promoting effective co-ordination between 
corporations of a nation in five aspects: 
 
1. Bargaining wages and working conditions with the work force.  
2. Securing workforce should be co-ordinated with suitable skills.  
3. Accessing finance and assuring investors of returns on their investments.  
4. Methods of promoting effective co-ordination between firms and stakeholders 
especially suppliers and clients in order to secure economic stability through 
securing demand for companies’ products.  
5. Promoting effective co-ordination between actors within corporations in order 
to achieve the objectives of the firm. 76 
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Moreover, bringing change often requires the co-operation of those parties who 
control the corporation. And the fact that a change would be efficient would not 
ensure that controlling parties would always want it to occur. The controlling parties 
might prevent an efficient change if it reduces their private benefits. In other words, 
while a change might be efficient, if the controller does not capture the efficient 
change gains, that is unless the potential efficiency gains are substantially large, 
structures in place might persist.77 
 
Similarly, if the possible efficiency and welfare gain brought about by changing an 
institutional arrangement is not sufficient to compensate the costs of adjustment, 
“society” might rationally retain the seemingly inefficient institutions.78 A firm that 
can produce competitive products that can be sold can go on even with an outdated 
governance structure.79 At the same time, global capital markets cannot generally be 
relied on to put managers under pressure to move to the most efficient ownership 
structure. “Many established companies do not use capital markets for funds, but 
rather finance themselves from retained earnings. When firms do not rely on external 
finance, their managers and controllers will not be constrained by capital markets”.80 
 
Additionally, factors other than corporate law need to be taken into consideration 
since “corporate law is not just the ‘the-law-on-the-book’ alone, but is ‘law-on-the-
book’ plus the quality of the regulators and judges, the efficiency, accuracy, and 
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honesty of the regulators and the judiciary, the capacity of the stock exchanges to 
manage the most egregious diversions, and so on”.81 
 
Similarly, the ‘rules-on-the-books’ could be very much the same in two nations but 
the quality of enforcement (because of a corrupt, incompetent or inefficient judiciary 
or regulatory system) might make corporate governance systems differ greatly. A 
flawed corporate law might work well in a system where contractual understanding 
and business practices counteract.82 In other words, low-quality law might in some 
nations be a symptom of weak preparation for big corporations but not its base-line 
cause.83 
 
2.2.6 The Role of the Law 
 
Law can create or destroy formal arrangements so law is not irrelevant, but it is a 
second-order phenomenon. Other institutions primarily control the economic 
conditions of a country, including business conditions, incentives, professionalism, 
capital structure, and product and managerial labour market competition.84 These 
institutions are the primary control, with the law just assisting or impeding.  
 
According to Cheffins, however, one should recognize that even if corporate law does 
not have an important influence a country’s corporate governance arrangements, other 
aspects of law could be relevant. For example, in the US and the UK being listed in 
the stock market might have been one of the reasons that the widely held company 
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became the dominant business form. Stock exchange listing rules work as a binding 
contractual arrangement between the stock exchange and the company whose 
securities are being listed with clear legal implications.85 
 
The primary source of the standard for commercial conduct is not legal rules, but 
extant social norms enforced by various non-legal sanctions.86 What counts are not 
just general principles, but also all the particular rules implementing them; not just 
substantive rules, but also procedural rules, judicial practices, institutional and 
procedural infrastructure and regulators’ enforcement capabilities. The concern is the 
corporate rules system “in action” rather than “rules-on-the-books”.87 The relatively 
worse performance of “rules-on-the-books” and structures might lead to their 
replacement only if decision-makers recognized that the rules and structures were 
indeed inefficient. Identifying which rules and structures are inefficient might be 
difficult not only for researchers but also for actual decision-makers.88 
 
Existing legal rules might also have an efficiency advantage because institutions and 
structures might have already developed certain solutions to address needs and 
problem arising under these rules. In such a case, replacing the existing rules might 
make the existing institutional and professional infrastructure obsolete or ill-fitting. 
Replacing these rules would require new investments and adaptation to the new rules 
by different actors.89 
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Moreover, legal rules are often the product of political processes combining public 
features and the interests of powerful economic-political groups. To the extent that 
interest groups play a role, each interest group will push for rules that favour it.90 
Control over corporate resources provides political power; therefore, the set of rules 
that might be easier to pass are those that would not directly lower those groups’ 
interests91, but instead simply allow transactional changes.92 
 
Kenneth Dam also explores what problems economic transactions had to overcome to 
become viable and whether legal rules developed from common law traditions are as 
good as or better than legal rules developed from civil law traditions. The empirical 
setting for this second issue is sometimes framed as a chicken or egg question – must 
you have the legal framework in order to consummate the transaction or must you 
develop the economic framework before the legal framework? The answer is often an 
iterative process in which some transactions require the pre-existence of a legal 
framework in order for those transactions to be possible. Hedge funds, mortgage-
backed securities and many other staples of modern financial transactions rest on a 
foundation of legally created (usually by statute) intangible rights that are enforceable 
by a court system. Nevertheless, it is clear that, historically, economic transactions 
preceded laws defining economic rights. 93 
 
Dam further emphasizes that the fact that the businessmen entre into transaction 
without an enforceable legal system which allows easy cheating is because the 
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businessmen trust each other enough to enter into these transactions relies on the 
game theory experiments that show that players in a repetitive game (or set of 
transactions) generally find that cooperation produces more reliable and higher 
rewards than cheating. As Dam pointed out trust is the key element that makes market 
transactions possible, “but [the trust elements of transactions] are not commodities for 
which trade on the open market is technically possible or even meaningful.” He 
correctly argues, “If everything must be treated in a book, nothing can be.” 94 
 
Dam also noted that social understandings could be a barrier to adoption of western 
legal systems by traditional societies. He maintains that the theme that adoption of 
modern legal rules may not only not work, but may create problems that make the 
population worse off. He suggested that legal reform, as practiced by industrial 
technical assistance programs, should be careful not to create harm by 
“modernization.” He further emphasizes that the development of modern transaction 
relationships took a long3 time to form and we should not expect commercial 
development in transitional economies to be quick or easily achievable. 95 
 
From a legal perspective, the question of convergence becomes an interesting one. 
Debates about legal convergence are concerned with what mechanisms actually bring 
about convergence and the possibility that the content of legal rules adapt to changed 
economic circumstances.96 
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Soskice97 argues that bad and inefficient corporate law indirectly brings about 
economic losses in several forms. First, the prospect that managers might misuse their 
power leads to investors demanding a higher return as a security to their investment. 
As a result, investors choose corporations that are potentially able to generate this 
additional return. This practically means an increase in agency costs, which in turn 
increases capital cost. This situation might lead to the loss of some investment 
opportunities. 
 
Another effect of bad corporate law, according to Soskice, is the fact that managerial 
efforts that should be spent on the business and socially productive purposes are 
instead diverted towards giving extra security to investors. This is because managers 
have problems raising capital since investors consider investing as high risk due to the 
fear of managerial expropriations. 
 
Moreover, the fear of the need for careful, constant monitoring of managers and 
problems in raising capital prevents corporations from achieving optimal size. 
Corporations remain rather small. Only with small corporations can shareholders get 
enough information to make sure that they are not the victim of managerial 
expropriation.98 
 
2.3 What is CSR? 
 
Finding a definition for CSR is not just a matter of researchers trying to add 
conceptual precision. Defining CSR and its material scope is of utmost importance 
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because different definitions represent different interests with different substantive 
concerns. 
 
Horrigan has argued that CSR definition is “standpoint-dependent, context-sensitive 
and multi-textured”.99 It differs from one jurisdiction to another, from developed 
economies to developing economies and from the government’s point of view to 
society’s point of view.100 
 
CSR began to take form in the 1950s. Murphy101 has recognized four periods in which 
CSR evolved. First (up to the 1950s) was the “philanthropic” period in which CSR 
meant occasional charity work by corporations. Second (1953-67) was an 
“awareness” period in which social obligations of corporations were specifically 
recognized as CSR. Third (1968-73) was the “issue” period in which corporations 
focused more on specific issues, such as the environment and discrimination. And 
fourth (1974- till now) has been a “responsive” period in which corporations have 
taken serious management and organizational action to fulfil their social obligations 
and address CSR issues.  
 
Despite the widespread discussion of CSR, one of the most controversial issues in 
CSR debates is its definition. For a concept that has been discussed for so long, it is 
strange that researchers still do not share a common definition or set of core 
principles. It has become increasingly difficult to determine what the definition of 
CSR is and what constitutes socially responsible behaviour. Some still even doubt 
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corporations should have social responsibilities in the first place. Similarly, empirical 
researchers have been unable to agree on the answer to the one question that has 
dominated CSR research probably more than any other over the past 30 years: 
whether CSR is good for business or not. 
 
The problem with this lack of agreement and consistency in defining CSR and its 
material scope makes evaluating and comparing the findings from different studies 
very difficult.102 Moreover, not having a particular definition for CSR has a rather 
significant effect in practice. In practice, managers need to have a proper definition to 
know what is expected from them and what the limits of CSR are otherwise they will 
not be able to answer to the calls for socially responsible behaviour. However, some 
have argued that the lack of a universal definition of CSR in itself should not 
necessarily be seen as a weakness for a field that is still in a state of emergence.103 
This situation allows managers to use different strategies to cover different aspects of 
CSR. 
 
Lockett et al from their study of CSR literature over a ten-year period concluded that: 
 
 “CSR knowledge could best be described as in a continuing state of 
emergence. While the field appears well-established … it is not characterized 
by the domination of particular theoretical approach, assumption and method.”  
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They suggested CSR is “a field without a paradigm“.104 It has been similarly argued 
that CSR would be better defined if it were seen as a process rather than as a set of 
outcomes.105  
 
The main issue about defining CSR seems to be: “what responsibilities to society may 
businessmen reasonably be expected to assume?”106 There seems to be agreement on 
considering CSR as voluntary actions that businesses can take above compliance with 
minimum legal requirements to address both its own competitive interests and the 
wider interests of society. 
 
McWilliams and Siegel have argued that the most important feature of CSR is going 
beyond what law requires. They defined CSR as “actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the corporation and that which is required by law. 
CSR means going beyond obeying the law”.107 
 
CSR is a sensitive concept; a term that draws attention to a complex range of issues 
and elements that are all related to the position and function of the business enterprise 
in contemporary society. On the one hand, it focuses on how issues are internally and 
externally organized; on the other hand, it addresses the growing importance and 
influence of social issues.  
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Hayek sees the term “social” as unacceptably open-ended to be considered a 
responsibility. He argues that there is a wide range of issues which might be 
considered as socially responsible behaviour, involving political, charitable and 
educational issues.108 
 
In response, McBarnet argued that “CSR is not philanthropy, contributing gifts from 
profits, but involves the exercise of social responsibility in how profits are made”.109 
Corporations engage in CSR initiatives in order to be trusted within a society. Howard 
Bowen, often regarded as the father of CSR, defined the social responsibilities of 
“businessmen” as their obligations to “pursue those policies, to make those decisions, 
or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and 
values of our society”.110  
 
Some authors contend that CSR is not about how corporations spend their money and 
the pursuit of profitable business is not a non-socially-responsible thing in its own 
right. CSR sometimes even means making more profit; it is just a matter of long-term 
profit versus short-term profit. The emphasis of CSR is on how this money is made.  
Hu Li sees the beauty of CSR “in that it recognizes that changes in corporate 
governance and behaviour must be driven by re-conceptualizing self-interest in the 
marketplace in the light of the many social and environmental risks threatening 
sustainable profitability”.111  
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The challenge is to incorporate social expectations into internal actions while at the 
same time using the capabilities and capacities of the organisation to contribute to the 
traditional business role that is profit maximisation. Jonker suggests calling CSR the 
“interface management”. He argues that “in pursuing such interface management an 
organisation not only produces private goods but also public goods. Public goods can 
be defined as the development of social, natural or intellectual capital which results 
in, for instance, a healthier, safer and more prosperous environment”.112 
 
McBarnet sees CSR as a change in corporation policies. Before, the focus was on 
profit maximization for shareholders but now it involves some responsibilities toward 
a broader range of stakeholders, such as protection of the environment, and 
accountability on ethical obligations. It is a shift from “a bottom line” to “triple 
bottom lines”, in other words, a change from “profits” to “people, planet and profits”, 
or indeed to “profits and principles”.  
 
Some authors have brought up the issue of “motive” in defining what constitutes 
socially responsible behaviour and whether it is necessary to have a genuine social 
motive, or whether a disguised business strategy designed to increase underlying 
profit would suffice. Dunfee argued that the answer to the issue of “motive” depends 
on the normative definition used. A duty-based approach holds that the intention 
underlying a particular action will be worthwhile if the motive behind it is that 
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intention. By contrast, a utilitarian approach holds that if the outcomes are the same, 
the acts count equally.113  
 
In some contexts, “corporate social responsibility” is sometimes used interchangeably 
with terms such as “corporate citizenship”, “responsible business”, “corporate 
sustainability”, and “triple bottom line” responsibility. Sustainability expert John 
Elkington famously described a “triple bottom line” as combining “economic 
prosperity”, “environmental quality” and “social justice” in corporate strategies. 
Horrigan defined a sustainable corporation as “one that creates profit for its 
shareholders while protecting the environment and improving the lives of those with 
whom it interacts [and] operates so that its business interests and the interests of the 
environment and society intersect.”114 
 
While emphasizing the importance of sustainable corporations in today’s world’s 
intense global competition, Carroll argues that the business case for CSR will always 
be at the centre of attention since “CSR can be sustainable only so long as it continues 
to add value to corporate success”. 115 
 
Carroll offers that “the social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, 
legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a 
given point in time”. He categorized CSR into four layers in his famous "Pyramid of 
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Corporate Social Responsibility": first, the required economic function of making 
profit; second, the legal requirement of obeying the law; third, the expected ethical 
behaviour and fourth, desired philanthropic actions.116 Jones recognizes three aspects 
for implementing CSR policies according to Carroll’s "Pyramid of Corporate Social 
Responsibility": first, the “principles” aspect of recognizing social responsibilities; 
second, the “processes” aspect of responding to social issues; and third, the “policies” 
aspect of addressing those social issues. 117 
 
Johnson has argued that a socially responsible corporation is one whose managers 
balance a variety of interests, that is, “instead of striving only for larger profits for its 
shareholders, a responsible enterprise also takes into account employees, suppliers, 
dealers, local communities and the nation”.118 
 
Perhaps one of the best definitions of CSR that includes what is expected from 
corporations in terms of policies is the one by Hu Li. He argued that: 
 
 “CSR refers to a way of doing business whereby enterprises try to find a state 
of equilibrium between the need to achieve financial and developmental 
objectives and the social and environmental impact of their activities. It is a 
mode corporations use to achieve commercial success in ways that also 
honour the ethical, legal, as well as environmental and other societal 
expectations. It considers a corporation not just a self-centered profit-making 
entity, but also an integral part of the economy, society and environment in 
which corporations exist”.119 
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2.4 CSR Theories 
 
Scholars have categorized CSR theories in different ways: 
 
Klonoski120 distinguishes three different types of CSR theories. The first is 
“fundamentalism”, arguing that the only social responsibility of business is increasing 
profit; the second type of theories are those that defend the corporation’s moral 
identity; a third group consists of theories that consider the social dimension of 
corporations as a particularly relevant matter. 
 
Windsor121 identifies three key approaches to CSR. First is the “ethical approach”. 
According to this approach, corporations should exert strong self-restraint. Second is 
the “economic approach”, which maintains that the main objective of corporations is 
wealth maximization and it is only subject to minimalist public policy and customary 
business ethic. Third is the “political approach”, which considers corporations as 
citizens that have exactly the same rights and responsibilities as the latter. 
 
Mele122 suggests that the most complete of the contemporary mainstream theories of 
CSR are: A) Corporate Social Performance. This theory is grounded in sociology. B) 
Shareholder Value Theory or Fiduciary Capitalism. This theory is grounded in 
economic theories. C) Stakeholder Value Theory. This theory has an ethical approach. 
D) Corporate Citizenship. This theory is rooted in political theories. 
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The answer as to what is the best theory is not easy. As some strengths and 
weaknesses of each theory will be enumerated, and arguments in favour of and 
against each one will be demonstrated, one should bear in mind that: “A good 
normative theory needs a good philosophical foundation, which has to include a 
correct view of human nature, business and society, and the relationship between 
business and society. In future one may hope for further philosophical developments 
in order to reach a more convincing normative theory of business and society 
relations”.123 
 
2.4.1 Corporate Social Performance 
 
This theory maintains that corporations have responsibilities for helping to solve 
social problems created by corporations in general or by other causes, apart from 
wealth creation and beyond its legal responsibilities.  
 
The advocates of this theory stress that corporations have power and with power 
comes responsibility. They also emphasize that society gives permission to 
corporations to operate. Consequently, corporations must serve society by creating 
wealth, contributing to social values and satisfying social expectations. In other 
words, improving corporate social performance “means altering corporate behaviour 
to produce less harm and more beneficial outcomes for society and their people”.124 
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Davis further explains “the power-responsibility equation”. He states that “social 
responsibility of businessmen arises from the amount of social power they have”, an 
“equation” which goes along with the “iron law of responsibility”. This law 
emphasizes that “those who do not take responsibility for their power shall ultimately 
lose”.125 
 
At the core of this approach lies the idea that business and society are two interwoven 
systems; therefore, since corporations exist and operate in a shared environment, they 
should be socially responsible like any other member of that environment. A 
corporation would risk its reputation if its performance were contrary to the 
expectations of those people who constitute the corporation’s social environment.126  
 
2.4.2 Shareholder Value Theory 
 
Shareholder Value Theory or Fiduciary Capitalism strongly argues that the only social 
responsibility of business is making profits and its supreme goal is to increase the 
economic value of the corporation for its shareholders. Other social activities that 
companies could engage in would only be acceptable if they are prescribed by law or 
if they contribute to the maximization of shareholder value.127  
 
Milton Friedman is the paramount representative of this view. He wrote: “there is one 
and only one social responsibility of business – to use resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the 
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game, which is to say, engages in open and free competitions, without deception or 
fraud”.128 He also considered the businessmen who are promoting "social conscience" 
for business as “preaching pure and unadulterated socialism” and accused them of 
undermining the basis of a free society.129  
 
In order to support his claim, Friedman questioned the conceptual basis of CSR and 
maintained that taking CSR initiatives equals imposing extra tax on shareholders 
since they have already paid tax as citizens under the tax regulations of the 
government; therefore, CSR initiatives are a sort of double taxation. Moreover, a 
manager who is either directly or indirectly chosen by shareholders is imposing this 
CSR tax and decides how this money should be spent. In other words, this private 
employee is functioning as a public employee, legislator and an executive who should 
be chosen through a democratic political process. He wrote: “this process raises 
political questions on two levels: principle and consequences. On the level of political 
principle, the imposition of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds are 
governmental functions. We have established elaborate constitutional, parliamentary 
and judicial provisions to control these functions, to assure that taxes are imposed so 
far as possible in accordance with the preferences and desires of the public”130, 
concluding that doctrine of social responsibility is preaching the socialist view that 
“political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the appropriate way to determine 
the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses”.131 
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Friedman drew a line between business as a whole and corporations, believing that it 
makes no sense to say business as a whole has any responsibility but since 
corporations are artificial persons, they can have artificial responsibility within the 
scope of law, ethical custom and the will of its shareholders. He wrote: “in a free-
enterprise and private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the 
owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires”.132 
 
On the contrary, Stout claimed that academics created the shareholder value theory 
based on a mistaken belief that shareholders are the firm’s owners. Stout argued that 
corporations own themselves because corporations, through their managers, decide 
how to allocate profits. She rejected the notion that shareholders are a corporation’s 
residual claimants. Because, according to Stout, shareholders have no more of a 
readily exercisable claim to the firm’s assets than any other corporate constituent, 
their interests should not be pursued above all others when determining what is best 
for the corporation. The corporation’s interests may include a broader range of 
outcomes than simply shareholder wealth maximization.133  
 
Stout further argues that there is nothing in the law that supports the idea that 
shareholders should be the only constituency that matters. She stated that “the reason 
[for corporate underperformance] can be traced not to flawed individuals (greedy 
CEOs, out-of-touch directors) but to a flawed idea — the idea that corporations are 
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run well when they are run to maximize ‘shareholder value’ as measured by stock 
price.”134 
 
Many sceptics of CSR and some economists135 share Friedman’s perspective. They 
argue that the market, not the managers, should allocate resources and returns. They 
are also concerned that acceptance of CSR by corporations may put market-effective 
functioning at risk of losing its effectiveness. They consider the market superior to 
corporations in the efficient allocation of resources, whereas if allocation of resources 
is left to managers, they may lead companies in favour of their own interests instead 
of shareholder interests.  
 
Friedman’s perspective was shaped on utilitarian and accountability approaches. His 
utilitarian approach is that political representatives and public officials are trained for 
and experienced in addressing public policy issues, whereas business managers are 
trained for and experienced in managing business organizations. His accountability 
approach is grounded is his presumption that business managers’ prime responsibility 
should be to company shareholders, who generally expect profits, while “in 
democratic systems the accountability of the government officials to the electorate is 
secured through elected political representatives”.136 
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Husted and Salazar take Friedman’s argument to another level by arguing that CSR 
should be seen as a wealth transfer from the shareholders to society.137 Further, as 
they and McWilliams and Siegel view it, corporations that provide CSR will likely 
have higher costs, putting them at competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis corporations 
that eschew such expenditure.138 Both pairs of authors come up with similar solutions. 
McWilliams and Siegel advocate that “(t)o maximize profit, the firm should offer 
precisely that level of CSR for which the increased revenue (from increased demand) 
equals the higher cost (of using resources to provide CSR)”. Husted and Salazar 
advocate that “firms provide CSR resources up to the point that the social curve 
intersects the social benefit curve”.139   
 
Dunfee believes that Friedman’s argument against social responsibility is strange. He 
argues: “if this is all illegal or inappropriate activity, then the relevant authorities must 
be asleep at the switch. So a better way to view the Friedman argument is that they 
are just that, arguments about a way they would prefer to see the world structured. But 
that is not the world that we live in. Nor is it likely a world that most citizens would 
prefer to live in. True, there are some agency abuses by executives, and yes, much 
philanthropy is incoherent and unfocused. But that does not mean that society would 
prefer that all firms cancel their programs of social investment”.140 But what Dunfee 
fails to explain is that Friedman gave his view of the world we live in, but Dunfee 
only refuses Friedman’s outlook without suggesting any other views. At the same 
time, Friedman accounted for “justifying” CSR initiatives by profit-making goals or 
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the law. He did not call for “cancellation” of all CSR programmes as Dunfee 
presumed.141  
 
Theodor Levitt, who was the editor of the Harvard Business Review, considered 
corporate social responsibilities a danger. He argued that “corporate welfare makes 
good sense if it makes good economic sense – and not infrequently it does. But if 
something does not make economic sense, sentiment or idealism ought not to let it in 
the door”.142 He quoted Frank O. Prior, the then Chairman of Standard Oil Company 
(Indiana), who said that “Good human relations makes sense only when it rests on a 
foundation of economic good sense and not just on sentiment. Sentiment has a 
tendency to evaporate whenever the heat is on. Economic good sense is durable”.143 
Levitt continued by arguing that the reason behind this style of corporate governance 
and even capitalism is the separation of power. He goes to the extreme by arguing: 
 
“Welfare and society are not the corporation’s business. It is business making 
money, not sweet music. The same goes for unions. Their business is “bread 
and butter” and job rights. In a free enterprise system, welfare is supposed to 
be automatic; and where it is not, it becomes the government’s job. This is the 
concept of pluralism. The government’s job is not business and business’s job 
is not government. And unless these functions are resolutely separated in all 
respects, they are eventually combined in every aspect. In the end the danger 
is not that the government will run business, or business will run the 
government, but rather that the two of them will coalesce, as we saw, into a 
single power, unopposed and unopposable”.144  
 
He further holds that social responsibility means having sentiments as a motive in 
business and will mislead the role of business while profit-maximization will mislead 
the role of the government. In the end, he recognizes two responsibilities for business: 
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first, to obey the elementary canons of everyday face-to-face civility (honesty, good 
faith, and so on) and second, to seek profit. 145 
 
Advocates of shareholder value theory further supported their point of view by the 
following arguments:  
 
1. Business is considered as a private and autonomous activity only restricted by the 
regulations of the government. Private property is crucial, since it is considered the 
best guarantee of individual rights and owners are legally entitled to the (residual) 
fruits of their financial investment and any other use is unjust. “One could argue that 
shareholders achieve primacy through the moral force of their property rights, the 
contribution of their equity capital, and the risks that investment can mean for their 
personal wealth”.146 Furthermore, stakeholders often purchase shares of a 
corporation’s stock to enjoy the same rights and ownership privileges. This point of 
view has been challenged by some scholars who have argued against the notion of 
applying private property rule to corporations. Deakins argued that “if we take the 
company to be the fictive legal entity which is brought into being through the act of 
incorporation, it is not clear in what sense such a thing could be ‘owned’ by anyone. 
Nor does the ownership of a share entitle its holder to a particular segment or portion 
of the company’s assets, at least while it is a going concern”.147 
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2. Some of the proponents of shareholder value theory base their arguments on 
efficiency grounds, suggesting that shareholder value theory creates the best 
environment for the creation of wealth and is the basis for economic growth. Profit 
maximization as the primary objective of the corporation acts as an incentive for 
businesses to create the goods and services demanded by consumers. Asking 
managers to deal with social concerns will either distract them from their main task or 
requires them to take decisions on an issue about which they do not have any 
knowledge or experience. Directors as entrepreneurs are experienced in business 
matters, not in balancing social interests.148 The negative social impacts of business 
can be avoided through appropriate laws and government actions, along with private 
charity. 
 
3. Shareholder value theory allows corporations to be accountable to their owners. It has 
been argued that according to other theories managers are not ultimately answerable 
to any particular group of persons, while in shareholder value theory they are 
accountable to shareholders since this clear accountability also provides for an 
efficient monitoring system.149 
 
4. By creating wealth, businesses meet other social objectives, for example: providing 
employment and producing goods, enhancing competition and therefore bringing 
higher quality goods and lower prices.150 
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In sum, it has been argued that social concerns affect the business decision-making 
process in three ways: first, managers might decide to get involved in social values in 
hope of better economic gain; second, regulations and auditing, and third, consumer 
choices.151 But the current findings152 suggest that first, the bigger the corporation is 
and the more the executive pay is, the less attention their board of director pays to 
socially responsible activities. Second, in a capitalist system while regulations can 
affect the corporations’ decisions, significant decisions are fully at the discretion of 
the corporation itself. This means that governments still lack the public legitimacy to 
more strictly influence the decision-making process within corporations. Moreover, 
corporate lobbying influences the government itself. Similarly, governments do not 
have enough information to act on time in order to hold corporations accountable. The 
regulation process is costly and time-consuming. Additionally, more regulation leads 
to the public sector trying to monitor, and the private sector trying to find loopholes to 
escape the regulations. Third, the motivation of consumer choice is not convincing153 
since it is not clear enough why one would prefer more socially responsible products, 
taking into account the fact that they are usually more expensive than the normal 
products. Even with similar pricing, the question remains the same. If consumers are 
not well informed and sufficient advertising has not been done, it is highly 
improbable that a consumer would even notice this difference. “As many have shown, 
free-market capitalism was never intended to represent the public will; it was intended 
to describe how to make a return on financial investment”.154 
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Some scholars went so far as arguing there is no longer any serious competitor to the 
view that corporate law should principally try to increase shareholder value.155 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman contended that the five basic characteristics156 of 
corporations strongly feature shareholder value theory. These characteristics are not 
directly concerned with the interests of other participants in the firm, such as 
employees, creditors, other suppliers, customers or society at large. These 
stakeholders should have protected their interests by contractual and regulatory means 
rather than through participation in corporate governance.157  
 
They further argue that: 
 
 “The primacy of shareholder interests in corporate law does not imply that the 
interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go unprotected. It merely 
indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanism for protecting the interests 
of non-shareholder constituencies – or at least all constituencies other than 
creditors – lie outside of corporate law”.158 
 
On the contrary, Mele argued that the limitations imposed on business by the law 
have very limited and even sometimes-imperfect influences. It is neither possible nor 
convenient to regulate everything in business life. Furthermore, laws generally come 
after some undesirable impact occurs. Moreover, loopholes can easily be found in the 
law and many regulations strangle business creativity and entrepreneurial initiatives. 
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In addition, a strong interventionism with laws, rules and other governmental actions 
is opposed to a minimalist regulation of markets, also required for strong free 
competition”. 159 
 
Kuhn and Deetz argued that the current picture of corporations in the human mind is 
due to the “communicative picture of a particular vision of reality that dominant 
powers depict as legitimate and reproduce across space and time”.160 That is, as time 
goes by, the historical patterns that a social phenomena has gone through to take its 
current form and how a certain practice has been portrayed as a response to these 
social needs will be forgotten and the phenomena will be considered natural; 
therefore, one can argue that the problem truly lies within the assumed nature of the 
corporation. Clemens and Cook define institutions as “models, schemas, or scripts for 
behaviour. “Consequently, institutions endure because these models become “taken 
for granted” through repeated use and interaction or they become “legitimate” through 
the “endorsement of some authoritative or powerful individual or organization”.161 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the corporate goal of profit maximization would make a 
good example. As it has been argued, this goal “was originally an assumption 
introduced by economic theories of the firm to explain the firm’s behaviour, but – as 
an unintended consequence – it has gradually become a normative goal of corporate 
governance so firmly entrenched that we rarely think otherwise”.162 Indeed, this 
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process that the modern market has gone through “makes it difficult to see firms and 
their “imperatives” as anything but natural and normal elements of the social scene 
and, in turn, to see their social influence as legitimate”.163  
 
2.4.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Stakeholder theory draws on the definition of “stakeholder”. One might mistakenly 
assume that after all these years there is fundamental agreement regarding such a 
critical term and concept. In fact, it appears that there is more consensus on the 
definition of CSR compared with the one for stakeholders. All definitions explicitly or 
implicitly suggest that the stakeholder has some interest in the corporation’s decisions 
in a way that the corporation can have an effect, positive or negative, on the 
stakeholder.  
 
Stakeholder theory was first presented as a managerial theory. For the purpose of this 
thesis, a stakeholder is one who has an interest in the enterprise and who is at risk if it 
fails. It might consist of an employee, a creditor, suppliers and a community that are 
all in a position where they have a stake in the enterprise’s sustainability.164 
 
Stakeholders can be taken in two senses: in a narrow sense, the term stakeholder 
includes those groups who are vital to the survival and success of the corporation; in a 
wider sense this includes any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
corporation.165 
 
                                                
163 Deetz 178 
164 Deakin 12 
165 Mele 64  
 63 
Stakeholder theory aims at broader accountability for corporations. It maintains that 
no group that has contributed to corporate success should remain unrecognized. The 
advocates of this theory argue that shareholders are but one of many stakeholders and 
contend that employees and other constituencies’ interests should be considered in the 
corporate decision-making process.166 The success of a corporation depends on 
stakeholders as much or even more than it does on shareholders.167 Jensen doubts the 
practicality of stakeholder theory since the advocates of this theory do not specify 
how managers should handle the competing interests of different stakeholder groups. 
Managers are left with a theory “that makes it impossible to make purposeful 
decisions” and keep score of managers’ decisions. This will make managers 
“unaccountable for their actions”.168 
 
Similarly, Jensen famously argued that it is impossible for managers to seek to 
maximize more than one meaningful objective. This objective is long-term value 
maximization or value-seeking. Jensen then connects this principle to stakeholder 
theory through what he calls Enlightened Stakeholder Theory. Jensen states: 
“(E)nlightened stakeholder theory adds the simple specification that the objective 
function of the firm is to maximize total long-term firm value”.169 While enlightened 
stakeholder theory appears to utilize the structure of stakeholder theory, it also 
“accepts the maximization of long-term value of the firm as a criterion for making the 
requisite trade-off among its stakeholders”.170 
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When talking about stakeholders, the first thing that comes to the surface is the 
question of legitimacy; that is, why the managerial team in a corporation needs to 
include stakeholders in their decision-making. In answer to this question, it is argued 
that stakeholders, if not included, will be subject to opportunistic exploitation by the 
corporation and its shareholders. Moreover, running a successful corporation involves 
balancing the multiple claims among which conflicting stakeholders’ interests is an 
important one. If stakeholders feel insecure, they will ask for more return as a 
guarantee for investments or services. This situation will lead to an increase in 
capital-raising costs which, since most corporations cannot ensure that they make this 
surplus profit, will lead to less investment and less opportunities for the 
corporation.171  
 
Evan and Freeman base the legitimacy of the stakeholder theory on two ethical 
principles: “Principle of Corporate Rights” and “Principle of Corporate Effects”. Both 
principles are based on Kant’s motto of Respect for Persons172. The “Principle of 
Corporate Rights” holds that “the corporation and its managers may not violate the 
legitimate rights of others to determine their future”. The “Principle of Corporate 
Effects” focuses on taking responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions, 
holding that “the corporation and its managers are responsible for the effects of their 
actions on others”. 173 
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Stakeholder theory seems ethically superior to maximizing shareholder value because 
it implies that managerial duties are wider than just their fiduciary duties to 
shareholders. It takes into consideration stakeholder rights and their legitimate 
interests beyond what is strictly required by law in manager-stakeholder relations. 
This theory, at least in its original formulation, is more respectful of human dignity 
and rights.174 
 
Another positive point of stakeholder theory is that it fills in the conceptual gap and 
obscurity of current CSR theories by addressing concrete interests and practices and 
demonstrating specific responsibilities towards specific groups of people affected by 
business activity. Therefore, it is not a mere ethical theory disconnected from business 
management, but a managerial theory related to business success.175 
 
In the same fashion the UK law in Hutton v West Cork Railway emphasize that the 
value of the judgment today lies in the general doctrine that during the life of the 
company, it may conduct itself in a way which benefits stakeholders other than 
shareholders, but only insofar as that will in the end, albeit indirectly, be in the 
shareholders' interest. 176 
 
The facts of the case were that a railway company which had no provision in its 
articles for paying remuneration to directors, and had never paid any, sold its 
undertaking to another company at a price to be determined by an arbitrator. By the 
Act authorizing the transfer it was provided that on the completion of the transfer the 
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company should be dissolved except for the purpose of regulating their internal affairs 
and winding up the same and of dividing the purchase-money. The purchase-money 
was to be applied in paying the costs of the arbitration and in paying off any revenue 
debts or charges of the company, and the residue was to be divided among the 
debenture holders and shareholders. After the completion of the transfer a general 
meeting of the company was held at which a resolution was passed to apply £1050 of 
the purchase-money in compensating the paid officials of the company for their loss 
of employment, although they had no legal claim for any compensation, and £1500 in 
remuneration to the directors for their past services.177 
 
Cotton LJ and Brown LJ held that the money payment was invalid. In the course of 
his dicta, Bowen LJ held that there is “…a kind of charitable dealing which is for the 
interest of those who practise it, and to that extent and in that garb (I admit not a very 
philanthropic garb) charity may sit at the board, but for no other purpose.” 
So according to Bowen LJ, directors can only spend, “money which is not theirs but 
the company’s, if they are spending it for the purposes which are reasonably 
incidental to the carrying on of the business of the company. That is the general 
doctrine. Bona fides cannot be the sole test, otherwise you might have a lunatic 
conducting the affairs of the company, and paying away its money with both hands in 
a manner perfectly bona fide yet perfectly irrational… It is for the directors to judge, 
provided it is a matter which is reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the 
business of the company… The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, 
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but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the 
company.”178 
 
The upshot for a company in insolvency was that directors were not free to make 
payments to employees, because payments could only be made which were incidental 
to the business, and an insolvent business had no further business. In English law, the 
position has been altered by the Insolvency Act 1986, s.187 and the Companies Act 
2006, s.247, which allow directors to consider employees directly when a company 
has gone insolvent.179 
 
The case's practical significance was limited by cases and statute as in Re Horsley & 
Weight Ltd where the Court of Appeal held that a company's substantive object may 
include making gifts, and under CA 2006 section 172 which entitles and obliges 
directors to regard interests other than shareholders as a proper exercise of their 
power.180 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman have criticized the practicality and proper functioning of 
stakeholder theory. They recognize two models of stakeholder participation: first, a 
“fiduciary” model where the board of directors functions as a neutral co-ordinator of 
the contributions and returns of all stakeholders in the corporation. They argue that 
this type is just a reformulation of the manager-oriented model, and suffers from the 
same weaknesses.  
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Second, a “representative” model of the corporation where two or more stakeholder 
constituencies appoint representatives to the board of directors.181 According to 
Hansmann and Kraakman, this type also closely resembles labour-oriented model and 
is subject to the same weaknesses. “The mandatory inclusion of any set of stakeholder 
representatives on the board is likely to impair the corporate decision-making process 
with costly consequences that outweigh any gains to the groups that obtain 
representation”.182  
 
2.4.4	  The	  Agency	  Theory	  
 
This theory assumes that the predominant underlying assumption for understanding 
the governance framework of publicly traded corporations is that managers will 
operate with self-serving motivations; this stems from agency theory, which is 
derived from economics.  
 
Friedman, who originally framed the issue of socially responsible versus profit 
maximizing behaviour in terms of whether business managers should be what he 
called “civil servants” or alternatively agents of their shareholders, further developed 
this theory. Basically, Friedman argues that managers as agents owe the owners of the 
corporation, the shareholders, a duty to pursue their interests. In other words, 
managers should spend corporations’ money in the way its owners would want. To 
the extent that CSR activities do not accord with the desires of shareholders, the agent 
violates that duty. His argument is a moral one, arguing that it is unethical for a 
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corporate manager or an agent to engage in CSR activities because the agent violates 
his or her duty to act in the interests of the principals (the shareholders). 
 
“An agency relationship may be defined as a contract in which a principal engages an 
agent to perform a service on their behalf; this necessitates the delegating of some 
level of decision-making authority to the agent”.183 Agency models have two actors: 
the principal and the agent. The principal delegates authority to the agent to act on his 
or her behalf. The principal’s problem is to motivate the agent to do what he or she 
was asked to do. The costs associated with motivating the agent to act on behalf of the 
principal are referred to as agency costs. This issue arises due to the fact that the agent 
has more information than the principal. Agency theorists generally assume that 
managers will pursue their own interests whenever possible, rather than those of the 
principal.184  
 
While agency theory focuses on the actions managers might take that are not in line 
with the shareholder’s interests, “managerial hegemony theory”, in line with agency 
theory, focuses upon the significant control managers can have over the board 
election because of the information they have about the corporation’s business and 
how that can enable managers to maximize their own self-interest. When managers 
are able to control boards of directors, the opportunity for them to pursue their own 
self-interest is high.185  
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By contrast, “stewardship theory” argues that the agency theory is incomplete and 
assumptions about the manager as self-interested will not always hold. It follows the 
pattern from psychology and sociology to adopt a different model of man, who can be 
collectivist, pro-organizational and trustworthy. 186 
 
Generally speaking, it is expected that the severity of agency costs will lessen in CSR 
activities compared to business activities for two reasons:  
 
1. Due to limited knowledge and the lack of consensus about what constitutes best CSR 
practice and its impact on society and the corporation, one might argue initially that 
managers (agents) do not have a greater level of knowledge than shareholders 
(principals) in this area. If this statement is correct, the problem of asymmetric 
information would be less severe in CSR investments than in those associated with 
the traditional business activities of the corporation where the managers have a 
greater knowledge than the shareholders.  
 
2. Moral hazard occurs when the objective function of the agent differs from that of the 
principal. If shareholders’ (principal) values hold that the corporation should 
contribute to social causes due to altruism, then the agent may undertake actions even 
if they result in negative result for the corporation. In contrast, if the contract between 
the principal and agent includes an incentive mechanism that depends only on the 
financial returns obtained, then the objective functions of the principal and agent will 
differ and moral hazard will arise.187 
 
                                                
186 F. David Schoorman and Lex Donaldson ames H. Davis, ‘Toward a Stewardship Theory of 
Management’ 22 he Academy of Management Review 20  
187 Salazar 144-146 
 71 
Agency costs appear to be lowest, it has been argued188, in the case where the 
government makes CSR activity an obligation for the firm. This result might be used 
to support CSR legislation as it is being proposed in different countries. To the extent 
that legislation reflects societal needs, the conflict between what shareholders believe 
are social needs and what these needs actually are, can be reduced. 
 
According to Stout, the common but misleading claim that directors and executives 
are shareholders’ “agents” is a legal error underlying shareholder primacy. At law, a 
fundamental characteristic of any principal/agent relationship is the principal’s right 
to control the agent’s behaviour. But shareholders lack the legal authority to control 
directors or executives. Traditionally, shareholders’ governance rights in public 
companies are limited and indirect, including primarily their right to vote on who sits 
on the board, and their right to bring lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty. As a 
practical matter, neither gives shareholders much leverage. Even today it remains very 
difficult for dispersed shareholders in a public corporation to remove an incumbent 
board.189 And shareholders are only likely to recover damages from directors in 
lawsuits involving breach of the duty of loyalty, meaning the directors were 
essentially stealing from the firm. Provided directors do not use their corporate 
powers to enrich themselves, a key legal doctrine called the “business judgment rule” 
otherwise protects them from liability. 
 
2.5 CSR and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) 
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The search for a positive link between CSR or related concepts like social 
performance and financial performance has spawned an abundant literature, the 
results of which remain somewhat inconclusive, with some authors discovering a 
positive relationship between social performance and financial performance, others 
encountering a negative relationship, and still others finding no relationship. Still, 
there appears to be a growing consensus in the business community that CSR is good 
for business.190 The business case has re-emerged more recently as a discussion of 
strategic CSR, a concept that Friedman himself would have called “hypocritical 
window-dressing; but consistent with profit-maximizing behaviour of the 
corporation”.  
 
The grounds for arguments in favour of a positive relationship between social 
performance and financial performance are: 
 
1. It has been argued that CSR seems to reduce business risk191 by having a positive 
effect on organizational reputation in the long run.  
 
2. Some have argued that the empirical evidence shows CSR and Corporate Financial 
Performance are most likely correlated in a sense that CSR helps improve managerial 
knowledge and skills and therefore enhances corporate reputation. By balancing a 
large number of stakeholder interests, a corporation may increase various stakeholder 
groups’ confidence that the corporation will be understanding and non-adversarial in 
resolving future stakeholder conflicts.192 CSR and CFP may influence one another in 
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a way that good managers are capable of taking positive strategic action in both 
economic and social domains. Astute managers are able to identify and implement 
specific CSR activities through which their organization’s reputation can be enhanced 
in social or environmental domains. They also ensure that slack resources are invested 
wisely to promote these opportunities.193 
 
3. Stakeholders may favour socially responsible corporations in which they are 
constructively engaged.194  
 
4. The more socially responsible are the corporations, the better and more committed 
employees they may attract.195  
 
5. Other groups of stakeholders, such as customers, may become more willing to buy the 
corporation’s products or pay a premium for the goods from socially responsible 
corporations. 
 
6. Additionally, and in line with the above-mentioned literature, the meta-analytic 
findings suggest “a business can develop mutually beneficial relations with 
stakeholder groups, which might pay off surprisingly fast for the socially responsible 
firm. In turn, these positive economic effects of CSR might translate into more slack 
resources available for future investments in CSR. Over time, these dynamics might 
constitute a virtuous cycle for the socially responsible firm”.196 
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By contrast, some have argued against the over-emphasized positive relationship 
between CSR and CFP on the following grounds:  
 
1. Evidence suggests that at present many consumers, especially US consumers, are not 
particularly concerned about a corporation’s environmental track record.197  
 
2. The integration of prior CSR-corporate financial performance research shows that, 
“although the internal skills perspective is substantiated empirically to some extent, 
the internal learning effects of CSR tend to be 33% smaller than the reputation affects 
emanating from high CSR”.198 
 
3. It is true that certain customer segments, such as members of socially responsible 
groups or older people, have been found to be willing to pay premium prices for 
products from high-CSR corporations, but these purchasing decisions cannot be 
generalized to the whole population of consumers.199 
 
4. High levels of CSR may provide the slack resources necessary for a corporation to 
engage in corporate social responsibility; at the same time, CSR often represents an 
area of relatively high managerial discretion, so that the initiation and maintenance of 
voluntary social and environmental policies may depend on the availability of excess 
funds. In other words, no matter how much the executive leadership and 
organizational culture is supportive of CSR, the primary condition to use their 
discretion is profits and thus slack resources represent the necessary conditions for 
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high CSR. That is, a corporation’s prior profit level, if it is low, may act as a factor 
inhibiting CSR activities and investments.200 
 
In sum, these evidences and arguments reaffirm CSR as an important, but not 
essential, internal resource. 
 
The concerns of CSR advocates start where there is a clash of interests. In these 
circumstances, it is highly probable that the CSR which are about the long-term profit 
and reputation of the corporation will not be chosen over short-term profit and eye-
catching limited business opportunities.201 “If efforts to do good become a distraction 
from the core business, corporations may actually be downright irresponsible”.202 
 
There has to be a moral element involved in the way business is done; so as long as 
the only justification for adhering to CSR is profit maximization, it cannot be 
assumed that in a conflict of demands CSR will win out. “People sometimes argue 
that if it makes good commercial sense to respect human rights, then market forces 
will secure compliance. It is not self-evident, however, those human rights norms are 
always good for businesses.”203 It has been argued that the current role of CSR in 
industry is the response of businesses to new opportunities and strategic use of an 
ideology which has made CSR policies as a “business case”, not a responsibility. 
McBarnet argues that CSR is another level of social accountability for business that is 
inadequate without enacting new legal accountability.204 If CSR were considered a 
legal responsibility, corporations would have to obey it without considering whether it 
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is cost-effective or not. If the chance of getting caught and the penalty were less than 
the costs of complying, then CSR would be just thought of as a business decision.  
 
2.6 The Role of the Law in CSR Debates 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, although there is not a generally accepted 
definition, CSR is commonly considered to do more than what is required by law. 
Having said that, one might ask why law should be discussed at all? Does legal 
science have a role to play in the study of CSR?	  	  	  
Business corporations have to obey the law. This has always been a precondition and 
has been accepted as a minimum social responsibility of businesses, even by the 
harshest critics of CSR.205 However, since the legal system and the State’s capacity to 
enforce it are incomplete and insufficient to respond to the problems that are 
emerging fast, there are big regulation gaps and implementation deficits which, as it 
has been argued, have to be filled and balanced by diligent managers with pro-social 
behaviour and an aspiration to the common good206; therefore the more incomplete 
these regulations and implementation processes are, the more is the demand for 
corporations to be socially responsible and even to go beyond what is required by law. 
Horrigan207 considers the emphasis on corporate responsibility being just the 
observance of the minimum legal requirements to be simplistic. Cane208 argues that 
this emphasis fails to take into account all of the dimensions of corporate legal 
responsibility. Legal responsibility includes what is legally forbidden as well as what 
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is legally permissible. In other words, the “compliance-based and sanction-focused 
account of corporate responsibility overemphasizes law and its authoritative 
enforceability of norms as the dominant regulatory mechanism”.209 This approach 
does not take into account other forms of regulatory mechanisms that do not depend 
on official authority such as “best practice” standards, common business norms, self-
regulation and community influences.210   
 
Buhmann argues that there are two roles that law can play within the scope of CSR: 
first, that corporations need to abide by the law primarily to be able to go beyond the 
law, then, second, compliance with international law. Many CSR demands and 
corporate CSR actions appear to be based exactly on assessments of compliance with 
international law, especially human rights and labour law.211 Buhmann sees the 
significance of international law in the role it plays “as guidance for CSR self-
regulation and for reporting and benchmarking”.212  
 
Human rights might work as a common principle of law, and as a principle that can be 
used in many CSR initiatives for development in the third world. In most cases, 
human rights, labour rights and environmental protection are heavily regulated in 
developed countries, but less so in many developing countries.213  
 
Moreover, another role of law is through the informal law. Informal law might appear 
in two forms: first, a set of normative ideas, patterns of behaviour and action that are 
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not based on a sharp distinction between law and morality. In other words, they are 
not enacted by the State and their validity does not rely on State sanctions but rather 
on moral or practical sanctions. Second, informal law is pre-formal law. This is the 
case where informal law may be a result of a societal development and later on, the 
normative ideas of informal law will be the subject of formal regulations.214 
 
Legal rules can also act as a driver for CSR. It other words, they can encourage actors 
to act in line with a mix of economic and marketing considerations in order to gain 
legitimacy and to avoid negative sanctions by stakeholders. 215 
 
One of the most important elements in the discussion about the role of law in CSR 
debate is the debate about the theory behind the corporation’s legal personality. There 
are two major opposing theories about the nature of the corporation: first, nexus of 
contract (shareholder value) and second, organic theory (stakeholder value). 216  
 
Nexus of contract theory rejects the legal personality of the corporation and the 
consequent imposition of a conscience and social responsibility. According to this 
theory, “the company is like a market; it is the product of a complex equilibrium 
process. In this theory, the company is viewed as a connection of contracts and all 
who deal with it are therefore expected to bargain for their respective positions via 
contract”.217 Since the corporation is created by shareholders and regulated by 
contract, shareholders as owners have the right to define the objective of the 
corporation. This theory explains why the only objective of the corporation and the 
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sole purpose of the top managers have been considered to be profit maximization. 
Stakeholders, in this view, are supposed to secure their rights through contracts.  
 
By contrast, the organic theory supports a stakeholder's view.218 The advocates of this 
theory argue that the corporation is a separate legal entity different from its 
shareholders, a social being with a distinct will and conscience of its own. Owing its 
existence and capital to society, the corporation has an obligation to act responsibly 
and consider wider stakeholder interests.219 Corporations have been treated as an 
individual within society, having the same rights and obligations as an individual, 
therefore it should act as one. It is an established principle that every individual is 
responsible for the society in which he or she operates.  
 
Another leading question is to what degree the law acknowledges social obligations 
of the corporation? That is, in which specific way the law is in a position to control 
CSR? In this respect Berle220 and Dodd221 had different views: Berle took a 
minimalist view, believing in the role of law as the protector of only shareholders’ 
benefit, while Dodd took a maximalist view, advocating protection of not only 
shareholders but also for other social groups.222 If the minimalist view of Berle is 
accepted, the social responsibility of business would be, as Friedman223 also argued, 
profit maximization, which would be better achieved through market mechanisms.  
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It has also been argued that the idea that the law might make business responsible for 
CSR is not feasible in reality. Parker holds that “ideally CSR includes compliance 
with businesses’ legal responsibilities to society, economic expectations (to produce 
goods and services that society wants and to sell them at a profit), society’s ethical 
expectations (additional behaviour and activities that are not necessarily confined into 
law but nevertheless are expected of business by society’s members) and even 
society’s discretionary expectations (those about which society has no clear-cut 
message for business, but society does expect business to assume a discretionary role, 
for example making philanthropic contributions)”.224 If so, how is it possible for 
legislators to enact laws to encompass all the above-mentioned areas?  
 
Another criticism is the question of legitimacy that can be applied to business going 
too far from its role towards making public-interest decisions; this is not corporations’ 
expertise. It is not what their structure asks them to do, so it can be argued that they 
are going out of their range, and certainly it is not democratic. No one cares what a 
CEO of a corporation says and wants in this respect; no one elected them. They do not 
have any power to speak for people. These are the decisions that should be made by 
governments not by corporations. As The Economist put it in a critique of CSR: “the 
proper guardians of the public interest are governments, which are accountable to all 
citizens”.225 
 
Corporations react differently to their legal responsibilities. Schwartz and Carroll226 
have categorized these reactions into three major groups: 
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The first category is “compliance”. Compliance reaction can be demonstrated in three 
different ways. First, companies might comply passively to their legal responsibilities. 
This means that the corporation is doing what it does naturally and accidentally that 
action is in compliance with the law. Second, companies might comply restrictively 
with their legal responsibilities. This implies that the corporation does the compliance 
because it is required by the law; otherwise, it would not do it. Third, companies 
might comply with their legal responsibilities in an opportunistic manner. They might 
take advantage of loopholes in the law, leading them to comply with the text, not the 
spirit, of the law. Corporations might also change their operating jurisdiction in order 
to evade the law, for example incorporating in developing countries.  
 
Schwartz and Carroll have categorized “avoidance of civil litigation” as the second 
reaction that companies might have to their legal responsibilities. They have also 
categorized “anticipation of the law” as the third way that companies might react to 
their legal responsibilities. This means that legal systems are usually slow and 
corporations have the time to effect the enactment procedure through lobbying.227  
 
Comparative legal analysis still has much to offer in understanding CSR. The laws 
that governments pass to encourage CSR have significant influence in: first, the 
standards established by laws and mandatory regulation, while not immediately 
translated into action in any realistic portrait of global organizational practice, have a 
particularly strong influence on establishing social expectations about responsible 
corporate behaviour. Second, once the social expectation is created, a number of other 
forces, including consumer demands, institutional investor demands, community 
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demands and NGO demands press for the standards set out in the law. Third, the laws 
and policies that governments enact send a strong signal about the importance of a 
subject, possible future legislations and the individualistic versus collectivist nature of 
the country’s underlying political and social philosophy.228 
 
2.7 Globalization and CSR 
 
Globalization is defined as two processes: first, the process of intensification of cross-
border social relations between actors from very distant locations, and the process of 
growing transnational interdependence of economic activities, with the State losing 
most of its political and monetary power leading to economic integration and 
convergence.229 
 
The advocates of globalism are convinced that an unlimited and borderless global 
economy will lead to better common good. They argue that the primacy of market 
imperatives over political regulation will leave everybody better off.230 In other 
words, the “invisible hand”231 of the market will direct private corporations to do less 
harm and move towards the common good. They assume that corporations can be 
considered as the solution to the global regulation gap and public wellbeing.232  
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Additionally, the power of multinational corporations is not just based on their 
enormous expansion and the amount of resources they control. Their power is further 
enhanced by their mobility and their capacity to shift resources to locations and legal 
systems where they can generate more profits.233 This profit-making goal is a 
constraint on their power as well; that is, less profit will lead to disinvestment and 
might put the corporation at risk of takeovers. This kind of market pressure puts 
socially responsible managers under pressure to seek for more profitable activities 
instead of CSR in order to satisfy the investors. 234 
 
At the same time,	   companies are scared that if they do not try to find solutions to 
community problems the government may increase its role, leading to new 
obligations and greater intervention in the labour market. Many companies prefer to 
“be one step ahead of government legislation or intervention, to anticipate social 
pressures themselves and hence be able to develop their own policies in response to 
them”.235 
 
Business engagement in social responsibility is either for financial reasons or political 
ones. As for the economic reasons, there is an enormous literature (as discussed in 
earlier sections) about the relationship between CSR and corporate financial 
performance (CFP), but empirical studies236 have proven that there is a weak 
relationship between the two. This weakness in economic argument draws attention to 
the political reasons. It has been argued that CSR is a response to political pressure. 
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Engaging in political process “allow[s] business to not only deflect or dilute certain 
pressures but also be in the driving seat to ensure that change took place on terms 
favourable to business”.237 
 
This assumption brings up an important question about government since it is 
generally presumed that the State is in charge of public wellbeing by setting out the 
rules and preconditions for proper business behaviour in the capitalist societies’ 
market. But government performance is affected by the increasing reluctance or 
unwillingness of States to impose regulations on global corporations since they fear 
that such limitations will lead to disinvestment and make their economies less 
competitive.238 Governments also informally use corporations’ help for implementing 
public policies that, as it has been argued239, will cause excessive dependence of 
States on big corporations. Additionally, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
prevented governments from restricting imports on the basis of environmental or 
labour standards that are practices in the exporting country even if they were willing 
to do so. More specifically, WTO rules generally restrict a country’s ability to require 
product labelling that includes an explanation of how a product was produced outside 
of its borders.240  
 
Moon presented two models for further exploration of the role of the State: first is the 
view that argues CSR comes to the surface when there are no formal regulations or 
public policies about that issue. This view holds that CSR, by definition, means going 
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beyond the law; therefore CSR and a government are mutually exclusive. The second 
view posits that CSR is an interaction between market actors and a government.241 
 
A current discussion about the role of government in CSR is based on the assumption 
that socially responsible corporations operate in a more or less properly working 
political context with proper regulations. But, as has been shown before, with 
globalization this assumption is not entirely true anymore and, due to the huge gap in 
global regulations and framework and a reduction in State enforcement power, 
business corporations have an additional political responsibility to contribute to the 
development and proper working of global governance.242 Due to the multi-
nationality of corporations and the emergence of NGOs with political power, one 
State or one set of regulations cannot cover the newly emerging issues. This situation 
needs multilateral and beyond-national-border regulation and governance. 
 
The problem of assuming a political responsibility for corporations in a liberal market 
is the fact that they are not considered democratic but rather private non-political 
actors, and if they enter politics it is due to strategic decisions to maximize profits; 
therefore, they are not accountable before the public. 
 
Another issue is that when corporations go global, they do not face homogenous 
social values but rather different sets of social (sometimes contradictory) expectations 
while, at the same time, getting fuzzy and losing their respective power.243  
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While current theorizing in CSR is still dominated by an economic view of the 
corporation and an instrumental view of CSR projects244, it has been argued that, 
since political solutions have been decentralized in non-State actors, new forms of 
political regulation beyond nations are needed to find a new economic rationality. The 
challenge of CSR is, first, getting involved in the political process of setting global 
standards and regulations for multinational corporations. A second challenge is 
making corporations and governments believe that corporations are both economic 
and political actors rather than purely economic actors.245 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter an attempt was made to show the importance of studying the political 
bedrock while studying corporations in developing countries. Efforts were made to 
show how politics affects corporate governance and vice-versa. In order to 
demonstrate this, first “path dependence” theory, which, maintains that patterns of 
history deeply influence current patterns of politics, was discussed. Then 
“convergence theory” was discussed. This theory claims that corporate governance is 
on a reform agenda all over the world, moving towards the Anglo-American model of 
shareholding of maximizing shareholder value. The advocates of this theory pointed 
out the success and prosperity of Common Law jurisdictions (which follow the 
shareholder value model) as compared to the failure of other jurisdictions. They also 
emphasized the failure of alternative models of running a corporation as justification 
for their argument.  
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The chapter continued by analysing the globalization of capitalism. It was argued that 
capitalism is the bedrock of most of the advanced economies to which convergence is 
happening towards their shareholding model. Further, the role of international 
institutions in bringing about these changes was presented. Finally, the role of 
corporate law was discussed, concluding that law can create or destroy anything so 
law is not irrelevant but it is a second-order phenomenon; other institutions primarily 
control managerial mistakes; they are business conditions, incentives, 
professionalism, capital structure, product and managerial labour market 
competition.246 These institutions are the primary control, with the law just assisting 
or impeding.  
 
Different definitions of CSR were presented and attempts were made to show the 
diversity and lack of consensus on this matter. The conclusion was drawn to the effect 
that a good definition is the one that encompasses what is expected from corporations 
in terms of CSR policies. They are expected to balance their desire to maximise 
profits with respecting other stakeholders’ interests. 
 
Different CSR theories were discussed. It was concluded that it is not easy to say 
which theory is the best and a good normative theory needs to include a correct view 
of human nature, business and society, and the relationship between business and 
society. 
 
The shareholder-value theory seems to still have strong conceptual bases. Friedman’s 
profit-maximization theory and the agency theory seem to have lost a bit of their 
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attraction due to the collapse of the market and a growing census on the need for more 
socially responsible corporations, but they still remain the most significant criticism 
of CSR initiatives. 
 
Different studies that have been conducted to show the link between corporate social 
performance and corporate financial performance were demonstrated. It was 
concluded that, in line with Friedman’s “Strategic CSR” and meta-analytic evidences, 
CSR might be considered as an important factor for better corporate financial 
performance, but not as an essential, internal resource. 
 
The role of law in CSR debates was then discussed. CSR has always been considered 
to go beyond what is required by the law. Having said that, attempts were made to 
answer the question of why law should be considered in CSR debates at all? The role 
of legal science in the study of CSR was discussed. 
 
Further, the role of globalization in CSR debates was demonstrated. “CSR as a rapidly 
developing business strategy is a response to globalization and the extension of global 
multinational enterprises across countries, with the implication that State control over 
such enterprises is rarely fragmenting”.247 It was argued that the primacy of market 
imperatives over political regulation would result in a better-off society. The 
“invisible hand” of the market will direct private corporations to do less harm and 
move towards the common good. The role of States as compared to corporations in 
regulating the market and the problems associated with assuming political 
responsibility for corporations were discussed. 
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Chapter 3: Legal Transplants 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Comparative law is an important branch of law, both as a tool of research and as a 
tool of education, but considering comparative law as a tool of law reform gives rise 
to concerns about the uses and misuses of foreign legal models in the process of law 
making.  
 
In this chapter, Key proposition 1.3 will be discussed. This proposition argues that the 
act of borrowing is usually simple, while on the other hand, building up a theory of 
borrowing is more complex. Additionally, Key proposition 1.2 will be examined. This 
holds that the so-called “law-matters” thesis needs to be assessed by reference to what 
has been referred to as “functional equivalents” to law in transitional economies such 
as Iran. 
 
This chapter will also discuss the first Key proposition. This key proposition 
examines whether the process of transplanting into another legal system is likely to be 
affected by local socio-economic-legal conditions, cultural values and institutional 
arrangements. This chapter will also discuss Key proposition 3.3. This involves 
determining whether the relationship between the legal rule to be transplanted and the 
socio-political structure of the “origin” jurisdiction will determine the rejection or 
acceptance of legal transplants.  
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Max Weber considered a calculable legal system as a precondition of legal 
development in capitalist societies.248 Looking from an idealist point of view, in order 
to ensure calculability of a legal system, laws should be fairly stable over time.249 A 
stable legal system is a better platform for long-term planning. However, lawmakers 
cannot foresee the future; therefore, there is a critical need for ample legal change in 
the real world. Laws are written incomplete and once gaps in the laws become 
apparent, lawmakers need to fill them either by writing new law or by reallocating 
law-making and law enforcement powers to agents who are capable of responding 
more flexibly to such changes.250  
 
The extent to which one legal system may develop its own principles and procedures 
or adopt those of foreign (legal transplantation) jurisdictions has recently been the 
subject of an abundant literature.251 Legal transplants can range from the wholesale 
adoption of entire systems of law to the copying of a single rule. “Foreign legal 
systems may be considered first, with the object of preparing the international 
unification of the law; second, with the object of giving adequate legal effect to a 
social change shared by the foreign country with one’s own country; and third, with 
the object of promoting at home a social change which foreign law is designed either 
to express or to produce”.252 
 
Scholars in different fields agree that over a period of 200 years, the development of 
complex legal systems and the amelioration of “rule of law” have played a crucial 
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role in modernization and industrialization, and is the key determinant of economic 
growth while the corporate form has been regarded as a very important factor in the 
creation of viable market economies.253 
 
The problem is that there is no systematic data available on what are the legal rules 
related to corporate governance around the world, how well these rules are enforced 
in different countries, and what effect these rules have. There is no systematic 
knowledge of whether different countries actually do have substantially different rules 
that might explain differences in their financing patterns. Comparative statistical 
analysis of the legal foundation of corporate finance – and commerce more generally 
– remains unchartered territory.254 
 
As Alan Watson, the most prominent contributor to the transplants literature, has 
noted, while “the act of borrowing is usually simple… building up a theory of 
borrowing on the other hand, seems to be an extremely complex matter.”255 For 
example, there is little agreement among scholars on the feasibility of legal transplant 
and the conditions for successful transplants, or even how to define “success”. 
Moreover, there is little analysis of how the rejection or acceptance of legal 
transplants relates to economic development.256 
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Watson has famously argued that legal transplants were one of the most important 
sources of legal development.257 Movement of laws from one legal system to another 
have been both voluntary and involuntary. The European legal harmonisation project 
and the adoption of corporate governance codes are examples of voluntary transplants 
and the imposition of colonial laws is an example of involuntary transplants causing a 
multiplicity of legal systems in which the colonial system existed alongside the 
customary one. This imposition first served the needs of commerce and capitalism; 
and second, “the rule of law” was seen as a start of the civilizing process.258 
 
Watson also controversially asserted that the autonomy of law means that it can be 
freely transplanted from one legal system to another. Contemporary comparative law 
scholars, however, take the view that law is culture-specific and cannot be transferred 
from one society to another and have exactly the same effect. The transplanted law 
will change as it interacts with local laws and conditions.259 Otto Kahn-Freund 
maintained that it cannot be assumed that all laws are transplantable. For Kahn-
Freund260, laws that are deeply embedded in a society will not be suitable for legal 
transplants. It will be necessary to first determine the relationship between the legal 
rule to be transplanted (whether mechanical or organic) and the socio-political 
structure of the origin jurisdiction. It will also be necessary to compare the socio-
political environment of both the origin and the receiving jurisdiction. This two-
pronged process is necessary to determine the viability of the transplantation. Teubner 
claimed that the most important question is how closely a particular area of law is 
                                                
257 Alan Watson said that legal transplantation is ‘extremely common’ and forms ‘the most fertile 
source of [legal] development’: Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 
(2nd edn, The University of Georgia Press 1993) 95 
258 Mohammad Rizal Salim, ‘Legal Transplantation and Local Knowledge: Corporate Governance in 
Malaysia ’ 20 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 55 5 
259 Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ 313 
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“coupled” to one or more “social processes”. He says that received ideas act as an 
“irritant”, resulting in distortion of the ideas behind the law that is being 
transplanted.261 However, even Alan Watson acknowledged that transplanted laws 
will inevitably develop. He compared it to a human body: it will grow in its new body 
according to him. The development of the law in the host country is a natural process 
which should not be seen as a rejection.262 “These laws, at least in the early stages of 
transplantation, would not be as effective as laws which have been developed 
locally”.263  
 
A series of studies by Katharina Pistor and others showed the deficiencies of 
transplanted laws in their new legal environment. They concluded that legal 
institutions in transplant countries were less developed compared with those in the 
origin countries due to lack of complementarities, 264 and transplant countries were 
less innovative than the origin countries.265  Pistor has further argued that law should 
be developed by the society and made “part of the institutional fabric of society”.266 
Legal institutions here mean the institutions that create, support and enforce laws. It 
therefore covers a whole range of institutions – courts, legislative bodies, law-making 
and drafting agencies, enforcement agencies, law schools and bar associations. This 
does not mean that the legal transplants are impossible and will be rejected 
immediately. It means that they need to take into account the specific cultural values 
                                                
261 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Differences ’ 61 Modern Law Review 11 11 
262Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 27 
263 Salim 6 
264 Katharina Pistor, ‘Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six 
Countries’ Katharina Pistor, ‘Innovation in Corporate Law ’ 7 
265 Katharina Pistor, ‘The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison ’ 791 
266 Katharina Pistor, ‘Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six 
Countries’ 90 & 93 
 94 
and needs of a particular society and evolve; therefore, they cannot function the same 
way and produce the same results. 
 
There are other criteria which affect the efficiency of corporate governance regulation 
in developing countries including culture and value systems, the quality of legal 
institutions, access to courts, and the amount of the State intervention in businesses. 
These issues cannot be resolved merely by reforming the law-in-the-books or by 
importing laws from other legal systems. Reforms should pay attention to elements of 
uniqueness in the local setting. 267 
 
Another problem with most transplanted laws is that they are usually to serve the 
business interests of big corporations, despite being unsuitable for local conditions. 
For example, in many developing countries the law which focuses on the agency 
problem of director-shareholder conflict was not designed for the concentrated nature 
of the companies in these countries; therefore, the focus on the regulation of directors 
is unnecessary and only secondary to the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder 
conflict. The State also plays a significantly different role in developing countries. 
Not only is the State the majority or controlling shareholder of many of the largest 
listed companies, it also has direct influence on the management of many companies. 
To the extent that the State benefits as direct and indirect beneficiary of businesses, it 
cannot be considered as merely an impartial intermediary seeking to benefit the whole 
populace by implementing appropriate development strategies and ensuring free 
competition and fair-play to all.268 
 
                                                
267 Salim 1 
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In this section attempts will be made to present the definition of legal transplants, its 
development and its influence in the study of legal culture and legal systems, taking 
into account the variation of transplantation process based on social, legal economic, 
fiscal, financial and technical circumstances prevailing in each country’s “legal 
culture” and legal system.269 
 
In order to do this, first the definition of legal transplants will be presented. Second, 
attempts will be made to show how legal transplants are developed.  Third, different 
series of arguments will be presented to demonstrate the role of legal transplants. 
Fourth, the costs of legal change and their effect on legal transplantation will be 
discussed. Fifth, the influence of culture on legal transplants will be presented and 
finally the development of legal transplants in developing countries will be discussed. 
 
3.2 What Does ‘Legal Transplants’ Mean? 
In Watson’s words, legal transplants mean “the moving of a rule or a system of law 
from one country to another, of from one people to another.”270 He argues that it is 
now the most fertile source of legal development since “most changes in most 
systems are the result of borrowing”.271 He maintains that the object of legal 
transplants is the “rules not just statutory rules; [but also], legal concepts and 
structures that are borrowed, not the spirit of the legal system”.272 
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Pistor et al. defined a transplant country as “a country that imported its corporate law 
– typically wholesale with a set of other formal laws – from another country or other 
countries rather than developing it domestically.”273 
 
3.3 How Are Legal Transplants Developed? 
Perhaps Valderrama has put forward the best classification of ways through which 
legal transplants take place.274 He enumerated five drivers for legal transplantation: 
 
1. Authority; a concept which he took from Alan Watson. Alan Watson stated:  
 
“In the absence of legislation, which typically has been scarce for private law, 
law making is left to subordinates – judges and jurists – who, however, are not 
given power to make law. They must justify their opinion. It will not do to 
say, “This is my decision because I like the result”. They must seek 
authority”.275 
 
 
2. Prestige and imposition; it has been argued that every legal culture has faith in itself 
and tries to impose its legal culture on other countries if it has the power to do so. For 
example, many civil developing countries have the desire to import the French system 
because it is considered a good-quality work and prestigious.276 
 
3. Chance and necessity 
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4. Expected efficacy of the law; this theory follows the research conducted by Daniel 
Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean Francois Richard on cross-national legal 
transplants.277 They concluded that: 
 
“The way in which a formal legal order incubated in Europe was transplanted 
into other countries was a far more important predictor of the effectiveness of 
legal institutions than the association of that transplant with any particular 
legal family ... . The quality of transplantation process counted far more than 
the content of the transplant effect”.278 
 
5. Political, economic and reputational incentives; it has been argued that in developing 
countries the law cannot be considered the result of social rule-making. The mere fact 
that these imported laws actually do not work in the system shows that another 
interest other than that society’s specific interest has been followed. In these 
countries, legal process is often determined by political relationships. Mattei argues 
“the very notion of limiting powers by formal law is completely inconsistent with the 
philosophy of rule-making in those countries”.279 
 
3.4 Why Do Legal Transplants Take Place? (The Role of 
Legal Transplantation) 
In recent years legal transplantations have become more frequent, possibly due to 
greater domestic demand for regulating the market in another way as a result of 
economic change and development. This process has been referred to as globalization 
and has been usually considered the main reason for legal transplants. It increases 
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competitive pressures due to the integration of financial markets and “(...) brings laws 
and legal cultures into more direct, frequent, intimate, and often complicated and 
stressed contact”.280 
 
The role of legal transplantation was furthermore explained by Watson. He stated 
that: 
 
“As a practical subject Comparative law is a study of the legal borrowings or 
transplants that can and should be made; ...an investigation into the legal 
transplants that have occurred: how, when, why and from which systems have 
they been made, the new circumstances in which they have succeeded and 
failed and the impact on them of their new environment”.281 
 
The main question here is: “Why do legal transplants seem to exist everywhere?” 
First is the “practical utility motivation”, which means legal transplants are a cheap, 
quick and potentially fruitful source of new law and may be the only feasible means 
of law reform in some instances. Second is the “political motivation”, which often 
follows colonization or military occupation. The idea is that the transnational and 
cross-border spread of law and legal ideas is not, as it might appear, just for scientific, 
technical and economic ideas that have value by themselves but may instead be 
substantially dependent on the political factors that may have more power in 
determining how law migrates than do factors that relate to the intrinsic or 
instrumental value of the migrating law itself.282 Third is “symbolic motivation”, 
meaning that “all law-making, apart from legislating, desperately needs authority” 283 
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and law borrowed from a prestigious foreign source often fills that gap of authority 
among the legal profession.284 Fourth is “blind copying”, meaning some rules are 
transplanted quickly and without adequate preparation in the home country.285 
 
Commentators are split between those who argue that legal transplants, as a 
mechanism for legal change, are possible, and those who claim that legal transplants 
are impossible. In fact, the whole debate is about the relationship between law and the 
society in which it operates. At one extreme is the optimism of Alan Watson, who 
views law as separated from political and social institutions. For Watson, “the 
transplanting of legal rules [by which he means both individual rules and large parts 
of a legal system] is socially easy.”286 At the other extreme are those who argue that 
“rules cannot travel [because their meaning is culture-specific]. Accordingly, “legal 
transplants” are impossible.”287  
 
However, each of these extreme theories put forward several questionable 
assumptions. Watson’s optimism fails to take into account that “what matters most is 
the idea behind the law being transplanted, rather than the law itself”.288 Another 
questionable assumption by Watson is that he assumes “many legal rules make little 
impact on individuals”.289 At the same time, the view that legal transplants are 
impossible is contradicted by a variety of empirical evidence. However, the argument 
that the probability of survival of efficient transplanted legal rules in competition is 
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higher might be partially true, but it fails to address the conditions under which in a 
given country inefficient rules might continue their existence. 
 
Between these two extremes, several more moderate positions are also present in the 
literature. Otto Kahn-Freund argues that distinctive “environmental” conditions in 
each country, particularly the political environment in the form of constitutional 
structure and interest group coalitions, make successful transplants rare.290 “Anyone 
contemplating the use of foreign legislation for law-making in his country must ask 
himself: How far does this rule or institution owe its existence or its continued 
existence to a distribution of power in the foreign country which we do not share? 
How far would it be accepted and how far rejected by the organized groups291 which, 
in the political sense, are part of our constitution?”292 And consequently the strongest 
“organic” element in the law today is “its close link with the infinite variations of the 
organisation of power in culturally, socially, economically very similar countries”.293 
 
Ugo Mattei has taken an economic oriented analysis and suggested that legal 
borrowing can best be explained as a movement towards efficient rules. That is, 
competition in a “market for legal culture” determines which laws are transplanted 
from foreign legal systems, arguing that the most efficient legal rules survive around 
the world.294  
 
                                                
290 Kahn-Freund 7: By politics, Kahn-Freund means constitutional structure of government as well as 
interest group pressures. 
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Some have considered “fitness” between the transplant law and the host environment 
crucial to the success of a transplant:  
 
“’Fit’ might be thought of as having two components – micro and macro. 
Micro-fit is how well the imported rule complements the pre-existing legal 
infrastructure in the host country. Macro-fit is how well the imported rule 
complements the pre-existing institutions of the political economy in the host 
country. Central to analysis of both micro-fit and macro-fit is the availability 
of substitutes. The fewer the available substitutes for the transplanted rule, 
either within the legal system (in the form of other laws and legal procedures) 
or outside the legal system (in the form of norms, informal State interventions, 
or market constraints), the more likely it is that the transplanted legal rule or 
institution will be adapted to local conditions and thus used by relevant actors 
in the host country”. 295  
 
Another important question in the discussion of the role of legal transplantation is: 
“What are the conditions of successful legal transplants?” In order to answer this 
question, one first needs to find out what baseline is being used to measure the 
“success”, and this too is controversial.296 It has been argued that “success” simply 
means “use of the imported legal rule in the same way that it is used in the home 
country, subject to adaptations to local conditions”.297 Therefore, failure is the case 
where the transplanted law is rejected, ignored by relevant actors or leads to 
unintended consequences.  
 
Motivation is also highly relevant to this analysis. Motivation must be considered 
both from the law reformers initially responsible for the transplant, and the legal 
actors298 with the potential to use and to implement it. 
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3.4.1	  Watson’s	  Series	  of	  Studies	  
The legal historian Alan Watson provides rich historical evidence showing that legal 
transplantation has been happening frequently throughout history. He maintains that 
legal transplantation has been a huge success despite the socio-economic diversity in 
societies. He further argues that convergence of socio-economic structures, functional 
equivalence of legal institutions and the totality of society’s culture does not matter 
for developing legal transplants. 299 In this way, he confronts functional comparative 
analysts and the culturalists. 
 
This argument is based on three assumptions. In the first assumption, Watson 
emphasizes that comparative law should study the interrelation between different 
legal systems instead of studying the foreign law.300 In line with Watson’s argument 
and in order to explain it, Teubner301 uses Montesquieu’s “esprit des lois”, stating that 
in Montesquieu’s words laws are the expression of the spirit of nations, that they are 
deeply embedded in and inseparable from their geographical peculiarities, their 
customs and politics. Therefore, the transfer of culturally deeply embedded laws from 
one nation to another was a “grand hazard”. But today, due to the process of 
globalization the situation is different. The primary unit is no longer the nation and 
national laws (following their economies) have been separated from their unique 
regional comprehensive spirit. The growing globalization process has created one 
worldwide network of economic culture and legal communication which places 
national legal orders in second place as merely regional parts of this network.302303 
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Teubner asserted that: 
 
 “… the transfer of legal institutions is no longer the matter of interrelation of 
national societies where the transferred institution carries the whole burden of 
the original national culture. Rather it is a direct contact between legal orders 
within one global legal discourse. This explains the frequent and relatively 
easy transfer of legal institutions from one legal order to the other”.304 
 
In the second assumption, Watson identified legal transplants as the main source of 
legal change, tracing it back to the need of authority for the new imitated law.305 
 
In the third assumption, from all the above-mentioned and his rich historical research, 
Watson concludes that legal change can be explained without reference to social 
change, and in this way he confronts contextualists and culturalists who see law as 
mirroring culture and society. “His findings resonate with sociological theories about 
cultural evolution, which rejects a historical trajectory for the whole of society and 
                                                                                                                                      
size and the geographical position of a country. Other factors are sociological and economic, such as 
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catalogue of national characteristics we also find purely political elements: ‘la nature et . . . (le) 
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de liberte que la constitution peut souffrir,’ clearly an anticipated reference to the political 
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manieres.’ One sees that the political factor is here formulated in terms of principles rather than of 
institutions. Kahn-Freund 7 
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identifies instead separate evolutionary paths for different sectors of society, among 
them law”.306 
 
Watson has a point here but he has failed to explain the counter-examples of 
politically induced change of the law.307 
 
Otto Kahn-Freund308 suggested that we should differentiate between legal institutions 
that are deeply integrated in culture and ones that are separated from culture and 
society. Legal institutions can be separated into two categories: the organic ones 
where transfers are very difficult and mechanistic ones where the transfer is easier. 
 
Teubner contended that the term “legal transplant” is misleading and suggested the 
term “legal irritants” would be a better fit. He argues: “legal transplant makes sense 
insofar as it describes legal import/export in organismic, not in mechanistic, terms”.309 
The problem with the term “transplant” is that it gives the wrong impression – that, 
like a difficult surgical transplant, the transplanted organ will operate in the new body 
in the same way as it was operating in the previous body. However, this is not the 
case in transplanting the legal institutions. They cannot easily move and need careful 
implantation and cultivation in the new environment.  
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Some have argued that when the foreign law is transplanted it will either lead to 
integration or repulsion. While Teubner argued that the transplanted institutions 
“work as a fundamental irritation, which triggers a whole series of new and 
unexpected events”310 he further stated that “legal irritants” cannot be domesticated, 
they are not transformed from something alien into something familiar, not adapted to 
a new cultural context; rather, they will unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the 
external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context will undergo 
fundamental change.”311 
 
3.4.2 LLSV Series of Studies: (Legal Origins) 
Countries that are less prone to be influenced by other countries’ legal systems are 
called origins, whereas the remaining countries are called transplants,312 but which 
countries are origins is a matter of empirical controversy.313 
 
Although there is no unanimity among legal scholars on how to define legal families, 
among the criteria often used for this purpose are the following:  
 
(1) “Historical background and development of the legal system,  
(2) Theories and hierarchies of sources of law,  
(3) The working methodology of jurists within the legal systems,  
(4) The characteristics of legal concepts employed by the system,  
                                                
310Ibid 12 
311Ibid 12 
312 Daniel Berkowitz, and the references therein. 
313 England, France and Germany are uncontroversial origins. There is some controversy concerning 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States, and a very serious 
dispute with respect to Portugal and Spain. 
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(5) The legal institutions of the system, and  
(6) The divisions of law employed within a system”.314 
 
The debate about legal origins has been heated up by the article of La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (Henceforth LLSV.) in which they argued that the 
differences in the nature and effectiveness of financial systems around the world can 
be traced in part to the differences in investor protection against expropriation by 
insiders, as reflected by legal rules and the quality of their enforcement.315 They 
showed that countries with poor investor protection316 have more concentrated 
ownership. They later tried to investigate if this unfriendliness towards investor 
protection (particularly in the French civil law sub-family) leads to less external 
finance and thus smaller capital markets.317 
 
In order to answer this question, LLSV (1997)318 tried to establish a link between the 
legal environment and financial markets. Using a sample of 49 countries with the 
focus on determinants of financial development, they showed that “countries with 
poorer investor protection, measured by both the character of legal rules and the 
quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets”.319 These 
results suggest that common law and French civil law operate in very different legal 
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environments. They have argued that a highly protective legal environment that 
secures the investors from expropriation by entrepreneurs raises their willingness to 
invest and thus expand the scope of capital markets.320 
 
Theoretical accounts of why this might be true have been focused on two principal 
mechanisms. Mahoney321 and Glaeser & Shleifer322 emphasize judicial independence 
from the State and hence the capacity for courts to protect property and contract rights 
from incursion by the State; these authors claim that a common law regime generates 
greater judicial independence than does a civil code regime. Beck et al.323 emphasize 
the “adaptability” factor and assert that common law regimes especially those in 
which judicial opinions are a source of law and judges can justify their results on 
equity and not merely statutory grounds are better able to respond to changing 
circumstances than are civil code regimes in which law is only found in statutes. 
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Anderlini, Felli & Riboni324 make a similar claim for case-law-based systems, arguing 
that ex post judging is better able to respond to local information than ex ante 
legislating, although judicial responsiveness to ex post evidence may generate a time-
inconsistency problem that reduces the value of case law relative to statutory law. 
Djankov et al.325 also understood that stronger economic performance can be 
attributed to the capacity of judges to exercise discretion; their measures of formalism 
in the procedures for deciding simple disputes attempt to capture the extent to which 
judges are required to look to established legal rules, whether in statute or case law, 
and to follow externally imposed procedures to decide or justify decisions.326 
 
In order to further prove their argument, after having shown that law and its 
enforcement varies across countries and legal families, La Porta and others 
investigated how the countries with poor laws or their enforcement cope with the 
problem of poor investor protection. They argue that these countries adopt substitute 
mechanisms of corporate governance, which they call “bright line” rules. “Bright 
line” rules are to legally introduce mandatory standards of retention and distribution 
of capital. Out of all legal families, French civil law countries have mandatory 
dividends and German civil law countries are the most likely to have legal reserve 
requirements.327 
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Levine traced the effect of legal origin on financial development through long-run 
economic growth. He suggested that legal origin influences economic growth by 
shaping national financial systems. 328  
 
In a research conducted by Beck and others, they focused on the channels through 
which legal origin influences finance. They used “broad cross-country regressions to 
assess whether legal tradition shapes finance primarily by affecting the power of the 
State relative to the judiciary or primarily by influencing the adaptability of the law to 
evolving conditions”.329 They have assessed two theories of why legal origins 
influence financial development.  
 
First, the “Political Channel” which stresses that (I) legal traditions differ in terms of 
the priority they attach to the rights of private property owners vis-à-vis the rights of 
the State and (II) this has consequences on protection of private contracting rights as 
the basis of financial market development.330 In other words, the political channel 
argues that the civil law tradition tends to emphasize the development of institutions 
that advance the State’s power rather than private property rights, which adversely 
affected financial development.331 Similarly, LLSV state that: “(A) civil legal 
tradition, then, can be taken as a proxy for an intent to build institutions to further the 
power of the State...”332 A powerful State will tend to create policies and institutions 
that divert the flow of society’s resources towards favoured ends and, even with a 
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responsive civil regulation, it will have difficulty not interfering with the market. 
Thus, according to the political channel, the common law’s emphasis on private 
property rights and limiting the State’s power tends to support financial development 
to a greater degree than the civil law.333 In civil law nations and socialist nations, the 
principal mechanism of resource allocation is central planning. In common law 
nations and capitalist nations, this mechanism is the market.334 
 
Securing private property rights by the State has two opposing effects. On the one 
hand is controlling disorder, which means that investment must be secured, typically 
by the government, from expropriation. On the other hand is controlling the abuses of 
State intervention, implying that a government capable of protecting property against 
private infringement can itself become the violator. As both the Marxist and the 
public choice literature have identified long ago, politicians choose policies and 
institutions to stay in power and to get rich.335 
 
The second theory about the effect of legal origin on financial development, is the 
“Adaptability Channel”, which holds that (I) legal systems that adapt quickly to 
minimize the gap between the financial needs of the economy and the legal system’s 
ability to support those needs, will foster financial development more effectively than 
would more rigid legal traditions, and (II) the major legal traditions differ in terms of 
their ability to evolve in changing commercial conditions. Several scholars argue that 
common law systems embrace case law and grant substantial discretion to judges, 
inefficient laws are challenged in the courts and “... through the process of litigation 
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and re-litigation inefficient rules will be replaced by efficient rules”336; therefore, it 
tends to be more responsive to changing economic conditions. These authors suggest 
that “legal systems that (I) reject jurisprudence – the law created by judges in the 
process of solving disputes – and (II) rely instead on changes in statutory law will 
tend to evolve more inefficiently with negative implications for finance”.337  
 
In sum, the political and adaptability channels are inter-related. They are both part of 
law and finance theory and both predict that legal origin strongly influences financial 
development; however, they focus on different mechanisms. “The political channel 
focuses on the power of the State. In contrast, the adaptability channel focuses on the 
process of law-making. Of course, legal origin may operate through both channels; 
the political and adaptability channels are not mutually exclusive”.338 
 
At the same time, there are differences between the political and the adaptability 
channels. First, they provide conflicting predictions regarding French versus German 
civil law countries. The political channel holds that French and German civil law 
countries stand for more power for the State as opposed to private property rights, 
leading to too much State intervention in the market and consequently less 
development in their financial markets. In contrast, the adaptability channel states that 
common law and German civil law based countries are more adaptable to changing 
commercial conditions than the French civil law-based countries. Second, the political 
channel stresses that the differences in countries’ financial development lie in the 
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independence of the judiciary’s power. In contrast, the adaptability channel stresses 
that these differences arise from the flexibility of the law.339 
 
According to Cheffins La Porta’s Law Matters thesis suffers from a major historical 
oversight. He uses the example of the UK as the most similar system of corporate 
governance to the US and argues that there is no need of a particular set of laws in 
order to ensure the separation of ownership from control. Instead, alternative 
institutional structures can induce the same conclusion.340  
 
Cheffins argued that a fair and reliable judicial system would ensure that the minority 
shareholders feel comfortable enough to invest. As it was the case in the UK, law did 
not do a great deal to help the investors to feel more comfortable, it was the wholesale 
regulatory reform resulting from activities of financial professionals and London 
Stock Exchange.341 Additionally in order to ensure the directors observe the duty of 
loyalty legal restrictions on managerial self-dealings would be required. Another 
additional means to enhance the confidence of outside investors would be attributing 
legal mechanisms to minority shareholders to protest against perceived oppression.342 
 
 
Cheffins further argues that strong corporate law might not be a necessary condition 
for a corporate system dominated by widely held companies since investors draw 
confidence from substitutes, such as stock market listing rules and quality control 
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carried out by financial intermediaries. Historical developments in the UK illustrate 
the point.343 
 
Another major weakness of LLSV studies is the fact that it is based on cross-sectional 
data since there were not many comparative studies available at that time. A study by 
Armour and Deakins criticizes the methodology used by LLSV. This study suggests 
that many civil law countries showed a greater increase in shareholder protection 
proving that the legal origin effect is declining over the time. This study also finds no 
link between legal origin and stock market development.344  
 
They further found that the vast majority of rules in the areas of company law are 
statutory both in the common law systems and civil law systems. In a sample of 20 
countries they did not find any link between shareholder protection and stock market 
development. They also proved that civil law countries are quickly catching up with 
common law countries in the issue of shareholder protection and the gap is becoming 
smaller.345 
 
In the same fashion, Siems criticizes the research techniques used by LLSV. He argues 
that LLSV failed to take into account two factors:  
 
1. Particular rules are not identical in different countries and in a comparative study 
one should not impose one’s conception on a foreign system. “Legal rules must 
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not be regarded in an isolated way, because the functioning of legal systems can 
only be under- stood as a whole.”346 
2. To identify functional substitutes; in other words identifying legal rules that has 
similar effect.347 
 
3.4.3 Pistor et al. Series of Studies 
Another approach to assessing the quality of corporate laws is classifying them from 
mandatory to enabling corporate law.348 Mandatory law means that private actors may 
not be able to choose whether or not to work within the allocation of control rights 
prescribed in statutory law. By contrast, an enabling law allows private actors to opt 
out the statutory provisions and enables parties to reallocate control rights.  
 
A mandatory legal system means that legislatures function as lawmakers while its 
judges’ responsibility is just to implement these pre-made rules and have little law-
making function. By limiting the ability of private agents to experiment with new 
legal forms and restricting a court’s ability to review them, a legal system adversely 
affects statutory legal change, which serves to implement abrupt radical legal change 
and consequently it limits the source of legal innovation. In contrast, a highly 
enabling legal system gives private actors significant discretion regarding the control 
rights and increases the amount of innovation on the side of private actors. Courts 
need to keep up with this fast pace accordingly and failing to do so may result in 
market failure since it fails to resolve the disputes among competing claims. Put 
differently, “a highly enabling law provides a fertile ground for legal innovation. 
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Unless a legal system proves capable of responding to the new challenges arising 
from legal innovation, this strategy may be self-defeating”.349 
 
Pistor and others propose that “the capacity of legal systems to innovate is more 
important than the level of protection a legal system may afford to particular 
stakeholders at any point in time”.350 The more innovative and adaptable a legal 
system is, the more likely it is able to respond to a changing environment. 
 
This innovative character of a legal system gives firms the possibility to explore new 
opportunities while ensuring a minimum level of investor protection. However, this 
minimum protection may be taken as a first indicator to assess the quality of legal 
systems since such protections have proven to be soon outdated, especially in areas 
such as corporate law and financial market regulation because socio-economic and 
technological change is rapid and challenges the legal system continuously.351   
 
Pistor and others found that there are substantial differences in three aspects in the 
capacity of legal systems to innovate:  
 
1. The rate of statutory legal change, which is significantly higher in the origin countries 
than the transplant countries, with the common law countries having the highest level 
of statutory change compared with civil law countries. They also found that the 
differences in legal change is actually greater with two countries with one system 
(which would mean origin country and transplant country) than between the legal 
families;  
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2. The flexibility of corporate law/enabling laws vs. mandatory laws; that is, the more 
mandatory a legal system, the less legal innovation will take place and vice versa, 
and; 
 
3. The development of new enforcement mechanisms via developing new legal 
institutions. This would mean that the more enabling is a corporate law, the greater is 
the need for the institutional innovation. 352 
 
The question that comes to the surface here is why the transplantation of law has not 
solved the problem of legal backwardness. The point that should be taken into 
consideration is that “the strength of a legal system is not encapsulated in particular 
legal provisions found in statutory law but in the extent to which it promotes 
innovation and change without creating a control vacuum”.353  The findings of Pistor 
et al. suggest that legal transplants cannot function in the transplant countries in the 
same way as they do in the origin countries. They argue that “Socio-economic 
conditions, including overall economic development, the size of the corporate sector, 
the ownership structure of firms, and the patterns of firm finance, differ from country 
to country. Institutions that make the law work smoothly in one country, such as 
courts and regulators, may be absent, weak, or corrupt in another”.354 Socio-economic 
change takes place within the constraints of existing formal and informal institutions 
and thus is highly path-dependent.355 Therefore, even radical sudden legal change will 
                                                
352 Ibid 6-12 
353 Katharina Pistor, ‘Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six 
Countries’ 97 
354 Ibid 99 
355 North, D, C, 1990, ‘Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance’, New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 117 
not change pre-existing legal institutions overnight. This will take time and may not 
even succeed fully since rent-seeking may get in the way. Those who enjoy rents in 
the pre-existing legal system and not in the new one will use all their lobbying power 
to either block the new rule-making or make it practically ineffective and ignored. 
Typically, this type of change occurs in response to a crisis. Although crises are 
important motors for legal reform, crisis-driven legal reforms can mean that 
lawmakers overreact in a backlash fashion.356  
 
Pistor el al. asserted that in the process of transplantation, the main difficulty would 
be whether transplant countries reveal different patterns of legal evolution than origin 
countries.357 It has been shown that legal families have only limited predictive power 
with regard to the effectiveness of legal systems.358 Pistor et al. further suggest that  
“the answer might lie in the propensity of different legal systems to innovate by 
allowing sufficient room for experimentation, and responding to the need to close 
loopholes that may open up in this process”.359 Moreover, transplant countries need to 
develop appropriate complementary institutions. Some transplant countries have 
sought to make up for the gap of legal institutions by strengthening formal laws or by 
allowing very little flexibility in their laws which will adversely affect the capacity for 
innovation and retards the development of other complementary institutions, which 
are necessary when a country moves from a rigid to a more flexible regime.360 
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However, different studies361 have suggested that getting the “right” laws on the 
books will boost financial market development. However, there are reasons to caution 
against such simplistic conclusions. The results of these studies could not be 
replicated in transition economies since massive legal change, especially in corporate 
law, has had remarkably little impact on the development of financial markets.362 
Moreover, the law-on-the-books has not always been the cause for economic growth. 
It has been argued that countries with strong shareholder protection (mainly common 
law countries) have had better economic growth but there is no straightforward 
evidence showing that these countries necessarily had better laws on the books when 
they developed their corporate law. Indeed, they improved the law in response to 
challenges posed by the growth of the corporate and financial sectors. In this 
situation, key questions arise as to “why do some countries develop better laws over 
time than do others? More generally, how does law evolve? Can we observe 
systematic differences in the evolution of law between different legal families 
(common law and civil law) on one hand and between countries that have their legal 
systems transplanted from other countries and countries that develop their own 
systems on the other?”363  
 
Pistor and others argue that: 
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“The fact that the transplantation of similar if not identical laws within 
decades after their enactment in the Western origin countries did not produce 
similar results questions the importance of formal law on the books for 
economic development. However, there may be more to effective law-making 
than getting the rules on the books right. Without a demand for law, which 
could be spurred by socio-economic development, the law will live a book-
life, but will be ignored in practice”.364 
  
Pistor et al.365 answered these questions by proposing that “the process of legal 
change is crucial for the development of effective law”. By this proposition they 
imply that the mere changing of the law on the books is not enough. “For law to be 
effective, it must become part of the institutional fabric of a society, contributing to 
the process of institutional innovation and change”. Law will be effective when it 
changes as a response to “changing demands or socio-economic conditions, such as 
changes in the size or ownership structure of firms or in the patterns of finance”. They 
continue by arguing that “the success of a legal system is not determined by having 
miraculously enacted good law at the outset but by developing the capacity to 
continuously find solutions to new problems”.  
 
It has been difficult to prove empirically that law and legal institutions have 
contributed to economic growth and legal development.366 Case studies on individual 
countries or regions are numerous but, due to lack of reliable data, a broader empirical 
research on the development of law and legal institutions is rare. In recent years, some 
studies have been conducted showing that “perception data that measure effectiveness 
of legal institutions – the absence of corruption, the rule-based exercise and transfer 
of State power, the absence of expropriation and contract repudiation by the State, and 
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the effectiveness of the judiciary – are positively correlated with the level of per 
capita GDP.”367 
 
Berkowitz et al.368 have argued that the successful adaption of transplanted law to 
local conditions has a major impact on economic development. In origin countries the 
process of change tends to happen continuously and gradually but this process in 
transplant countries tends to stick for a long period of time and when it happens, it is 
usually extreme, unstable and inconsistent. This pattern of legal change has been 
referred to as the “transplant effect”, which implies that the imported rules have been 
rejected in the host country369 and failed to become an integral part of the transplant 
country’s socio-economic infrastructure; that is, effectiveness is not merely a function 
of the characteristics of formal law, but is also a function of various potential 
inefficiencies of implementation of the transplanted law which makes it “alien” in the 
environment.370  
 
Stagnation may actually show the irrelevance of the formal legal system, which might 
be an indication of the effectiveness and efficiency of informal governance 
mechanisms which render the formal law irrelevant, or there is little or no demand for 
that particular set of rules therefore their governments might decide not to invest in 
institutions necessary to implement the new legal change, or the economic conditions 
of the transplant country are sufficiently different from the origin country, or the State 
may direct economic activities through administrative rules and regulations, leaving 
too little room for private actors to make differences in the market. Whatever the 
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reasons, legal stagnation signals rejection or only partial reception of legal 
transplants.371 At the same time, some countries for several reasons may be 
“transplant resistant”, meaning that the legal culture is strong in a particular area of 
law and it is parochial, leading to a monopoly-like situation in which legal 
alternatives are ignored.372 
 
Transplant countries try to solve the problems that occur due to sequences of abrupt 
legal change by following other countries’ legal development and importing foreign 
law, which has proven to be a repeated failure. Differences in legal systems produce 
different legal institutions over time. Substantial sudden legal change by importing 
new laws impairs the effectiveness of these legal institutions leading to rejection of 
the imported rules.373 In other words, countries that adopt foreign law are frequently 
unprepared for it or for the changes it brings. 
 
Implicit in this argument is that “the causality runs from the legal family to good law 
to good economic outcomes”.374 
 
If this proposition were true, policy advice would be straightforward. But 
unfortunately this proposition has proven to be wrong in different development 
projects. “In transition economies the level of shareholder or creditor rights protection 
on the books does not have a statistically significant impact on the development of 
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stock or credit markets”.375 On the contrary, the effectiveness of legal institutions and 
the process of law-making have been empirically proven much better predictors of 
financial market development than the content of legal rules. Even in transitional 
economies the effectiveness of legal institutions has proven to be a strong predictor of 
financial market development. 
 
Berkowitz and others376 show that legal families have little impact on the 
effectiveness of legal institutions. In contrast, there are significant differences 
between origin and transplant countries. Today origin countries have more effective 
legal institutions than do transplant countries that imported their laws. “Among legal 
transplant countries, the countries that adapted law in the process of importing it, as 
well as countries that had a population in place that was already familiar with the 
basic principles of the law being imported, have more effective legal institutions 
today than do countries that did not, even after controlling for GDP”.377 They suggest 
that legal families have only limited predictive power with regard to the effectiveness 
of legal institutions and those differences between origin countries and transplant 
countries account for differences in legal effectiveness. 
 
As the size of transactions, and consequently markets, grow the informal governance 
mechanisms become less effective.378 That is, if formal rules are not in place to 
govern the market, informal mechanisms surface, which in order to be effective 
reduce the size of the transactions and consequently of markets. Applying this 
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proposition to corporations would mean that the more formal the law in place to 
increase shareholder and stakeholder protection, the more prosperous the economy 
will become.  
 
3.5 Costs of Legal Change 
Each legal change requires an adjustment in corporate statutes or business strategies 
therefore it imposes a cost. 
 
The costs of adjusting to new laws include:  
 
“(I) Direct cost from acquiring information, importing (e.g., drafting a new 
law) and learning foreign legal rules and practices; (II) rent-seeking costs from 
those who plausibly lose from changing legal rules and are willing to waste 
resources to avoid those changes; (III) indirect costs due to the potential loss 
of legal coherence and potential contradictions within the emergent law given 
that some areas of the law will be more changed than others”.379 
 
Recently, Garoupa and Ogus380 pointed out that free-riding might be the cause of the 
lack of full adjustment by legal systems. If one country transplants, it alone bears all 
the costs whereas other countries gain from reduced legal deformity. Thus, each 
country prefers to harmonize by exporting their own legal rules, rather than the 
importing of others’ legal rules.381 
 
These costs are one of the reasons that countries delay or avoid a process of legal 
harmonization that could reduce barriers to international trade. In the present 
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globalized market, countries face conflicting incentives. Although it is widely 
recognized that there is an increasing need to homogenise commercial laws for a 
uniform regulation of transnational trading flows, there are also substantial switching 
and adaptation costs that may induce countries to preserve their local laws.382  
 
According to Legrand, social and political adaptation costs may be so high to make 
harmonization and unification impossible: legal traditions may be so distant from 
each other that society would simply resist the proposed legal change.383 
 
The impact of transition costs on the process of legal change has been the subject of a 
lengthy literature. These costs should be taken into account in any rational decision-
making on the form and structure of proposed changes in law because of their 
potentially significant impact. The costs might be so high that it brings into question 
the adoption of otherwise superior alternatives and the entire reform project. At the 
same time, proper analysis of transition costs make lawmakers aware of the effects of 
undisciplined changes and help them with the drafting and implementation techniques 
that can mitigate these costs to bring about stability for the market.384 
 
However, some degree of legal certainty is argued to be essential for a capitalist 
system to function properly. Clear and stable legal norms bring benefits to legal actors 
in a variety of ways: First, they promote efficient decision-making by affecting firms 
and individuals in the arrangement of their affairs. Second, they also can lead to a 
decrease in the costs associated with obtaining professional advice for transactions. 
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Third, familiarity with an established body of law among legal actors themselves may 
lead to a reduction of transaction costs through strengthened bonds of interim trust.385  
 
3.6 The Effects of Legal Tradition and Legal Culture  
Lawmakers, especially in small jurisdictions, are aware of a country’s need of 
investment by multinational corporations and domestic industries, which usually 
threaten to migrate and operate under another jurisdiction (assuming that there are no 
barriers to the freedom of establishment and movement of capital) if the national legal 
system imposes higher costs on them than those incurred by their competitors 
operating in different jurisdictions. This pressure, which is the consequence of 
competition between different legal suppliers (and it is argued that the chief engine 
for change is competition between national legal orders386), can heavily influence 
politicians and subsequently motivate lawmakers; however, competition might not 
always prevail if having more competitive laws endanger key players’ potential 
benefits. One of the most common ways of opposing a legal change process is to 
argue that they are against the domestic “legal culture”.387  
 
Comparative lawyers have become increasingly obsessed with notions of “legal 
culture”. By this, they mean “those historically conditioned, deeply rooted attitudes 
about the nature of law and about the proper structure and operation of a legal system 
that are at large in the society”.388 Consequently, it has been argued that 
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harmonization between fundamentally different legal cultures is inherently 
impossible; therefore, “transplants” will be rejected.389 
 
Undeniably, mutual adaption between different cultures will not be easy but, in Ogus’ 
words, the “culturalists” exaggerate the problem and fail to take into account the 
economic forces behind the phenomenon they are describing. He argues: “the 
acknowledged characteristics of “legal culture”, a combination of language, 
conceptual structure and procedures, constitute a network which, because of the 
commonality of usage, reduces the costs of interactive behaviour. Further, if exploited 
by a dominant group with monopoly power, these phenomena can give rise to rents 
for the suppliers and inefficient outcomes”.390 
 
But one might rightly question: what is “legal culture”? 
 
“Legal culture refers to those elements in law that go beyond the mere content of 
statutory or case law. It includes the historical background of a legal system, the 
emergence of sources of law, the systematization of the law, the style of argument and 
codification, legal education, and the ranking of law in a country’s social order.” 
Siems emphasizes that one should not underestimate the  importance of these factors 
since it is because of them that legal transplants are claimed not to be feasible “in the 
sense that even formally identical rules, being interpreted and applied differently in 
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different legal systems, do not survive the journey from one legal system to another 
unchanged”.391 
Post-modernists adopt a definition derived from systems theory, stating: “the 
framework of intangibles within which an interpretative community operates, which 
has normative force for this community... and which, over the longue duree, 
determines the identity of a community as community”.392 In practical terms, this is a 
set of linguistic, conceptual and procedural phenomena which serves to distinguish 
the legal community from other “communities”; which becomes the principal means 
of communication of legal principles and decisions in a particular jurisdiction.  
 
An economic interpretation of “legal culture” leads us to the notion of “network”.393 
Networks reduce transaction costs between market actors. The more actors accept 
them, the more valuable they become, which might cause monopolization by the 
actors within that network and lead to rent-seeking. A driving force behind the 
network characteristic of legal culture is that there are significant scales of economic 
benefits for those using a specific network. The added value that the network actors 
draw is from the fact that large numbers of other agents also use that network.  
 
“Nevertheless, in general, economists are not convinced that the existence of 
networks will restrict or retard innovation, at least where there are competing 
suppliers to the network, or others ready to create alternative networks. Those 
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developing new technologies will know that buyers will be ready to abandon one 
system, if they will benefit substantially from a new system”.394 
 
Blankenburg argues that “legal culture” can be explained in the following terms:  
 
“A complex interrelationship on four levels:  
• The level of values, beliefs and attitudes towards law 
• Patterns of behaviour 
• Institutional features 
• The body of substantive as well as procedural law”.395 
 
3.7 Legal Transplants in Developing Countries 
Designing the right legal system is a fundamental challenge when attempting to 
promote economic growth in a developing country. “Law will not solve all the ills of 
the developing world – it will not provide food for the hungry or electricity for those 
without power – it will, however, allow developing countries to have a legal 
infrastructure to assist their development in order to attain these very important social 
rights”.396 
 
Law-making is thought of as one of the main features of national sovereignty. If this 
belief prevails, nations, especially transforming transitional economy nations, may 
believe that indigenous law-making is an important feature of a successful 
                                                
394 Ibid 424 
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Types Compatible? The Application of Interdisciplinary Research to Law Reform in the Developing 
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transformation, and consequently may choose to reject other nations’ influence, even 
under circumstances in which this influence is perceived to be valuable to the 
economic development, in favour of “doing it themselves”, even if that means doing it 
less well.397 “The image of law as specially related to sovereignty, to national self-
expression and self-determination, to national reputation, and to national self-esteem 
will produce pressures towards indigenous law-making that are greater than the 
pressures towards indigenous institution-creation in non-law domains”.398 Law 
reforms imposed upon developing nations have traditionally failed to meet the 
indigenous commercial and social needs because the reforms have focused on the 
needs of the colonizer or international community, rather than on facilitating the 
development of domestic communities, commerce and markets.399 Legal borrowing is 
easier in the case of commercial and economic development than in the case of 
constitutional law that has a lot to do with the core values of that nation. 
 
A very preliminary issue with moving towards a unified legal system for international 
business has always been with the definition of corporate governance: What is 
corporate governance? There is no consensus on the definition of corporate 
governance. This means that it is complicated to implement reforms in this area 
because there is no consensus as to what has to be done. Unfortunately, it is usually 
the case that the reform requests in relation to corporate governance are ambiguous 
due to the lack of clear legal structure and clear definition. There is a fundamental 
problem without any real solution being offered.400 
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Another important question here is whether there is going to be a “global convergence 
that eliminates systemic difference” or “the emergence of a hybrid best practice 
system” or whether both of these alternatives are inappropriate. William Bratton and 
Joseph McCahery in their influential work on comparative corporate governance 
assert that each national corporate governance system is a significant system in 
itself.401 Each legal system is not a “loose collection of separable components” but 
rather all the components are related and complete one another.402 No empirical 
research demonstrates a clear necessity or requirement for convergence of corporate 
governance laws.403 Therefore, there is a place for developing individual national 
models of corporate governance and no need for developing nations to simply cut and 
paste Western laws into their law books.404 
 
On the contrary, some have argued that legal harmonization and transplantation can 
help increase trade flows. They argue that: 
 
 “A unified legal system avoids the conflict of laws problems and the often 
difficult application of private international law and foreign substantive law. 
This reduces the legal uncertainty associated with international business, 
generating greater legal predictability and security”.405  
 
However, the assumption that legal harmonization will lead to legal institution 
improvement has been questioned by several authors. It has been argued that these 
attempts tend to ignore the main elements of successful economic development, 
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which are the constant change, innovation and adaptation of institutions and 
organizations in a competitive environment. Instead of improving domestic legal 
systems, standardization or harmonization may actually undermine the development 
of effective legal systems. Pistor has argued that “for developing effective legal 
systems, the contents of the supplied laws is of only secondary importance to the 
process of law development and the compatibility of the new laws with pre-existing 
conditions, including existing legislation and legal institutions”.406  
 
There are two reasons that account for the importance of compatibility. These two 
reasons are embedded in features of legal systems: (I) the interdependence of legal 
rules and concepts that comprise a legal system, meaning that legal rules cannot be 
fully understood and enforced without reference to other legal terms and concepts. 
This means that without developing necessary complementarities for implementing 
the new rules, they might actually distort the domestic legal system. (II) Law is a 
cognitive institution meaning that for it to be effective and actually change behaviour, 
the application and enforcement of rules must be fully understood and embraced not 
only by law enforcers, but also is determined by the perception of those using the 
law.407 
 
As it has been suggested by Pistor and other authors, since the financial law standards 
tend to be general in nature, rather than harmonizing highly specified rules, the 
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standards should aim only at establishing the principles for such rules and leave 
lawmakers free to modify them where appropriate.408 
 
As for the design of reform packages, two camps have emerged in the debate: on the 
one hand, there are proponents of the “big bang” approach, who argue for a quick and 
all-at-once introduction of all reforms. On the other hand, there are those who stand 
for a “gradualist” approach and emphasize step-by-step sequencing of reforms. The 
advocates of the big-bang approach and political arguments often base their case on 
the assumption that reform packages complete one another and should be introduced 
simultaneously and comprehensively; thus, introducing partial reforms would 
eliminate their positive effects and disorganize the economy.409 
 
On the other hand, the proponents of gradualist reform have argued that (I) gradualist 
reform packages have generally higher ex ante feasibility and may be easier to get 
started, and (II) sequencing of reforms may create constituencies for further reforms 
and increase ex post irreversibility of enacted reforms.410 
 
The constant concern of gradualist reformers is the cost of reversal in case of 
rejection. From an ex post point of view, since a big-bang strategy involves high 
reversal costs, it reduces the reversibility of enacted reforms. From the ex ante point 
of view, however, high reversal costs in the case of aggregate rejection may make a 
big-bang approach politically unfeasible. Gradualism gives an additional option of 
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early reversal at a lower cost. This quite general advantage of gradualism may explain 
why politicians so often take a gradual approach to large-scale reforms.411 
 
Developed and developing countries, presuming lawmakers’ key responsibility is to 
control the activities of members of the society, vary in the amount of activities that 
will be regulated by the law. As Glaeser and Shleifer put it: “a key goal in the design 
of a legal system is to control law enforcers”.412 Starting from this premise, it is 
arguably reasonable to conclude that simple, bright-line rules are optimal for 
developing countries413 since these kinds of laws facilitate the monitoring and control 
of incompetent and corruptible judges and politicians, who are more likely to be 
found in developing countries than in developed countries.414 
 
But, as it has also been argued before, developing countries should be wary of 
adopting legal transplants. Scholars who have written about the economic 
implications of legal transplants have demonstrated varying degrees of enthusiasm for 
the practice. For example, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard claim to show that countries 
that have transplanted laws without adaptation and applied them to a population that 
was not already familiar with the laws tend to have relatively ineffective legal 
institutions.415 Closer to the other end of the intellectual spectrum on this issue is 
Richard Posner, who “while emphasizing the importance of adopting transplanted 
laws to local culture, endorses transplantation as a means of creating a legal code in 
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circumstances where merely local laws and customs are unsuitable or where 
legislative drafting skills are scarce”.416 
 
A pluralistic and localized approach to law reform is something that the international 
community needs to consider for developing countries. The problem has always been 
how to translate the “living law” to an intellectual and practical framework. In order 
to achieve this, Kingsley has proposed three steps: the first step is the acceptance of a 
conceptual framework: legal culture. The second step is the establishment of core 
parameters, in which the current laws and possible deficiencies arising out of these 
laws are reviewed. The third step is the application of interdisciplinary research. 417 
 
It has been argued that legal harmonization programmes will lead to economic 
development. Development programmes are supposed to incorporate proposed legal 
reforms into domestic legal systems in order to improve the existing legal framework 
and to accelerate the process of legal convergence. They are supposed to result in 
economic development with the double benefit of reducing transaction costs for 
transnational investors and increasing the quality of legal institutions in countries 
whose institutions are less developed. 418 
 
While there are also some empirical evidences showing that securities markets are 
important determinants of economic growth,419 comparative data also suggest that 
countries need to reach a certain threshold in their income levels to develop securities 
markets. “Securities regulations have also remained underdeveloped. While some 
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countries experimented with establishing a legal regime prior to the advent of market 
development, others have lagged behind even as markets developed more rapidly. 
Several countries ensured direct State control over the markets by vesting a ministry 
or other executive agency with the right to regulate markets rather than establishing 
an independent regulator”.420 Moreover, these countries do not tend to liberalize their 
laws. Indeed, in many countries the body in charge of securities market regulation is 
not an independent agency, but rather under the direct control of the Ministry of 
Finance, or an equivalent governmental organization. That is, “rather than using 
securities regulation as a complementary control device for shareholders and 
investors, it was frequently used as an instrument of direct State control”.421 
 
“The development of effective domestic institutions is crucial for the governance of 
global markets, because without a supranational enforcement system, law 
enforcement is dependent on local institutions”.422 Most of the proposed reforms 
depend on the existence of a developed and well-functioning legal infrastructure. That 
is, nations need to have a well-functioning legal foundation in order for the reforms to 
operate properly within the legal system, which will increase income level and 
development of the securities market and lead to economic growth.423 
 
In recent years a prominent strategy for economic development has been 
strengthening the rights of shareholders. Two arguments account for this. First, as 
studies have confirmed, a relationship exists between a developed securities market 
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and economic growth.424 Put in a nutshell, corporations grow and prosper if financial 
capital is available. The second link in the analysis is that investors will be more 
willing to invest if they are adequately protected from expropriation. Accordingly, for 
developing countries, the basic policy argument has been to adopt reforms that protect 
shareholders.425  
 
But the important question here is what particular reforms and what type of corporate 
governance system is required in a developing country and is more likely to foster 
securities markets? 
 
To start, one can usefully ask whether a market-oriented approach to corporate 
governance is feasible for developing countries looking to develop equity markets. 
For many authors, the answer to this question has been negative since the market-
oriented approach assumes the existence of markets with non-legal market institutions 
infrastructure to protect shareholders instead of formal laws. The existence of non-
legal complementarities represents little need for strong laws. However, developing 
countries do not yet have the mature market institutions that make a market-based 
model of governance with weak legal safeguards for protecting shareholders possible. 
Indeed, the whole endeavour is to create markets.426  
 
In order to answer this question, Paredes has suggested “instead of an enabling 
corporate law, a much more mandatory corporate law regime for developing countries 
that basically fills the void left by the lack of market institutions in these countries”.427  
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3.8 Conclusion 
Differences in different legal systems do not imply inefficiencies.428 Different legal 
systems may develop different solutions to the same problem that is consistent with 
their legal tradition, which may be as efficient as the agreed legal theory by the 
competitive market. It is not a rule of “one size fits all”. 
 
In this paper, the definition of legal transplants was presented and attempts were made 
to show its development and its influence in the study of legal culture and legal 
systems, taking into account the variations of a transplantation process based on 
social, legal, economic, fiscal, financial and technical circumstances prevailing in 
each country’s “legal culture” and legal system. Different series of arguments 
including Watson’s argument, LLSV’s argument and Pistor et al.’s arguments and the 
arguments for and against their points of view were presented to demonstrate the role 
of legal transplants. Additionally, the effect of costs that a legal system incurs through 
the legal transplantation process was discussed. Furthermore, the development of 
legal transplants in developing countries was discussed. It was suggested that legal 
transplantation is not an easy and short-term solution for developing countries in 
order to fill in the gap of less developed legal systems. “For law to play a role in 
economic activities and long-term economic development, it must be incorporated, 
meaning that it must develop solutions to problems that exist in the home 
jurisdiction”.429 
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As noted by Levine, financial systems exist to mitigate information and transaction 
costs in order to improve the allocation of capital within the market. Different types 
and combinations of information, enforcement and transaction costs in conjunction 
with different legal, regulatory and tax systems have motivated different financial 
contracts, markets and intermediaries across countries and throughout history.430  
 
The suggestion was made that in order to conduct a more comprehensive research 
project on legal transplants, three factors should be taken into consideration:  
 
1. The effect of “legal culture”  
2. The fact that some countries mix legal origins and import law from different countries 
e.g. Japan’s legal system is transplanted from France but the new Corporate Law is 
taken from the US model.  
3. The process of transplantation plays a more important role in its success than the rules 
that are being transplanted.431 
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Chapter 4: Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing 
Countries 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter Key proposition 3.3 will be further discussed. Attempts will be made 
to see whether transitional economies, such as Iran, present a major obstacle to the 
adoption of a dispersed ownership model of the corporation. Additionally, Key 
proposition 1.2 will be further examined. This holds that the so-called “law-matters” 
thesis needs to be assessed by reference to what has been called “functional 
equivalents” to law in transitional economies such as Iran. 
 
In order to do this, first, globalization and its effect on the developing country will be 
discussed. In the first section, the different nature of CSR policies in developing 
countries will be demonstrated and an attempt will be made to define a conceptual 
framework for studying comparative CSR. Second, the Anglo-American nature of 
reforms and the two contributing factors to development of this model of corporate 
governance including the failure of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and the 
influence of international financial bodies will be discussed. Third, three main social 
reporting theories:432 – legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory – 
will be presented. In stakeholder theory, team-production theory as a credible 
challenge to the principle-agent model of corporate law and the arguments for and 
against it will be discussed. Fourth, social development as a result of economic 
development or vice versa will be discussed while drawing attention to cultural 
dimensions influencing the society’s CSR agenda. Fifth, attempts will be made to see 
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if corporations have the responsibility to promote development. In this section the 
“private government” assumption of corporations will be discussed. 
 
The normative analysis of corporate governance433 falls into two categories: first, the 
analysis of corporate governance responsibilities within the context of a given system 
or model of corporate governance; and second, the comparative evaluation of 
different models of corporate governance. Analysing CSR (Corporate Social 
Responsibility)434 policies in developing countries perhaps covers a little bit of both 
categories. While one needs to analyse the contingencies of corporate governance in a 
given country, comparisons should be made with more successful implementation in 
other countries. 
 
The corporate governance reforms in emerging markets/developing countries435 are 
said to be important for several reasons: first, reforms legitimize the liberalization 
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movements and the governments’ cuts. Second, they decrease inefficiencies and 
promote competitiveness by allowing domestic firms to enter the global market. 
Third, they result in gaining investors’ confidence to gradually eliminate the debts by 
development banks.436 
 
The point that should be taken into consideration is that the emerging markets present 
both opportunities and risks for MNCs (Multinational Corporations).437 On the one 
hand, almost two billion consumers in emerging markets put forward a huge market 
opportunity for MNCs. Indeed, the best way now to generate both profits and create 
societal value by promoting development is to focus on emerging markets.438 On the 
other hand, MNCs operating in these countries face some challenges and difficulties. 
Doing business in emerging markets will be difficult because many of them are 
characterized by either bad or weak public governance and administration, lack of 
public transparency, high levels of bribery and corruption, poor records on human 
rights, inadequate environmental, safety and labour standards and high levels of 
poverty and inequality. 
 
Three factors should be taken into account when studying CSR in developing 
countries: first, the multinational corporations are increasingly competing to gain first 
mover advantage in developing countries; second, in most developing countries, “the 
State still holds the key to business success because of the existence of trade and 
business regulations restricting the freedom of multinational corporations to 
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incorporate their previously successful business doctrines which have been tried and 
tested in the developed nations”439; third; emerging markets have been identified as a 
source of enormous talent with the increased level of education. 
 
4.2 Globalization 
Globalization has been defined as the process of intensification of cross-border social 
relations between actors from very distant locations, and the process of growing 
transnational interdependence of economic activities with the State losing most of its 
political and monetary power, leading to economic integration and convergence.440 
 
The advocates of globalism are convinced that an unlimited and borderless global 
economy will lead to better common good. They argue that the primacy of market 
imperatives over political regulation will leave everybody better off.441 The economist 
Adam Smith in “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”442 believed that the “invisible 
hand”443 of the market will direct private corporations to do less harm and move 
towards the common good; therefore, one might assume they can be considered as the 
solution to the global regulation gap and public well-being.  
 
It is generally presumed that the State in a capitalist society is in charge of setting out 
the rules and preconditions for proper working behaviour. This presumption is 
undermined by different factors. Governments informally use corporations’ help in 
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implementing public policies, which will likely cause excessive dependence of the 
State on big corporations. Additionally, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
prevented governments from restricting imports on the basis of the environmental or 
labour standards which are practised in the exporting country even if they were 
willing to do so. Moreover, Moon and Vogel have also argued that corporations tend 
to prefer to be one step ahead of the State and develop their own policies in response 
to community problems since they know if they do not do so, the State will, and this 
would mean new regulations and more intervention in the market. 444 
 
In the modern era, there is a new movement described as “the new regulatory 
state”,445 which is a combination of different kinds of decentralizing regulation 
(including self-regulation) and the State “command and control” regulation. There is 
no single system that can be considered as the only solution to societal issues; 
therefore, there is “the rise of multiple sources of power and a world in which 
institutions with regulatory authority must compete”.446 Due to this multi-nationality 
of corporations and emergence of NGOs with political power, one State or one set of 
regulations cannot cover the newly emerging issues. It needs multilateral and beyond- 
national-borders regulation and governance. 
 
Some have argued that CSR is “mutually exclusive” with the role of the State as 
regulator since CSR is going beyond regulation, and in contrast some insist that CSR 
is the relationship between the State and market actors.447 In contrast, Black argues 
that different national and international regulation is what CSR is dealing with and it 
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does not necessarily come from the State since it is a broader social phenomenon.448 
In other words, regulation includes law but not limited to it. In this way she holds that 
the role of the State in CSR regulation is limited by nature. 
 
Most of the current literature and discussions on CSR are based on the assumption 
that socially responsible corporations operate in a more or less properly working 
political context with proper regulations. But, as it has been argued, most of the time 
this is not the case in the developing countries due to globalization, the difference in 
global regulations and framework, reduction in State enforcement power, and massive 
activities beyond national borders, business corporations have an additional political 
responsibility to contribute to the development and proper working of global 
governance.449 As Stiglitz puts it: “politics and economics are intricately interwoven: 
corporations have used their financial muscle to protect themselves from bearing the 
full social consequences of their actions”.450 The critics of “corporatism” emphasize 
that corporations pose a threat as rivals to governments, resulting in a condition in 
which “individual citizens become secondary rather than primary democratic 
participants”.451 In other words, the power of politics that should be directed towards 
common good by the government, is directed towards gaining private interests by the 
corporations. 
 
Some critics have attempted to connect a corporation’s legitimacy to wider societal 
regulations. Dahl maintains “every large corporation should be thought of as a social 
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enterprise; that is, as an entity whose existence and decisions can be justified only 
insofar as they serve public or social purposes”.452 According to Parkinson, “to 
describe companies as social enterprises is thus to make a claim about the grounds of 
their legitimacy…”453 – that is, if corporations get their legitimacy from society, they 
should make sure that their activity is aligned with that society’s interests.  
 
On the contrary some have argued that assuming a political responsibility for 
corporations in a liberal market will cause problems since they are not considered 
democratic but rather private non-political actors, and if they enter politics it is due to 
strategic decisions to maximize profits; therefore, they are not accountable before the 
public.454 
 
According to Palazzo, the power of multinational corporations is not just based on 
their enormous expansion and the amount of resources they control. Their power is 
further enhanced by their mobility and their capacity to shift resources to locations 
and legal systems where they can generate more profits.455 He further argues that 
multinational corporations, in their role as investors, innovators, experts, 
manufacturers, lobbyists and employers, play a key role in shaping every aspect of 
society, from media and entertainment to the environment and employment 
conditions.456 However this profit-making goal is also the constraint on their power as 
well; that is, the traditional view of corporations which holds that corporations are for 
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the sole purpose of profit maximization also insists less profit will lead to 
disinvestment and might put the corporation at the risk of takeovers. This kind of 
market pressure puts socially responsible managers under pressure to press for more 
profitable activities instead of socially responsible behaviour in order to satisfy the 
investors. Another issue is that when corporations go global, they do not face 
homogenous social values but rather different sets of social (sometimes contradictory) 
expectations. 
 
Business engagement in social responsibility is either for financial reasons or political 
ones. As for the economic reasons, the discussion is about the relationship between 
CSR and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) but empirical studies457 have 
proven that there is a weak relationship between the two. This weakness in economic 
argument draws attention to the political reasons. It has been argued that CSR is a 
response to political pressure. Engaging in political process “allow business to not 
only deflect or dilute certain pressures but also be in the driving seat to ensure that 
change took place on terms favourable to business”.458 
 
4.2.1 The Effect of Globalization on CSR Policies in Developing 
Countries 
Arguably, the process of globalization by which regional economies, societies and 
cultures have become integrated through a global network of political ideas through 
communication, transportation and trade has made it impossible for developing 
countries to continue with their previous development programmes due to the 
interconnectedness of these markets. 
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Reed459 has categorized the process of globalization into three interrelated structural 
processes involving methods of production and forms of State and international 
economy. 
 
The first process of change, “methods of production”, can be explained through the 
“outsourcing” concept, giving more flexibility to corporations through cutting costs of 
production and accessing other markets while increasing capital mobility. More 
specifically, firms retained the central aspects of production processes such as 
research, development and financial issues while contracting out the marginal aspects, 
such as production of component parts and maintenance. 
 
Second, the process of change, “forms of state” involves change from social 
reproduction policies to economic and business policies. That is, the priority is given 
to innovation and competitiveness rather than welfare rights and social expenditures, 
leading to a shift towards market-oriented industrial policies.  
 
The third process, “international economy”, arose when many countries liberalized 
their economies through international multilateral and bilateral (the most prevalent) 
economic agreements.460 The main characteristic of these agreements is strictly 
limiting government interventions imposing restrictions. These agreements were also 
necessary for the “outsourcing” process.461 
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The key argument here is that these processes lead to increasingly standardized and 
rationalized practices beyond the borders of a nation because they are considered 
legitimate. This legitimacy happens through three processes: first, the external 
regulations especially issued by bodies such as the UN, the OECD, the ILO or 
compliance with certain environmental standards like ISO 14000, give legitimacy to 
new management to involve them in their decision-making; second, copying the 
process that is considered “best practice” in their organizational field; and third, 
academic and professional authorities directly or indirectly set standards for 
“legitimate” organizational behaviour.462 
 
4.2.2 The Different Nature of CSR Initiatives in Developing Countries 
The definition of CSR has been discussed in previous chapters and earlier in this 
chapter, but CSR in developing countries represents a different set of challenges: 
 
“The formal and informal ways in which business makes a contribution to 
improving the governance, social, ethical, labour and environmental 
conditions of the developing countries in which they operate, while remaining 
sensitive to prevailing religious, historical and cultural contexts”.463 
 
Various reasons have been enumerated for the importance of CSR initiatives in 
developing countries:464 
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1. Developing countries are rapidly growing and therefore can be considered as one of 
the best playing fields for multinational corporations. 
 
2. Most of the dramatic social crises happen in developing countries; hence, these are 
where multinational corporations are likely to have the most impact. 
 
3. The challenges that these corporations face while trying to implement CSR policies in 
developing countries usually differ from the ones they face in developed countries.465 
 
These challenges together demonstrate a picture of how different CSR is in 
developing countries:466  
 
1. The first difference of CSR in developing countries is that in developed countries the 
focus of CSR is on ethical and environmental themes such as consumer protection, 
fair trade, green marketing, climate change concerns or socially responsible 
investments, while in developing countries, due to serious socio-economic issues, the 
focus is on social-economic themes including poverty alleviation, health-care 
provision, infrastructure development and education.  
 
2. The second difference of CSR in developing countries is in the empirical research. In 
developed countries the CSR literature is dominated by quantitative methods (80%) 
whereas in developing countries it is more likely to be qualitative. 
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3. The third difference of CSR in developing countries is in what Visser467 has 
categorized into two groups as ten major drivers of CSR in developing countries: 
 
1. The first group are “internal drivers,” which show themselves in six different 
ways: 
a. Cultural tradition: despite the common belief that CSR is a new 
concept, it has been argued that business ethics have a deep root in 
developing countries’ ancient cultures. 
b. Political reform: as mentioned before, any kind of reform in 
developing countries cannot take place without taking into account the 
socio-political reform process. 
c. Socio-economic priorities: it has been argued that most of the imported 
CSR approaches are inappropriate since they fail to take into account 
social and environmental problem in the region. 
d. Governance gap: some have argued for the CSR policies’ capacity to 
work as better national regulation in developing countries. While some 
have argued much reliance on their social services is wrong since, first, 
a corporation’s priority is towards their shareholders and they might 
change the country they are operating in because of issues of 
profitability. Second, since corporations are profit-oriented, they might 
support either directly or indirectly the State’s corrupt activities. Third, 
CSR is a concept beyond territorial mechanisms which addresses the 
limitations of the nation state in regulating the global economy.  
e. Crisis response: these crises are considered as catalysts of CSR.  
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f. Market access: with the rapid growth of globalization, companies in 
developing countries should comply with the global requirement of 
good business. 
 
2. The second group of major drivers of CSR in developing countries are 
“external drivers,” which show themselves in four different ways: 
a. International standardization 
b. Investment incentives: it goes without saying that the more is the social 
welfare in a country, the more multinational investments they attract. 
c. Stakeholder activism: these stakeholders are ‘development agencies, 
trade unions, international NGOs and business associations. These four 
groups provide a platform of support for local NGOs, which are not 
always well developed or adequately resourced to provide strong 
advocacy for CSR468. Civil regulation is perhaps the most effective 
role of these stakeholders. 
d. Supply chain. 
 
4. The fourth difference of CSR in developing countries is in Carroll’s CSR pyramid469. 
It has been argued that compared to the developed countries this pyramid’s levels 
have different significance and order in developing countries. These differences are: 
 
a. Economic responsibilities remain the most important level, which involves 
providing investments, creating jobs and paying taxes. The danger is still the fact 
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that states might economically depend on the multinational corporations, leading 
to less attention to social issues. 
 
b. Philanthropic responsibilities, the last level of Carroll’s CSR pyramid, here takes 
the second importance. These responsibilities would involve providing funds for 
social projects to improve the quality of life.  
 
c. Legal responsibilities, the second level of Carroll’s CSR pyramid, here takes the 
third place. These responsibilities would involve ensuring good relationships with 
government officials. “In developing countries, legal responsibilities generally 
have a lower priority than in developed countries. This does not necessarily mean 
that companies flaunt the law, but there is far less pressure for good conduct. This 
is because, in many developing countries, the legal infrastructure is poorly 
developed, and often lacks independence, resources and administrative 
efficiency”.470 
 
d. Ethical responsibilities, the third level of Carroll’s CSR pyramid, here takes the 
last place. These responsibilities include the adoption of voluntary codes of 
governance and ethics. 471 
 
4.2.3 Conceptual Framework for Comparative CSR 
There are two different corporate responsibility policies: explicit and implicit. Firstly, 
explicit CSR refers to the corporate policies which reflect the company’s own 
discretion and initiative for certain societal interests. These policies normally consist 
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of voluntary programmes and strategies articulated by corporations in attempts to 
combine business goals and social values. In contrast, implicit CSR has been referred 
to as the corporations’ policies as a reflection of wider policy arrangements embedded 
in formal and informal institutional environments. Implicit CSR normally occurs in 
the form of values, codified norms and rules which result in mandatory and customary 
requirements defining proper obligations of corporate actors.472 
 
The elements of CSR in implicit frameworks have been recognized in workers’ rights, 
the role of trade unions, corporate taxation and environmental legislation; the 
corporations operating in this system are, however, acting responsibly, as noted by 
Carroll.473 
 
Corporations in the US generally have explicit CSR frameworks, while European 
ones have rather implicit CSR frameworks, with a recent shift to more explicit CSR. 
It has been argued this adoption of explicit CSR has to do with “the wider national 
(and supranational) European institutional re-ordering which provides incentives to 
adopt corporate-level managerial solutions”.474 
 
As for the developing countries, if the above-mentioned argument was correct, with 
the increasing market liberalization and entering into the international business 
environment, they should have also moved towards a more explicit CSR. But 
evidence from these countries shows that with “weak civil society and market 
institutions and sometimes over-arching governments there has only been a slow and 
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tentative development of explicit CSR”475 For example, in Russia the absence of long-
term social capital and of habits of business responsibility are the main reasons for 
slow CSR development. “But where markets, civil society and the government are 
relatively autonomous, mutually reinforcing and non-parasitic, explicit CSR may 
emerge within the range of governance solutions as evidenced in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary (coincidentally countries which retained some vestiges of civil society 
through communism).”476 
 
Power and participation are two key issues that require further exploration in the CSR 
and development debate. CSR is an arena of political contestation “both in the 
‘macro’ sense of defining relations between the market and the State, and [in “micro” 
sense] between different actors and social groups, and in relation to participation in 
decision-making”.477 Who has the power to make decisions, what power structures are 
implicit in CSR, and who has a voice in the debate are all questions that we need to 
consider.478  
 
The developing countries are often characterized by weak institutions and poor 
governance whose national business systems often delegate responsibility to private 
actors because they are the dominant families or the religious groups. In general 
terms, it has been suggested that the rise of explicit CSR in many developing 
countries has been due to the increasing pressure that many MNCs face in their home 
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countries to operate under the standards of European and North American 
environmental, health and safety and human rights. The extent to which explicit CSR 
will be adopted by corporations in these countries “may depend on the strengths of 
traditional institutions (e.g. family, religious, tribal institutions) and the 
governments”479 that have shaped implicit CSR. 480 
 
4.4 The Anglo-American Nature of Corporate Governance 
Reforms 
The corporate governance reforms in developing countries are largely in line with the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
 
Historically, Anglo-American models have been characterized by: 1) a single-tiered 
board structure resulting in shareholder primacy; 2) a dominant role for financial 
markets as the main investor; 3) a weak role for banks; and 4) little or no industrial 
policy involving firms co-operating with government agencies or labour unions. 
 
In the Anglo-American system of corporate governance the market is said to act as 
the ultimate “disciplinarian” of wrong behaviours, such as the short-termism and 
opportunism of managers. Underlying this claim is the neoclassical preference for 
market forces over State intervention, under the belief that “the market provides the 
most flexible and least disastrous co-ordinating and adaptive mechanism in the face of 
complex interdependence and turbulent environments”.481 In other words, the more 
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exposure corporations and banks have to market forces, the more pressure is placed 
on family-run firms in developing countries to act responsibly. It is argued that this is 
an inevitable squeeze on profits brought about by increased competition, which acts 
inventively for the benefit of consumers, through making the best use of scarce 
resources.482 
 
The main source of development in an Anglo-American model is expected to be 
private corporations, which have been arguably seen as the “primary agents of 
development” and a key element in unleashing the “development potentials”.483 
 
In this literature, development is understood to be the result of economic growth, 
which in developing countries’ case happens through the process of economic 
liberalization. Reed argues that reform policies in developing countries have three 
intentions: first, to increase capital flow by attracting investment; second, to increase 
competitiveness through market pressure on domestic firms; third, to decrease “rent-
seeking” behaviour of politicians by decreasing the number of transactions between 
business and the government.484 
 
The main question here is why are some developing countries moving towards an 
Anglo-American model? Read accounted for several inter-relating reasons that might 
have contributed to the development of this model. First, there may be strong 
historical ties between an Anglo-American model and many countries. Second, the 
                                                
482Alexandre Lamfalussy, An Essay on Financial Globalisation and Fragility: Financial Crises in 
Emerging Markets ( Yale University Press 2000) citing Susan Soederberg, ‘The promotion of 'Anglo-
American' corporate governance in the South: who benefits from the new international standard?’ 24 
Third World Quarterly 7 19  
483 Reed 231 
484 Ibid232 
 157 
failure of alternative systems that they experienced in the past,485 486 and third, the 
debt crisis caused by poor economic performance which put them under the direct 
influence of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank.487 
 
4.4.1 The Failure of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
The ISI approach was preferred by many developing countries after the Second World 
War. The underlying policy of ISI was to “develop industrial base” to foster emerging 
domestic productions by strongly intervening with the industrial policies to flow 
capital in key sectors to protect them from foreign competition. In order to achieve 
this goal, they made imports more costly and domestic products cheaper through 
introducing high tariffs and overvalued exchange rates while subsidizing the industry 
infrastructures.488 
 
The ISI strategy proved to be unsuccessful for several reasons. First, lack of 
competition led to poor quality and expensive products. Second, the government 
subsidizations led to an increase in debts. Third, inefficiency further increased due to 
ineffective allocation of resources, corruption, political interventions leading to rent-
seeking behaviour, the ability of firms to influence governments to act in their interest 
instead of the interests of the society and the lack of an effective legal system.489 
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On the contrary, Soederberg explains that: “as in the case of East Asia, the State 
intervention in the economy is not viewed by market participants as detrimental to the 
efficient allocation of scarce resources, especially in terms of reducing competition 
(‘crowding out’); instead it is seen as a necessary force to limit unavoidable obstacles 
in the principle of short-termism and greed-driven herd behaviour”.490 
 
4.4.2 The Influence of International Financial Bodies 
Where the activities of international financial bodies are concerned, the first question 
that comes to the surface is “Whose interests are served?” It has been claimed that the 
international standard of corporate governance which tries to introduce ‘universal 
principles’ draws on the Anglo-American variant.  
 
Soederberg argues that this imposed standardization of corporate governance serves 
two overlapping goals: “first, it seeks to stabilize the international financial system by 
ensuring that emerging markets adhere to the principles of a neoliberal open market 
economy. Second, by placing a greater emphasis on “shareholder value” than other 
types of corporate governance, it protects the interests of institutional investors based 
in market-centric systems such as that of the USA”.491 
 
Financial liberalisation is posited as a desirable policy since, it has been argued, it 
leads to economic growth. It has also been argued that debtor countries should be 
exposed more directly to transnational finance, so that the former may be forced to 
undertake market-based solutions to their current economic and political problems.492 
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As a recent World Bank publication puts it, policy modifications are necessary so that 
the governments, financial sectors and market participants in the global South “adapt 
themselves to the new, competitive open market economy”.493 
 
In the words of the former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz:  
 
“The US Treasury had during the early 1990s heralded the global triumph of 
capitalism. Together with the IMF, it had told countries that followed the 
‘right policies‘ – the Washington Consensus policies – they would be assured 
of growth. The East Asia crisis cast doubt on this new world-view unless it 
could be shown that the problem was not with capitalism, but with the Asian 
countries and their bad policies. The IMF and the US Treasury had to argue 
that the problem was not with the reforms-implementing liberalization of 
capital markets … but with the fact that the reforms had not been carried out 
far enough”.494 
 
The multilateral institutions responsible for the development of the prevailing 
corporate governance model have surveillance and disciplinary characteristics which 
are intended to push developing countries to an Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance. The World Bank is able to police the implementation of what is 
considered “good” corporate governance practices in debtor countries on a regular 
basis by essentially making them an integral part of its anti-poverty and growth 
strategies, and withholding funds as the ultimate act of punishment.  
 
                                                
493 Ha-sung Jang, ‘Corporate governance and economic development: the Korean experience’,’ in 
Farrukh Iqbal and Jong-Il You (ed), Democracy, Market Economics & Development: An Asian 
Perspective (World Bank Group 2001) 73 
494 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents’ (Penguin; New Ed edition 2002) 213 
 160 
4.4.3 Problems of Implementing the Anglo-American Corporate 
Governance Model  
There are number of problems associated with implementing the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance in developing countries: 
 
First, the agency theory shapes the baseline of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system. The nature of the agency problem in this system means aligning 
directors’ interests with shareholders’ interests, while this problem in developing 
countries has been historically between majority and minority shareholders where one 
of the families is the controlling shareholder, ignoring the interests of the small 
shareholders.495 
 
Second, one of the major concerns here is maintaining competition; that is, when 
MNCs enter developing countries’ markets, because of their advantages, e.g. size, 
access to other markets, more experience, etc., they will take over a business sector 
and push the domestic firms out of the market.496 
 
Third, some global corporations are becoming bigger than some national 
governments. The fear here is that with the undermined public policy autonomy of the 
State, corporations will be able to influence these governments as equal negotiators.497 
At the same time, “the emphasis on corporate governance is being used as a 
justification on the part of governments (in both developed and developing countries) 
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to avoid discussion about the possible need for more effective (binding) international 
regulation (e.g., in such areas as climate control, biodiversity, international labour 
standards, antitrust law, etc.)”498 
 
Fourth, is the phenomenon that Blair499 characterizes as “market myopia“. The basic 
problem is that managers are under strong pressure to profit shareholders and this 
prevents long-term planning and induces short-sightedness. 
  
More importantly, there has been no conclusive evidence in the literature which 
suggests that the Anglo-American model leads to more stability in financial markets 
or greater competition than the bank-orientated model found in Germany and Japan. 
“In a Brookings Institution study, Mitsuhiro Fukao demonstrates that the underlying 
structure of Japanese and German companies is more conducive to stronger 
shareholder participation, and more stable management and corporate relations with 
creditors, suppliers and employees than are common in the USA and the UK”.500 
 
At the same time, even expecting most corporations to live up to the stronger 
understandings of a responsibility in developing countries is rather naive. Developing 
countries struggle with major challenges in their efforts to implement mechanisms to 
enforce Anglo-American corporate governance reforms and promote development: 
first, this model has developed some conditions, such as monitoring systems, to 
function effectively. How can developing countries introduce the same conditions? 
Second, even if they introduce these basic conditions, do they need to introduce other 
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features to supplement the Anglo-American model in order to match with their special 
needs and effectively contribute to development? Third, whether the Anglo-American 
model is the best choice for promoting development in developing countries or 
whether, in the longer term, they need to consider alternatives.501 It is currently being 
argued that the key to effectiveness does not depend on whether a country adopts one 
or the other model, but more on whether it has a well-functioning legal system which 
supports the appropriate and timely enforcement of contracts502 to tie the reforms to 
the larger question of democratic political reforms which are being undermined by the 
notion of globalization. Developing countries in most cases suffer from the absence of 
explicit regulations, a loose and corrupt enforcement system, ineffectual monitoring at 
different levels, bribery and corruption, and weak education in legal knowledge. 
These problems impair transitional legal systems, leaving loopholes or “grey zones” 
which are exploited by MNCs.503  
 
4.5 Social Reporting Theories 
Social reporting sits within wider attempts to align business strategies and CSR and 
“disclosure and reporting of business-related elements that interact with social, 
environmental and other concerns”.504 In recent years the number of leading 
companies worldwide who report on CSR-related issues has increased irreversibly. 
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There are three mainstream theories on social reporting: legitimacy theory, 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory. Islam and Deegan505 have argued that 
these three theories should not be considered as very different from one another; 
rather, they are overlapping and have been developed from a similar philosophical 
background. All three theories see the organisation as part of a broader social system 
which they are impacted by. Considering all these three interrelated theories together 
provides deeper insights into the factors that drive social and environmental reporting 
practices. 
 
4.5.1 Legitimacy Theory 
The most widely used theory to explain social reporting is legitimacy theory. 
Legitimacy theory holds that corporations make sure constantly that they are 
perceived as acting within the boundaries and norms of the societies they are 
operating in; that is, they seek to ensure that their activities are perceived as being 
“legitimate”.506 
 
“Threats” to a corporation’s perceived legitimacy are predicted to be of utmost 
importance for the management, leading to responsive actions to minimise the 
impacts of such legitimacy threats. Within legitimacy theory, “legitimacy” is 
considered to be a resource on which an organisation is dependent for survival.507  
Legitimacy is something that has been imposed on the corporation by a society; 
however, corporations are able to influence or manipulate disclosure through various 
strategies. Legitimisation strategies and how managers might react to particular events 
                                                
505 Deegan 850 
506 Ibid 853 
507 Gary O’Donovan, ‘Environmental disclosures in the annual report: extending the applicability and 
predictive power of legitimacy theory’ 15 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 344 
 164 
may vary between countries considering the specific national, historical and cultural 
context.508 
 
4.5.2 Stakeholder Theory 
The second theory often utilized by researchers to explain what motivates 
organisations to disclose social and environmental information is stakeholder theory. 
Deegan509 holds that stakeholder theory has two major branches: the ethical and 
managerial branches. There is a great deal of overlap between the managerial branch 
of stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. These two theories can be distinguished 
by their scope of focus; that is, while legitimacy theory has a general focus upon the 
expectations of “society”, stakeholder theory focuses on issues of stakeholder power 
which is narrower than the society.  
 
Stakeholders’ influence on corporations is determined by the stakeholders’ degree of 
control over resources required by the organisation. 
 
In describing stakeholder theory, and the role of information in controlling (and 
potentially manipulating) the actions of powerful stakeholders, Gray et al.510 state: 
“Here (under this perspective), the stakeholders are identified by the organisation of 
concern, by reference to the extent to which the organisation believes the interplay 
with each group needs to be managed in order to further the interests of the 
organisation. (The interests of the organisation need not be restricted to conventional 
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profit-seeking assumptions). The more important the stakeholder to the organisation, 
the more effort will be exerted in managing the relationship. Information is a major 
element that can be employed by the organisation to manage (or manipulate) the 
stakeholder in order to gain their support and approval, or to distract their opposition 
and disapproval”. 
 
Some scholars accept the legitimacy of stakeholders but argue that stakeholder 
theory’s point of view that the objective of the company should be maximizing 
stakeholder benefit rather than shareholder benefits lacks scientific basis.511 
Henderson512, while generally accepting CSR initiatives, argued that the pursuit of 
objectives other than shareholder profit maximization may reduce the society’s 
general welfare due to multiple objectives. Jensen513 suggests that long-term value 
maximisation is the solution for this, multiple objectives providing a trade-off 
between shareholder profit maximization and stakeholder needs. 
 
This issue of shareholder’s profit maximization is particularly related to the question 
of why public corporations took form and what their functionality is. The dominant 
theory holds that corporations have been chosen over other forms of business 
organization because of the benefit drawn from the separation of ownership from 
control, which results in “specialization of function”. According to this account, 
corporate law and market mechanisms have been evolved to facilitate and support the 
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“specialization” and reduce the agency costs. Additionally, shareholders are not just 
the suppliers of the capital; they also bear the risks that come with it.514 
 
4.5.2.1 Team-Production Theory 
Most of the conventional shareholder models of corporations are based on the idea 
that those “who invest in a company are its true ‘owners’, on whose behalf and whose 
interests alone corporations are managed”.515 The meaning of ownership is important 
in this context. Horrigan questions this conventional belief first by pointing out that 
choosing one set of contributors to a corporation’s success (shareholders) is justified 
while investing something of value in the company cannot be limited just to 
shareholders; and second, why “ownership” is the correct way of describing 
shareholders’ stake in a corporation. Shareholders do not “own” the company in legal 
terms. They own shares on contract-base terms.516 Lord Macnaghten summarised the 
basic Anglo-American legal position in the famous UK Salomon case more than a 
century ago, stating that “the company is at law a different person altogether from the 
subscribers [and] though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely 
the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands 
receive profits, the company is not in law the agent of subscribers or trustee for 
them”.517 
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Furthermore, the opponents518 of the principle-agent model of corporations observed 
that for the directors to be the agents, they should owe the shareholders (principal-
agent) a “duty of obedience”. However, directors are not required to follow 
shareholders’ orders in any way. The only two ways that shareholders can exercise 
weak and indirect influence are: first, limited voting rights to choose the directors that 
are chosen by previous directors; and second, power to sell their shares. But if the 
company is run badly, this power does not offer much protection either.519 Therefore, 
it has been argued that “directors’ legal powers and responsibilities do not resemble 
those of agents, but rather those of trustees”.520 
 
One of the most major attacks on shareholder wealth maximization theory is the 
“team production” theory.521 This theory has been defined as “production in which 1) 
several types of resources are used… 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs 
of each co-operating resource… [and] 3) not all resources used in team production 
belong to one person”.522  
 
The underlying concept of this theory is a move from the mere focus on agency costs 
to “protecting specific investments,” meaning that public corporations today need 
more than one individual or group to invest.523 “The appropriate normative goal for a 
board of directors is to build and protect the wealth-creating potential of the entire 
corporate team – “wealth” that is reflected not only in dividends and share 
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appreciations for shareholders, but also in reduced risk for creditors, better health 
benefit for employees, promotional opportunities and perks for executives, better 
product support for customers and good “corporate citizenship” in the community”.524 
The team production scholars Blair and Stout suggest: “the essence is that the whole 
can be made bigger than the sum of its parts”.525 
 
This theory questions a 1976 classic article by Jensen and Meckling.526 According to 
these two finance theorists, a corporation is not an entity of its own but instead a 
“nexus of contracts”. This view of the firm can be confronted by what Kuhn called 
“paradigms”.527 According to Kuhn, one of the ways we interact with our 
surroundings is to develop theories about the way it works and that certain causes lead 
to certain effects. Once these paradigms are accepted in a society, most of the 
individuals in that society will stick to it. He argues that the “nexus of contracts” and 
principal-agent model of corporations is one of these paradigms.528  
 
At the same time, the team-production theory embraces and develops the argument by 
Kuhn asserting that:  
 
“The public corporation can be viewed most usefully not as a nexus of implicit 
and explicit contracts, but as a nexus of firm-specific investments made by 
many and varied individuals who give up control over those resources to a 
decision-making process in hopes of sharing in the benefits that can flow from 
team production”.529 
 
                                                
524 Ibid 35 
525 Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ 85 Virginia 
Law Review 247 296 
526 Boatright 
527 Dean in Stout, ‘Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law ’ 
528 Stout, ‘Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law ’3-5 
529 Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ 285 
 169 
The team production theory has been strongly criticized by the advocates of 
shareholder wealth maximization theory. One criticism of the team production theory 
argues that this theory has the same problem as other stakeholder theories, under 
which it is impossible to mediate between different claims on the corporation. 
Bebchuk treats the team production model of the board as a vehicle for protecting 
stakeholders’ interests, then criticizes the model on the ground that it leaves 
stakeholders with too little power and directors “accountable to no one.”530 Other 
critics have doubted the applicability of this theory and argue that given the pressures 
of stock markets and the power of shareholders, it is not clear how one can shift from 
shareholder wealth maximization to team wealth maximization without changing the 
ownership structures.531 Stout has replied to this criticism by stating that the team 
production theory is not about giving undue control to either shareholders or 
stakeholders but rather on benefiting both groups by voluntarily submitting to 
“mediating hierarchy” with the board sitting on the top of it; therefore, directors must 
enjoy a wide range of discretion “to balance the competing interest in a way that 
keeps the team together and keeps it productive”.532 She further explains that 
“because if either shareholders or stakeholders were given greater leverage over 
boards, they might use that leverage to pressure boards to opportunistically threaten 
the interests of other members of the corporate ‘team’“.533  
 
4.5.3 Institutional Theory 
The other theory of Social Reporting overlaps with stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory a great deal and used by social and environmental accounting researchers is 
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institutional theory. Institutional theory is usually used to explain existing 
organisational structures regarding their operation or reporting policies. These 
policies are followed by influential stakeholder groups as a means to exert pressures 
on corporations to have particular practices in place. This might be the reason for 
similarities in organizational structures between different corporations.  
 
One key aspect of institutional theory is the concept of isomorphism, which refers to 
“the apparent adoption of [these] practices is deemed to provide an organisation with 
a level of legitimacy that would not otherwise be available if it was to deviate from 
‘accepted’ organisational forms or policies”. Dillard et al. also explain that 
“isomorphism refers to the adaptation of an institutional practice by an 
organisation”.534 
 
4.6 Social Development 
Society’s expectations of business vary considerably between countries, depending on 
their level of economic and social development. Minimum expectations are embedded 
in the legal framework, more specifically in company law, implicitly or explicitly 
describing who the organisation is there to serve and how the organisation’s purposes 
and priorities should be decided. The legal framework is driven not only by economic 
considerations but also by culture and politics.535  
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As noted earlier, traditional Anglo-American growth and development theory has 
typically given priority to economic development over social development. The basic 
strategy here was that if liberalization occurs, then this will create economic 
development leading to more employment and people will have more money and will 
be able to take care of the social development they need, e.g. education and health. 
Recent empirical work in the field of development, however, has challenged this 
contention.536 As a result, development economists like Noble-prize winner Amartya 
Sen537, are increasingly arguing that development in social matters does not result in a 
considerable development in economic matters, as argued by advocates of the Anglo-
American model. He argues that the most successful examples of economic 
development happened due to the early investment in education (especially primary 
education), health and other social programmes that allowed for their subsequent 
economic success. Similarly, Sen argues, China’s rapid economic growth is caused by 
the previous investment in social programmes which prepared the playing field and 
provided the understanding for undergoing changes.538 
 
Development economists like Sen argue that proponents of economic liberalization 
(who generally advocate Anglo-American corporate governance reforms as well) 
make a fundamental mistake by assuming that liberalization, which necessarily 
involves and legitimizes funding cuts and a reduced presence of the government in the 
provision of social welfare programmes, will induce economic development.539 To the 
contrary, governments in developing economies have a key role to play. Because of 
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the relatively low costs of health and education programmes in these countries, which 
provide the necessary basis for long-term growth and development, a tremendous 
impact can be made without affecting the efforts to stimulate economic recovery.540 
Liberalization policies of the Anglo-American kind are based on developments in 
private corporations which, however, undermine the social programmes undertaken 
by governments and are funded by tax revenue; they also are said to induce a “race to 
the bottom” by engaging in what has been termed “regulatory competition”.541  
 
Using a development-based and economic-based analysis, Campbell542 asserted that 
institutional conditions, such as public regulations and private watchdogs, e.g. the 
presence of non-governmental and international organizations that monitor corporate 
behaviour, affect the degree of CSR. Similarly, Marquis et al.543 observed that 
institutional pressures at the community level shape corporate social decision-making 
in large cities where corporation have their headquarters. 
 
At the same time, developing positive relations with the local community is necessary 
to accumulate social capital, especially for non-local companies. These relations are 
increasingly used by multinational corporations in order to integrate their subsidiaries 
into various markets in which they operate. Deep understanding of the local 
community and social customs is an asset which can be utilized by the companies to 
gain strategic advantage.544 
                                                
540 Ibid235 
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Batra545 argues that the usual business strategy of using products that have been 
historically successful in developed nations will not work in emerging markets. 
Prahlad and Lieberthal546 assert that corporations should change their business 
strategies from ‘thinking globally’ to ‘thinking locally’ as each of the emerging 
markets with its vast diversities in culture and socio-economic issues represents a 
challenge for marketing. 
 
4.6.1 Effect of Cultural Dimensions 
Hofstede identified five value-oriented dimensions that distinguish societal cultures: 
social inequality including the relationship with authority (power distance); the 
relationship between the individual and the group (individualism versus collectivism); 
performance orientation (masculinity versus femininity); and ways of dealing with 
uncertainty (uncertainty avoidance); and long-term orientation versus short-term 
orientation in life.547  Power distance is a measure of society’s tolerance and 
preference for unequal hierarchical power whereby inequality is endorsed by the 
followers. Low individualism translates into a collectivist society and is manifested 
by a close long-term commitment to the “group”, that being a family, extended 
family, or extended relationships. Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount and 
overrides most other societal rules.548 
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4.7 Do Corporations have the Responsibility to Promote 
Development? 
The main question here is whether corporations have extra responsibility for social 
development beyond the development that comes after their responsibility to their 
shareholders to generate profit. Opinions vary from the strongest position, believing 
that corporations exist merely to promote development; to the weakest position, 
which does not consider development as a goal but just a condition to prevent social 
sanction from the society they are operating in; with the moderate view maintaining 
development as one of the goals of corporations.  
 
Jamali and Mirshak549 found evidence to support the argument that CSR 
understandings and practices are likely to be affected by specific national and 
institutional realities that reflects the problematic socio-economic and socio-political 
situation in the developing economies where MNCs operate. They have argued that 
the “level of societal development is also likely to influence the prominence and 
sophistication of CSR discourse within a particular society”.550 These authors suggest 
concerted efforts towards collaboration between the private sector, public sector and 
NGOs. 
 
Similarly, Cordeiro551 emphasized that positive public perception and support from 
multiple stakeholders is necessary for MNCs to be successful in emerging economies 
and, therefore, MNCs should not only act responsibly to establish their long-term 
                                                
549 Dima Jamali and Ramez Mirshak, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Theory and Practice in a 
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reputations, but also bear the additional ethical responsibility to proactively encourage 
ethical practices and promote development. It goes without saying that assuming this 
kind of responsibility for corporations is not accepted by the advocates of the Anglo-
American model. 552  
 
The question here is what is it that corporations need to take into account in order to 
be considered responsible? The answer is not easy.  
 
The main objective of corporations has been considered as making profit. The 
problem here is not just that the corporations are reluctant to contribute to 
development of an economic or social nature but more what these contributions 
should consist of. Developing countries are normally very complicated to study and 
making changes should be according to all inter-relating issues such as community, 
culture, history, special needs, political system, religion, etc. Making changes in one 
sector might impair the function of the other sections, leading to political or social 
backlash or to worsening the situation. Corporations do not have the knowledge, 
expertise, time and responsibility to invest and take care of all these issues at the same 
time. Corporations are corporations, not governments. It has long been argued that 
assuming the responsibility of government for corporations is a mistake, taking into 
consideration the primary role of a government, which is governing a State, and a 
corporation, which is gaining profit. Therefore, one can argue that programming for 
development is the responsibility of the government, with corporations contributing to 
some parts of it. Assuming a general responsibility for development by corporations 
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should, therefore, be replaced by allocating particular responsibility in specific 
sectors, which will prevent confusion as to the nature and extent of the actions taken.  
 
There are two approaches to this situation: one is asking corporations to work closely 
with NGOs to play more roles in development programmes. This suggestion might 
not work for two reasons: first, corporations increasingly provide more funding for 
development but this co-operation is not frequent and is usually done for marketing 
and public reputation reasons. Second, NGOs are well-motivated but they do not have 
the capacity to meet these needs since they are being asked to take over some of the 
responsibilities of the State.553 The second approach is, therefore, State involvement. 
 
On the contrary, some have recognized the great corporations as “political systems”. 
Earl Letham maintains that big corporations have all the requisite characteristics: 
legislature, executive, judicial system and political factions, while their growth has 
produced a power tension in the sense that they have become a competitor to the 
sovereignty of the State.554 Pluralists have famously asserted the necessity of 
assuming political life for corporations. According to their argument – if we assume 
the same ground – first, the State is considered one of the many associations that are 
operating in a society. Second, they insist that the activities and purposes of private 
associations are equally important. Some of them have higher moral purposes than the 
State while some of their activities are more important than the State. Therefore, there 
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is no reason that one might deny granting political life to private associations unless 
we assume another ground for the authority and political life of the State.555 
 
Although the economic aspects of the corporation have received the widest notice, the 
concept of the corporation as a political system is by no means unknown. Walton 
Hamilton argues against the Hobbesian concept of the corporation (which argues that 
the corporation is a lesser commonwealth), holding that in some cases the corporation 
is an even greater commonwealth. Merriam has observed business enterprises as 
private governments, concluding that in some cases this private government has 
controlled the public government. C. Wright Mills has also referred to corporations as 
political institutions. Berle also found politics in all manner of corporations, a view 
that he shares with Aristotle.556 
 
Richard Eells contends that assuming political life for corporations brings about 
inescapable political issues. In the light of this political life, the responsibilities of 
corporate managers should be correctly spelled out, while new ways should be 
recognized to hold them accountable. But there is still the constitutional crisis that 
arises from political life.557 Eugene V. Rostow has argued against corporate 
democracy as a solution to constitutional crisis. He holds that “shareholder 
democracy” is impractical and there is no solution for it even in theory. He further 
argues that the best way to hold corporate managers accountable is to restrict their 
ability to direct the corporation for the sole purpose of profit maximization for their 
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shareholders. By this he implies that the employee interests should be taken care of by 
unions while protecting public interests is the matter of concern for the public 
government.558 Corporations can make a huge contribution to social problems; 
therefore, it is unreasonable to limit their role to profit-making and leave social 
reforms to others. The only issue here seems to be the concept of accountability that 
needs to be redefined.559   
 
Based on a review on CSR of MNCs in developing countries, Amba-rao560 argued 
that the solution is the institutional interactions among MNCs, the governments of 
developing countries, the respective governments of MNCS, international 
organizations and other stakeholders and activists in developing countries. 
Aaronson561 observed that since “many developing countries do not have strong 
human rights, labour and environmental laws, voluntary corporate responsibility 
initiatives are insufficient to address problems MNCs confront in their overseas 
operations”.  
 
Many researchers have hypothesised that CSR in emerging economies is still in a very 
early stage and suitable mechanisms do not exist to ensure that companies practice 
CSR with anything other than a charitable outlook. Kemp562 states: “there are 
numerous obstacles to achieving corporate responsibility, particularly in many 
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developing countries where the institutions, standards and appeals system, which give 
life to CSR in North America and Europe, are relatively weak.” Chambers et al.563 
measure the extent of CSR penetration in seven Asian companies and show that the 
mean value for the seven countries (even including industrially advanced Japan) is 
just 41% compared with, say, a score of 98% for a developed nation like the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Moon564 has identified three types of CSR reporting: “community involvement”, 
“socially responsible production processes” and “socially responsible employee 
relations”. He argues that at the very beginning stages of development of CSR in 
emerging economies is the “community involvement,” which requires a minimum 
amount of communal goodwill to operate in the business environment. Similarly, the 
results of the comparative study by Chambers et al.565 show that currently Asian 
nations are still engaging strongly only in the first parameter of community 
involvement. 
 
In particular, it could be argued that the incorporation of more participation into 
governance structures, e.g. the German model which allows employee participation, 
would place a much greater practical emphasis on creating employment and 
protecting jobs. Similarly, it could be argued that encouraging more co-operative 
models of governance might be a better solution for developing countries.566 
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The German model of corporate governance, or better put, “the bank-orientated 
model’s” underlying principle is the proposition that the purpose of the firm should be 
defined more widely than the maximisation of shareholder interests alone. This type 
of corporate governance is characterized by: 1) the dominance of private companies; 
2) ownership concentration of public listed companies; 3) the emphasis on family; 4) 
rare hostile takeovers; 5) allocating a high degree of importance to bank ownership of 
equity; 6) the assumption that there should be some explicit recognition of the well-
being of other groups which have had long-term co-operation and business 
relationship with the firm and therefore an interest, or ‘stake’, in its long-term 
success, such as employees, financiers, suppliers and even customers.567 
 
In this model of corporate governance “moral hazard is ostensibly overcome through 
attempts at achieving efficiency within management and through control. By 
developing a reputation for the ethical treatment of suppliers, clients and employees, 
corporations are able to build up trust relations which support profitable investments 
and mutually beneficial exchanges”.568 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this paper, it has been argued that there is an urgent and persistent need for a 
critical study of the potentials, challenges and limitations of CSR initiatives in 
developing countries. The specific issues in different developing countries should be 
taken into account. 
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In this paper, first, globalization and its effect on developing countries has been 
discussed. In this section, the different nature of CSR policies in developing countries 
were demonstrated and attempts were made to define a conceptual framework based 
on explicit and implicit CSR policies for studying comparative CSR. 
 
Second, the Anglo-American nature of reforms and the two contributing factors to 
development of this model of corporate governance, including the failure of Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and the influence of international financial bodies, 
were discussed. It was concluded that this model, besides the unavailability of 
evidence to confirm that it results in economic development, is not the ideal model for 
a variety of reasons. The Anglo-American model needs a number of modifications to 
adapt to the special needs of developing countries. It has also been suggested that 
developing countries might need to take these modifications of the Anglo-American 
Model into account in the future. 
  
Third, the three main social reporting theories were presented, concluding that they 
are interrelated and should be used in conjunction with one another. Moreover, team 
production theory as an alternative to shareholder wealth maximization and 
arguments in favour and against it were discussed, making more general assumption 
about what the source of value creation is and who bears the risk and who benefits. 
 
Fourth, the stream arguing that social development is a result of economic 
development and counter-arguments was demonstrated. It was suggested that social 
development is not necessarily the result of economic development; on the contrary, 
stable economic development is a result of prior social foundations.  
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Fifth, arguments in favour and against assuming a responsibility for corporations to 
promote development were presented, leading to the technical issue: namely, whether 
corporations are sufficiently equipped to take on community development roles.569 
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Key propositions 
1. The process of transplanting CSR into another legal system is likely to be affected 
by local socio-economic-legal conditions, cultural values and institutional 
arrangements; 
1.1. The connection between corporate legal rules and CSR principles is largely a 
reflexive one;  
1.2. The so-called “law-matters” thesis needs to be assessed by reference to what 
has been referred to as “functional equivalents” to law in transitional 
economies such as Iran;  
1.3. The act of borrowing is usually simple, while building up a theory of 
borrowing on the other hand is more complex;  
2. The impact of CSR values upon corporations in transitional economies, such as 
Iran, is likely to be shaped by the internal norms in these corporations;  
3. The political determinants of CSR are fundamental to explaining its impact; these 
will vary from developed to transitional economies;  
3.1. The State has a major influence in developing countries, such as Iran, upon 
the adoption of CSR in many companies;  
3.2. Transitional economies, such as Iran, present major obstacles to the adoption 
of a dispersed ownership model of the corporation; 
3.3. The relationship between the legal rule to be transplanted and the socio-
political structure of the “origin” jurisdiction will determine the rejection or 
acceptance of legal transplants.  
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Chapter 5: Iran: Analysis of Societal and Legal 
Characteristics of Iran’s Society 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to implement CSR policies in a country, in the first instance a study of how 
corporate governance systems work in that country is necessary. 
 
The corporate governance system in Iran is not similar to the ones in the Western 
countries. Upon studying this system, it was concluded that there are several obstacles 
embedded in the Iranian corporate governance system that makes the development of 
corporate social responsibility policies very difficult, if not impossible. Two of the 
most significant obstacles are: the lack of a proper private sector and the lack of a 
proper taxation system.  
 
Despite the serious call for “privatization” under Principle 44 of Iran’s Constitutional 
Law, most corporations in Iran are either completely owned by the government or the 
government holds the majority share (the so-called “half private/half public 
companies”). In governmental economies, corporations do not see the necessity of 
developing good governance policies or acting responsibly towards stakeholders and 
society in general. The Iranian government claims that they are implementing 
Principle 44 strongly by selling governmental corporations to the private sector; 
however, in reality all of the big former governmental companies are sold to either 
“Social Security Organization” or “Retirement Organization,” which are practically 
private sectors of the government and therefore a part of the government.  
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The lack of a proper taxation system comes from the government’s attitude towards 
tax. Tax can be used for controlling corporations through a punishment and reward 
system. Also paying tax as a social duty will make corporations fulfil their social duty 
as an education means and might also remind corporations of their other social duties. 
At the same time, taxes can be used further down the road by the government to 
provide better welfare for society. But the Iranian government’s income is from oil 
and gas, not tax; therefore, the government simply does not care about collecting 
taxes.  
 
In order to see how CSR polices can be implemented in Iran, one needs to study how 
the existing socio-legal system can be improved and how a new socio-legal system 
could be implemented. CSR is a way of behaving and one needs to see how this way 
of behaving can be influenced and directed towards more socially responsible 
behaviour in society as a first step to be able to find its way to corporations in the next 
step. 
 
In order to demonstrate this, first, the historical-political process and aspects of 
Constitutionalism Revolution in Iran will be discussed. Constitutionalism in Iran is a 
historically tested experience of introducing a new system in the legally 
underdeveloped Iran of that time. It brought all the contradictory social and political 
issues to the surface. How the Iran of that time responded to that introduction might 
tell us a lot about how it might respond to the introduction of another new system. 
Moreover, Constitutionalism was a quasi-successful movement in Iran. How it gained 
its success and where it made mistakes that led to the not-very-successful results can 
be very helpful in figuring out what obstacles CSR will be encountering while being 
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introduced in Iran, and how that will be dealt with. Additionally, studying 
Constitutionalism Revolution, as a way of limiting the State’s power, will help us 
understand how the Iranian government can be influenced. Is it by way of pressure 
from inside, or external forces such as globalization?  
  
The challenge between traditionalism and modernism in Iran, how it is going through 
this phase and how Iranian society is dealing with modernism is an important element 
in discussion of any change in Iran. Iran is a deeply religious society. In the eyes of 
many Iranians and the government, modernism has always been seen as a tool used by 
Western countries to impose their values and ideologies, which has always been 
considered as a threat to Islamic values in Muslim developing countries such as Iran. 
Modernism has been either totally disapproved of by the clerics or partially approved 
on the grounds of necessity. It goes without saying that partially approved modernism 
values have been very strictly Islamized, leading to changing the whole underlying 
concept and main purpose of those values.570 
 
The danger in implementing CSR policies in Iran is that it might be considered 
another aspect of modernism; therefore, it might either get totally rejected or, if 
implemented, strictly Islamized. This situation might compromise the underlying 
concepts and purpose of CSR. Some scholars have questioned the validity of the 
argument that considers modernism as Western values. They argue that if modernism 
was purely Western, people would not internalize it in their life and there would be no 
reason for the government’s intervention by spending precious time, energy and 
money on trying to talk people out of it and convince them that modernism is a bad 
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thing. They further maintain that in reality all these attributions of modernism values 
to the West, which is called “Western moral corruption” by the government, is but 
“people’s desires and critical spirit”.571 
 
Then, Corporate Law (included in the Commercial Code) and the corporate 
governance system will be presented. Attempts will be made to see if Iran’s Corporate 
Law and corporate governance system is an impediment to good governance and what 
changes should be made in order to encourage more socially responsible behaviour by 
corporations. 
 
One type of corporation in Iran, co-operatives, appears to be designed to meet 
corporate social responsibility purposes. The very reason of its existence is to enhance 
public welfare by reducing prices and ensuring the quality of products. At the same 
time, the nature of these companies supports their employees since it makes lay-offs 
and dissolution harder compared with other companies. This chapter will present a 
full study of this type of corporation. 
 
One issue that should be taken into consideration while studying corporate 
governance in Iran is that there are not many corporations in Iran in the Western 
meaning of ‘corporation’. For example, in the United States a corporation, in order to 
be named a corporation, should either have more than 100 employees or a certain 
annual turnover. In Iran’s case, theoretically, private corporations in this meaning do 
not exist extensively and are not encouraged by the government. There are a few 
privately owned corporations and a lot of governmental corporations. Practically, 
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however, there are a decent number of privately owned corporations, but since their 
shares are not traded on the stock exchange they are not known. One of the 
complications about studying Iran is the fact that there are many differences between 
the theory on the books and common practice. 
 
Some have argued that Islamic finance does not correspond with corporations in its 
Western form since these corporations are modelled based on the capitalist policies 
which do not require bringing true “justice” to people, while Islamic finance requires 
the economy and its main actors (corporations) to consider bringing “justice” to the 
society as their main purpose. “Justice” means that all levels of the society should be 
treated equally no matter how wealthy or educated they are. Some have gone so far as 
arguing corporations in the capitalist way will undermine Islamic principles.  
 
In contrast, another school of thought believes that “justice” does not mean that we 
should divide everything evenly in the society. They argue that real justice will only 
be provided if wealth is distributed according to each person’s education, the efforts 
that they put into achieving something and their social status. They argued that the 
true “justice” is not “economic justice” but “social justice” and if any government 
claims that it will provide its people with the former, they have promised the 
impossible.572 
 
Having outlined the above-mentioned Islamic finance issues, studying Islamic finance 
and how Iran’s government abides by it (or at least claims to do so), will be helpful 
for the purpose of this thesis. The point that should be taken into account is that there 
                                                
572 Hossein Naraghi, Follow-ups on the Insider Sociology (7 edn, Akhtaran publishing 2006) 68 
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are some differences in Shia’s conception of Islamic finance and Sunni’s conception 
of it. Shia (Iran’s sect of Islam) has stricter rules, resulting in the decline of privately 
owned corporations as compared to their growth in Sunni countries.  
 
5.2 Constitutionalism in Iran 
Due to ignorance and lack of knowledge from leaders, the contemporary history of 
Iran is marked by the use of violence to further the interests of conflicting and 
incompatible ideologies. There has never been balance, from the Qajar573 dynasty 
until the present moment.574 Violence forms an important part of this sensitive 
historical period. It goes without saying that violence only results in violence. Being 
caught in this vicious circle of violence will lead to the most dangerous point in time 
for a nation, in which people know nothing other than violence and using violence to 
express their ideas will seem like a natural thing.  
 
Constitutionalism in Iran was accompanied by many misuses on the part of some 
intellectual avant-gardes and opportunistic persons. They pushed this movement to 
the extreme from the very beginning by using the consequent openness of ambience 
to harass and ruin many people’s reputation. They also questioned many Islamic 
principles under the name of Constitutionalism. This situation went on and on to the 
extent that the very people who triggered the Constitutionalism turned against it, 
resulting in the banning of parliament by “Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar”.575 Ajoodani 
                                                
573 The dynasty preceding the Pahlavi dynasty (the last dynasty before the Islamic Revolution) 
574 Majid Ajoodani, Iranian Constitutionalism Revolution (Akhtaran Publications 2004) 25 
575 Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar was the Shah of Persia from January 8, 1907 to July 16, 1909. He was 
against the constitution that was ratified during the reign of his father, Mozzafar-al-Din Shah. In 1907 
Mohammad Ali dissolved Majles (Iranian parliament/National assembly) and declared the Constitution 
abolished because it was contrary to Islamic law.[1] He bombarded the Majles with the military and 
political support of Russia and Britain. Available at “BBC Persian” website: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2006/07/060724_pm-ma-constitution-sem.shtml   
 190 
maintained that forcefully dissolving the parliament was actually to the benefit of the 
whole Constitutionalism movement and rescued it. He argued that if Mohammad Ali 
shad had not done so, people would have done it themselves anyway. If that had been 
the case, nobody could have been able to even breathe a word about Constitutionalism 
for another century in Iran.576  
 
Some have argued that the wrongdoings of a few persons should not have questioned 
the whole Constitutionalism movement. But these scholars have misunderstood the 
main reasons for people’s concern about Constitutionalism. The main issues were not 
a few wrongdoings but rather the fact that the advocates of Constitutionalism were 
trying to impose their ideologies and personal understandings of Constitutionalism 
through violence and the very non-democratic ways that people wanted to put an end 
to them by Constitutionalism. Similarly, questioning Islam through Constitutionalism 
was the very first mistake that led to disapproval of it from the clerics and people.577 
 
It goes without saying that any prudent person would have realized that in the time of 
autarchy and in such a deeply religious society, in order to develop Constitutionalism 
principles and have a parliament, conformity with Islamic principles was a necessity. 
That is why in order to rescue the movement at the time, several papers were written 
to defend Constitutionalism. They tried to justify it by religion. Even the atheist 
leaders of Constitutionalism put a lot of effort into corresponding Constitutionalism 
principles with Islam. They suggested not only that Constitutionalism is not against 
Islam but also that it originated from Islamic customs.578 Moreover, in order to 
                                                
576 Ajoodani 24 
577 Ali Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in 
Iran (Cambridge University Press 2000) 114 
578 Ajoodani 27 
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implement a new system in any country, understanding the phonetics579 of its people 
is of huge importance.  
 
What has been said about the Islamic justification of Constitutionalism demonstrates 
quite fairly how things work in Iran. Some have argued that a real Islamic government 
and true “justice” can only be provided when the Twelfth Imam (Mahdi)580 rises 
again; therefore, giving the title of “Islamic” to any government is false and indeed 
against Islam. In their point of view, ruling by a cleric leader on Muslims is Islamic 
rule, not an Islamic government, and if such a ruler enjoys absolute power, he will be 
corrupt absolutely. In conclusion, having a parliament which restricts the leader’s 
power will reduce the amount of corruption and will contribute to guarding the root of 
Islam from corruption. In other words, Constitutionalism not only does not infringe 
Islamic principles, it also provides people with more justice.581 
 
Many have argued for the “Iranianizing of Constitutionalism”. One can easily realize 
what this school of thought meant by “Iranianizing of Constitutionalism” was, in fact, 
Islamizing Constitutionalism by reducing its fundamentals to the least possible so it 
can be in conformity with Islam. They did not want Iranian Constitutionalism follow 
the Western way of Constitutionalism since, as has been mentioned earlier, Western 
values have always been considered a threat to Islam.582 In contrast, even from the 
very beginning of the attempts at justifying Constitutionalism, there were some 
                                                
579 By “Phonetics” is meant “the basic patterns of behaviour”. 
580 According to the Shi’a and Sunni versions of the Islamic eschatology, the Mahdi (meaning: "Guided 
One") is the prophesied redeemer of Islam who will stay on earth seven, nine or nineteen years 
(depending on the interpretation) before the coming of the day ("Day of the Resurrection" or "Day of 
the Standing"). Muslims believe the Mahdi will rid the world of error, injustice and tyranny alongside 
Jesus.  
581 Ajoodani 36 
582 Mirsepassi 170 
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intellectuals trying to remind the scholars of the dangerous road they were stepping 
into. They argued that these reductions to the least possible would lead to 
misunderstanding and to the undermining of the fundamental concepts underlying 
Constitutionalism, among which the equality between men and women and the 
equality between Muslims and non-Muslims were the prefect examples.583 
 
Having stated all the above-mentioned facts, one should bear in mind that achieving a 
modern civilization would not happen simply by adapting the look of modernity or 
Constitutionalism such as parliament, industry or commerce; society needs to 
understand the fundamentals of the modern way of thinking. As long as society and 
people hold onto their traditional perception of life and are not willing to change the 
way they see the world, the real change will not happen.584 
 
Another point that should be taken into consideration is that there is no one unique 
reason behind a historical event and its consequences. Iran has always been a very 
complicated society; therefore, regarding one happening as the sole reason of legal 
underdevelopment would be unrealistic. One of the indications of the complexity of 
issues in Iran is in the very fact that, on one occasion, the leading sociology and 
history scholars consider autarchy as the main reason for the separation of the State 
from people, leading to underdevelopment, while, on another occasion, they consider 
the ruling of clerics as the main reason for underdevelopment.  
 
                                                
583 Laroui 249 
584 Dariush Ashoori, The Inside and Outside of Our Historical Experience (1988) 76 
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5.3 The power of clerics  
The necessity of the existence of the authority of law is beyond question. Ideally, 
people should obey the law not because they have to but because they want to. This 
can be very hard to achieve in the case of Iran because the nation sees itself as 
different from the State. There is a huge gap and separation between the State and the 
society for a couple of reasons: first, autocracy and second, Shia’s conception of the 
State, which believes that unless there is ruling by an Islamic government, true 
“justice” will never come to the surface. The clerics have been cultivating this in 
people’s heads for so long that it has turned into a culture. Always being unhappy 
with the government is deeply embedded in Iranian culture, even now that Iran has an 
Islamic government.585 
 
Another reason for this separation is that Iran has a deeply religious society; that is, 
the clerics are very powerful. This power has a historical root. In Qajar’s time, 
“Mohammad Ali Shah”, during the war with Russia, needed strong support from the 
people. In order to mobilize people, he needed the clerics to use their influence on 
people and ask them to go to war by justifying the war through religion.  
 
In return for the clerics’ favour, the king made them very powerful by giving them 
judiciary power; that is, if people wanted to solve a problem, they could go to the 
clerics instead of the government, and as time went by the necessity of having a 
government faded away. Consequently, two different courts came into existence in 
Iran: the “Religious Court” and the “Customary Court”. The “Religious Court” was 
governed by the clerics and its jurisdiction would involve anything that was related to 
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Islam and a Muslim’s personal life. One can easily see how broadly this jurisdiction 
can be interpreted. The “Customary Court” looked into the cases that were related to 
the State and the well-being of the nation in general. Obviously, one can also easily 
figure out the clash of interests between these two jurisdictions. The 
Constitutionalism Revolution in Iran tried to fill this gap between these two courts by 
putting the authority of law above the power of these two courts but, as mentioned 
earlier, it did not gain the expected success.  
 
The experience of the Iran-Russia war in “Mohammad Ali Shah” time made both the 
State and the clerics aware of the clerics’ deep influence in society and their power 
over people. However, in Iran’s society of that time, where there were no political 
parties and no possibility of establishing one, these powerful clerics formed the only 
opposition against the government. Sometimes if they had the necessary power and 
status, they would go so far as claiming the ruling power since according to Shia: true 
“justice” can only be achieved through Islamic ruling. But if they did not have the 
necessary power they would co-operate with the government under the condition that 
government would only take serious decisions after consulting them and having their 
assent. Of course, if the government breached this arrangement, clerics would cause 
disturbance by using their influence on people. They would boycott that decision by 
using religion.586 
 
As long as the separation between the State and people continues to exist, the conflict 
between them will never be resolved. It had been argued that as long as the litigation 
power stays with the clerics, people see no reason to go to the State for solving their 
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problems; therefore, the State would be non-essential and even the follower of the 
clerics.587 This is the reason behind the big gap between the government and people. 
This is the reason why Iranians have always considered the government an unjust and 
against-its-own-people phenomena.  
 
Another reason for bad perceptions about the government in Iran is the embedded 
Shia’s assumption that any non-cleric ruler is unjust rather than Iranian culture. In 
ancient Iran’s culture, the head of the State has always been considered a messenger 
from God and a righteous person, not someone cruel. Moreover, one might logically 
conclude that people’s bad image of the government might be simply because the 
government acted badly towards them.588 In autocratic governments, people have no 
security regarding their lives and properties. One night they are the richest and the 
next they might lose everything. This was true about the Iranian government of that 
time and it is true even now.  
 
It has been argued that the quasi-successful experience of the Constitutionalism 
Revolution proved that the religious intervention of the clerics in the political 
governance of the situation was not to the advantage of the whole movement since the 
clerics’ intervention was based on religion policies, which in most of the cases was 
not democratic. 
 
Admyiat, while agreeing with the above-mentioned argument, emphasized that even 
implementing this correct argument by reformists through violence and through non-
                                                
587 Mirza Fath-Ali Akhoondzadeh, New Alphabet and the Writings (Hamid Mohammad zadeh ed, Mehr 
Publishers 1979) 199-201 
588 Fereydun Adamiyat, The Ideas of Mirza Fath Ali Akhund Zadeh (1970) 162-3 
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democratic ways was as wrong as the religious interventions.589 At the same time, 
considering the role of religion in Iran’s society, Constitutionalism in Iran would have 
never lasted without taking Islamic fundamentals into account.  
 
5.4 Freedom of thinking  
The notion of “Freedom of thinking” has always faced the most powerful opposition 
in Iran. Each time that a bit of political freedom was achieved in Iran, it led to 
political chaos. This chaos reached the extent that some newspapers threatened to 
murder the king of the time and nobody even bothered to tell them that they were 
crossing a borderline. But the interesting point in these times of political freedom, 
even in that to-the-extreme political freedom, none of the extremist newspapers dared 
to talk about the basic freedoms, such as the freedom of thinking or the freedom of 
way of life. 
 
The prerequisite for asking for any kind of freedom in Iran has always been justifying 
that freedom according to Islamic principles.590 Also, freedom has always been 
accompanied by attacking the political autarchy. Reformists have always tried to 
solve the problem of not having the basic freedoms by political solutions, among 
which were replacing the autocratic system with the parliament system. 
 
In general, freethinking in Iran, in which noble and genuine ideologies would grow, 
has never been possible. New social and philosophical ideologies could not be 
developed while the new political ideas could freely grow, be used and customized. 
That explains why the intellectuals, who never had the chance to develop their own 
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ideology, in case of occasional freedom of expression would think of using the 
western ideologies to rescue Iran. The main issue with these ideologies was that they 
were not grown in an Iranian background and failed to take into account its culture, 
mindset and history. Consequently, these ideologies were totally foreign to the 
people, which finally in most cases led to them being disapproved of by the people. 
Predictably, this situation ended in many contradictions between the intellectual 
scholars’ words and their actions.591 They could not practice their words since society 
would be opposed to them. 
 
5.5 The Corporate Governance System in Iran 
In order to analyze the corporate governance system in Iran, studying the company 
law (embedded in the Commercial Code) is prerequisite. A summary of the most 
important and relevant articles of the Iranian corporate governance code has been 
attached to this thesis as Index 1. 
 
Iran’s company law was codified in 1933. It is a part of Commercial Code (Articles 
20-222). The public joint stock company and private joint stock company part of 
company law was amended in 1969, adding three hundred articles to the Company 
Law. 
 
There are five main types of corporations in Iran: 
1. Public and private joint stock company 
2. Limited liability company 
3. General partnership 
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4. Joint stock partnership 
5. Co-operatives 
 
The biggest companies in terms of capital are either Public Joint Stock Companies or 
Co-operatives, which in the case of Iran, both types of corporations either belong to 
the government or the government holds the biggest block of shares, enabling it to 
control the big investments especially in the natural resources-related industries. The 
biggest companies in terms of number are the private joint stock companies and the 
limited liability companies which are run by private investors. Most of the time the 
leading shareholders of these types of corporations are either family members or that 
company’s founder’s trustees.592 
 
These five types of companies are rooted in the French Commercial Code. A short 
summary of each type of company will follow: 
 
5.5.1 Public and Private Joint Stock Company: 
A joint-stock company is a company whose capital is divided into shares and the 
responsibility of shareholders is restricted to the nominal amount of their shares.593 
 
There are two types of joint stock companies: The public and the private one. The 
main difference between these two types is in the method of issuing shares. In public 
joint stock companies the starting capital can be drawn from the public and they are 
tradable in the Stock Exchange. This type of company is also capable of issuing 
                                                
592 Mahmood Erfani, Commercial Law, vol Second (Mizan Pubblishing 2002) 94 
593 Art. 1 of R. A. C. C. (Abbreviation stands for Reformative Articles of Commercial Code, passed on 
March 4, 1969) 
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debentures; whereas in the private joint stock company, only the founders should 
provide the starting capital and the shares are not tradable in the Stock Exchange.  
 
Every public joint stock company has an Articles of Association, which sets out the 
preliminaries for establishing a company and share descriptions. The Articles of 
Association also declares that the company is established by the decision of the 
General Assembly and being registered at the Company Registration Office. 
 
Company law has explained the assemblies, the procedures they should go through in 
their meetings, their authority, the participation of shareholders and the shareholders’ 
right to be informed beforehand what is going to be discussed in the meetings. 
 
The assemblies play an important role in the joint stock companies since they have 
the authority to make critical decisions. At the same time they are the most influential 
tool for the shareholders to supervise the directors. Assemblies choose the directors 
and the inspectors, who are required to report their activities back to these assemblies 
and seek the assembly’s approval in special cases.594 
 
There are three assemblies: 
 
1. Founder’s General Assembly, which takes place just once among the founders at the 
very beginning of establishing the company. They decide on whether the company is 
ready to be established or not.  
 
                                                
594 Rabia Eskini, Commercial Law, vol Second (Samt Publishing 2001) 126 
 200 
2. Ordinary General Assembly, which has the authority to take decisions about all the 
matters related to the company except the ones that are specifically attributed to the 
Extraordinary General Assembly.  
 
3. Extraordinary General Assembly, which makes decisions about the changes that 
should be made in the capital, the changes that are proposed to be made in the Articles 
of Association and dissolving the company. 
 
Both types of joint stock companies are managed by a Board of Directors, whose 
members are appointed by the shareholders at an Ordinary General Assembly 
meeting. The Board of Directors consists of five persons in the public joint stock 
companies and three persons in the private joint stock companies. The directors may 
make decisions about all matters related to the company except those decisions that 
are especially attributed to the Ordinary General Assembly meetings or the 
Extraordinary General Assembly meetings. 
 
The interests of shareholders are protected by the presence of inspectors in the 
company who were previously chosen in the General Assembly meeting. They ensure 
that the company’s accounts are in order and being managed properly and 
shareholders receive accurate information at the shareholders’ Assembly meetings. If 
an inspector breaches his duties, he may be held liable both under civil or criminal 
liability.595 
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The Commercial Code provides the details of civil and criminal liabilities for breach 
of duties upon the part of any member of the company. 
 
5.5.2 Limited Liability Company 
In limited liability companies, the capital is not divided into normal shares but into 
“Partnership shares,” which means each partner’s responsibility towards the 
company’s debts is as much as his capital. Family members or groups of friends 
usually form this type of business association. It is built based on their mutual trust. 
 
Any transfer of shares needs three-quarters of shareholders’ consent; a condition that 
makes share transfers very hard to carry out. This characteristic of limited liability 
companies is what differentiates them from public joint stock companies where shares 
are freely tradable either by the shareholder himself or through the Stock Exchange.596 
 
According to Article 105 of the Direct Taxes Law, both joint stock companies and 
limited liability companies are subject to the same tax rate. However, public joint 
stock companies whose shares are traded in the Stock Exchange enjoy 10% income 
tax exemption. This is one of the government’s policies to encourage big companies 
to trade their shares in the Stock Exchange. 
 
As for the governance structure of limited liability companies, the managing director 
has large discretion as to the decisions he makes. The courts are reluctant to hold 
them liable for their business decisions. Although there is no legal requirement for 
holding a shareholders’ meeting for taking major decisions, in practice most of the 
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limited liability companies in their Articles of Association articulate that any major 
decision should be authorized by a majority of at least half of the companies’ capital 
owners. In this way, they try to make sure the managing director (who might be 
chosen from the capital owners or outside of them) does not misuse his discretion. 
 
At the same time, it is required by the law that where a limited liability company has 
more than twelve partners, there has to be a board of supervisors, which has the same 
responsibilities as the inspectors in the public joint stock companies. 
 
5.5.3 Co-operatives 
Cooperation and helping others have been the leading motto of all the different 
governments in Iran. At the same time, in Iranian culture, helping others has always 
been an important social value, which compared with the Iran of today, was more 
predominant in the past. This social arrangement found its way into company law in 
the form of Co-operatives. Moreover, Article 44 of the Constitutional Law 
emphasizes that Co-operatives hold a special place in the heart Iran’s economy.597 
  
Co-operatives are a form of business association between artisans who mutually 
produce and sell the same goods. Profits are divided according to each member’s 
shares. 
 
The most well-known Co-operative in Iran is the Dwelling Co-operative. Most of the 
mayors, at the beginning of their office tenure, establish a big Dwelling Co-operative 
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through which they promise to provide people with low-cost housing. In this way, 
they gain people’s support for their future career opportunities and promotions. 
 
Other Co-operatives are: Producers’ Co-operatives, which covers agriculture, 
industries, mines, properties, fishing industries and the like; Rural Co-operatives; 
Worker’s Co-operatives; and Consumer’s Co-operatives, through which arrangements 
for the selling of goods needed by certain types of people will be made. 
 
The importance of these kinds of companies has been to the extent that a ministry has 
been established for supervising them. The Co-operatives Ministry authorizes the 
establishment and dissolution of Co-operatives. 
 
The law is harder on the Co-operatives. The directors are chosen by the General 
Assembly meeting. Any decisions regarding any change in the Articles of 
Association, dismissal of directors, dissolution and mergers is only at the discretion of 
the Extraordinary General Assembly with the Ministry of Co-operatives holding a 
decisive position in the procedure. 
 
The company is internally supervised by inspectors that should be chosen for the 
course of two years. Their duties include auditing the company’s books and accounts, 
hearing the complaints and preparing the annual report.  
 
Co-operatives, in general, appear to be more in accordance with corporate social 
responsibility policies. The very reason of their existence is to enhance public welfare 
by reducing prices and ensuring the quality of products. At the same time, the nature 
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of these companies supports employees since it makes lay-offs and dissolution harder 
than in other companies.  
 
5.6 Co-operatives 
Co-operatives in Iran have been defined as a sort of corporation that is established by 
natural persons, legal persons or a combination of both. These kinds of corporation 
are supposed to be non-governmental but in the case of Iran, they are all 
governmental. Their goal is to produce or to distribute in order to achieve the goal of 
improving economic and social welfare by encouraging co-operation between 
different ranges of actors.598 
 
The main purposes of Co-operatives are stipulated in the Co-operatives Law: 
1. Entrepreneurship  
2. Helping to fulfil social justice  
3. Helping to provide investments and facilities for the workforce 
4. Improving the sense of co-operation and public involvement in society 
5. Preventing hoarding, inflation and monopoly.599 
 
Principle 44 of the Constitutional Law is the leading legal guidance for the economic 
governance of Iran. According to this principle the main economic sectors in Iran are 
ranked:  
1. Governmental 
2. Co-operatives 
                                                
598 Ali Hassani, The Co-operatives (University of Tehran Press 1995) 67 
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3. Private 
 
It goes without saying that mentioning Co-operatives as the second main economic 
sector shows its importance in Iran’s economic and legal policies. 
 
The state sector includes all large-scale industries, foreign trade, major minerals, 
banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio 
and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, 
railroads and the like. These will all be publicly owned and administered by the State. 
Cooperative companies and enterprises concerned with production and distribution in 
urban and rural areas form the basis of the Co-operative sector and will be operated in 
accordance with Shariah law. As of 2008, 120,000 Co-operatives were in operation 
across the country employing about 15 million people.600 The private sector consists 
of enterprises concerned with construction, agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, 
trade, and services that supplement the economic activities of the State and Co-
operative sectors.601 
 
Since strict interpretation of Article 44 has never been enforced in Iran, the private 
sector has played a much larger role than that outlined in the Constitution.602 As a 
result, in recent years the role of this sector has increased, whilst a 2004 amendment 
to the Constitution allows 80% of State assets to be privatized. Forty per cent of such 
sales are to be conducted through the “Justice Shares” scheme and the rest through the 
Tehran Stock Exchange. The government will retain ownership of the remaining 
                                                
600 ‘120,000 Cooperatives Operating in Iran’ (Iran Daily, 30 June 2008)  <http://www.nitc.co.ir/iran-
daily/1387/3162/html/economy.htm>  
601 Iranian Constitution adopted on 24 October 1979  
602 ‘Call for Prioritizing Vision 2025’ (Iran Daily, 12 February 2009)  <http://www.nitc.co.ir/iran-
daily/1387/3340/html/economy.htm>  
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20%.603 In 2005, the government assets were estimated at around $120 billion. Some 
$63 billion of such assets were privatized in the period 2005–2010, reducing the 
government’s direct share of gross domestic product (GDP) from 80% to 40%.604 
 
The Co-operatives have based their activities on the following principles: 
 
1. Voluntary membership for everyone. 
2. Democratic governance by the members and free flow of information. 
3. Economic participation of members: usually a part of investment is provided 
by the public. 
4. Independence from governmental organizations. 
5. Educating the members. 
6. Co-operation between all the Co-operatives. 
7. Being socially responsible. 
 
The following charts show the Co-operative organization in Iran: 
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There are three types of Co-operative organizations in Iran:605 
 
1. Governmental Co-operatives: governmental organization either supervises or supports 
these Co-operatives. They are managed by the government. The most important roles 
of these governmental organizations are first to make sure that Co-operatives abide by 
good governance principles and second, to provide financial aids for them. The Co-
operatives Ministry and Co-operatives Fund are two major governmental 
organizations formed for this purpose by the government. 
 
The Ministry of Co-operatives can ask the court to suspend directors of a given Co-
operative and if the court obtains the necessary evidence to prove the suspension was 
the right course of action, it will allow the Ministry to dismiss the directors and 
choose temporary new ones.  
 
The Co-operative Fund’s duty is to provide Co-operatives with the necessary funds 
from the government and attract investments.  
 
2. Non-governmental Co-operatives (People’s Co-operatives): these organizations are 
voluntary organizations which are formed by people who have the same economic 
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and social needs.  Despite the fact that these organizations enjoy financial aids from 
the government, they have dependent legal entities and are governed by their 
members. Co-operative corporations and Co-operative unions fall into this category. 
 
3. Intermediary Co-operatives: Co-operatives Office is the only legal entity that falls 
into this group of organizations. The members of this organization are Co-operative 
corporations and unions. From a financial and administrative point of view, these 
organizations are non-governmental. But the government’s relationship with this 
Office is different from its relationship with Co-operative corporations or unions. The 
Co-operatives Ministry plays an important role in the decision-making, managing and 
supervising of this Office. These characteristics of Co-operatives’ Office practically 
qualify it as a governmental organization. 
 
The Co-operatives Office has the same role as the Chamber of Commerce but in the 
Co-operatives sector. At the same time, it should perform the duties that are devolved 
upon it by the Ministry.  It also has the role of arbitration in disputes. 
Chapter 6: Corporate Social Responsibility in Iran 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Iran, located in the Middle East, a politically troubled and unstable region of the 
world, has unique environmental characteristics. Moreover, Iran is a strict Islamic 
country basing its social and commercial activities on fundamentalist religious 
regulations. The 1979 Iranian Revolution changed the Iranian people’s social values 
and corporate culture. For example, being faithful is one of the conditions to be 
selected as a high-ranking board member or director. In addition to religion and 
culture, the origin of French and Belgian civil law influences corporate culture in Iran. 
 
In the recent years, because of the increase in general knowledge, education, 
exposition to international communities of national corporations and the presence of 
international corporations, Iran’s market is becoming more competitive and gradually 
CSR is finding its way into company decision-making. 
 
CSR in Iran is far removed from its strategic Western concept. It is mainly 
synonymous with philanthropy or sponsorship of different cultural/sports events and 
with donating money in natural disasters. Few companies have strategic CSR and if 
they do it is usually within the EFQM606 framework. 
 
Voluntary CSR in Iran is deeply interwoven with a strong culture of donating money 
to charities, building schools, mosques and hospitals. It is also profoundly embedded 
with Islamic religious customs of helping the poor by donating money under the 
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membership foundation based in Brussels. 
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Islamic concepts of Khums,607 Zakat608 and ًWaqf.609 These Islamic concepts have not 
been specifically called Corporate Social Responsibility but socially responsible 
behaviour exists in Iranian culture and religious customs. Some argue that if these 
socially responsible cultural concepts combine with a new commercial concept of 
CSR, better results will be achieved610 but this view is rather simplistic. The modern 
concept of CSR, like any other modern Western concept, is likely to be affected by 
socio-economic-legal conditions. The socio-political structure of Iran will determine 
the rejection or acceptance of CSR concepts. The act of borrowing from other legal 
systems is a complex matter.  
 
The literature on CSR in Iran is very scarce. Even the few attempts at research are 
shallow and in many cases, contradictory. They do not explore CSR in an Iranian 
concept of CSR but rather try to explain why Iran does not have CSR in the Western 
style, arguing that Iran is not economically ripe for Western CSR concepts. While this 
argument might be partially correct when it comes to securing investments for large 
corporations, not having a Western style CSR is not in itself a bad thing. 
Implementing Western concepts in Iran is a complex matter that requires a lot of 
research on how foreign laws and regulations can be transplanted to Iran. 
Transplanting CSR policies in Iran without the above-mentioned considerations might 
end in their rejection. At the same time, Iran has special characteristics, a very 
different culture and a very different socio-legal system. Digging deeply into these 
                                                
607 Khums is the Arabic word for One Fifth (1/5). According to Shia Islamic legal terminology, it 
means one-fifth of certain items which a person acquires as wealth, and which must be paid as an 
Islamic tax. 
608 Zakāt or "alms giving", one of the Five Pillars of Islam, is the giving of 2.5% of one's possessions 
(surplus wealth) to charity, generally to the poor and needy. The Shia double this to 5% of one's 
possessions. 
609 A Waqf is an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, typically denoting a building or plot 
of land for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. The donated assets are held by a charitable trust 
610 An interview with Bagher Namazi, the head of Iranian Institute of Non-governmental Co-
operatives: http://csriran.com/?page_id=26  
 211 
elements might show that there exists an Iranian style of CSR that just needs to be 
strengthened and encouraged rather than changed or renewed. 
 
In this chapter, first, CSR key players in Iran will be shown. Then, the main CSR 
activities in Iran and examples of domestic and foreign company activities will be 
presented. Furthermore, the State’s role, the United Nations’ role and the Stock 
Exchange role in promoting CSR policies will be discussed. Finally, the difficulties of 
promoting CSR policies in Iran will be debated. 
 
6.2 CSR key players in Iran 
 
6.2.1 Government 
Organization Description 
Ministry of Industries and Mines  Government body 
Ministry of Commerce Government body 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Government body 
Environment Organization This organization is a part of the government. Its 
duty is to protect and maintain the environment. 
Institute of Standard and Industrial Research of 
Iran (ISIRI) 
This Institute is a member of ISO. 
Tehran Stock Exchange Co. State owned 
National Committee of Sustainable Development  This committee is part of the Environment 
Organization. Its purpose is to promote 
sustainable development in Iran. 
Centre of Strategic Research The Centre for Strategic Research was established 
in 1989 to compile and draw up the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s strategies in various fields. The 
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main task of the centre is to carry out strategic 
studies in various international, political, 
economic, legal, cultural and social fields. 
 
6.2.2 Corporations 
Corporation  Description 
TAM Irankhodro TAM Irankhodro is a fully owned private 
subsidiary belonging to the publicly owned 
Irankhodro Industrial group offering know-how 
and engineering (EPC) services. 
Saipa Saipa is the second largest Iranian auto 
manufacturer. 
Mashhad Leather Mashhad Leather is the pioneer producer of 
highest quality leather accessories in Iran. 
Mashhad Carpet Mashhad Carpet Company is the largest 
manufacturer of machine-made carpets and area 
rugs in Iran. 
Bahman Group Bahman Group is one of the largest car producing 
and transport companies in Iran. The Environment 
Organization has awarded it as one of the 
environmentally friendly companies. 
Melli Shoe Co. Melli is one of the biggest shoe producing private 
companies in Iran which was confiscated by the 
government. 
Tolypers Co. One of the biggest detergent producers in Iran. 
Golrang Industrial Group 
 
Golrang is a major manufacturer of food and 
detergent products in Iran. 
Damavand Mineral Water Is the leader of bottling mineral water and 
producing soft drinks in the Iranian market. 
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Mobarakeh Steel Company Iran's largest steel maker, and one of the largest 
industrial complexes operating in Iran. 
 
6.2.3 Civil Society 
Media 
Unions  
Universities and research institutes 
 
6.2.4 UN and International Organizations	  
UNDP 
UNICEF 
UNIDO 
Regional Organization of Islamic Chamber of Commerce 
 
6.3 CSR Activities in IranActivities 
6.3.1 UN and International Organizations	  
Established a National MDG Committee  
Held workshops for industrial and State managers about MDG  
Trained a few volunteers on Global Compact  
Published pamphlets about MDG  
Established partnerships between UNICEF and the private sector in Iran 
 
6.3.2 Unions and Associations 
Held CSR conferences in co-operation with UNDP, World Bank and some MNCs  
Held International Symposium on Business Ethics in the Age of Globalization 
Held training courses for companies 
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Published books about business ethics 
 
6.3.3 Government 
Established Institute for Productivity and Human Resources Development 
Awarded National Productivity and Business Excellence Award (EFQM) in co-operation with Ministry 
of Industries 
Codified Social Accountability 8000 Standard 
Established policies on privilege, punishment and empowerment of companies to consider environment 
issues 
Established sustainable development committee with partnership of all ministries 
Held annual conference on green industries and corporations 
Held annual green film festival 
Endowed Green Award 
Established national environment conservation fund 
Codified ‘Good work’ national programme by Ministry of Labour 
Ratified Guild Law by Ministry of Commerce 
Ratified consumer protection law 
Awarded national consumer protection rights award with partnership of Ministry of Commerce 
Codified Corporate Governance Regulation by Tehran Stock Exchange 
 
6.4 Examples of Domestic Companies’ CSR Activities  
Organization CSR Activities 
Pasargad Bank In Iran according to law, people can be 
imprisoned for not paying their debt, even a small 
amount. Usually charities pay the small debts to 
free these prisoners. 
Mobarakeh Steel Employer Assistance 
Tak Makaron in co-operation with UNICEF Nutrition Improvement Programme 
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Behrouz Food Industries in co-operation with 
UNICEF 
Held workshop for deprived women 
Pakshoo in co-operation with UNICEF Supported nurseries in deprived areas of Iran 
Butan Ratified a Code of Ethics, Support for Mehr-e- 
Tehran Charity 
Saipa Performed the environmental project of “Planting 
of one tree for one car”, Established Ramazan 
Charity, Donated money to cancer victims, 
Donated money to victims of the Bam earthquake, 
Obtained a variety of environmental certificates 
Toulipers Recycling and waste management, Use of 
advanced production technologies, Donated 
money to a variety of charities 
Tam Iran Khodro Implemented strategic CSR within EFQM, Co-
operated with research institutes and universities 
to conduct CSR-related researches, Provided 
electronic equipment to the Ministry of Education 
to equip schools, Sponsored different educational 
seminars 
Damavand Mineral Water in cooperation with 
UNICEF 
Provision of educational facilities in 12 cities and 
96 villages, Employee volunteer scheme 
 
6.5 Examples of Foreign Companies’ CSR Activities 
Organization CSR Activities 
OMV Donated money for refurbishment and equipment 
of schools 
Hydro Organized journalist visits to Norway 
Shell Provided educational grants to medical students, 
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Constructed a children’s facility in Bam, Donated 
money for improving internet connection to 
Ahvaz schools, Donated money to footballs clubs 
of Ahvaz schools 
Statoil Organized the invitation of Ilam Football team to 
Norway, Provided technical and educational 
courses for Oil & Gas companies’ managers, 
Trained lifeguards for the IRIS 
BP Published a sophisticated book on Persian 
painting 
BBC Provided journalism training to 15 Iranian 
journalists leading to the launch of the ZigZag 
website 
 
6.6 The State Role in Promoting CSR Policies 
In developing countries such as Iran, directors of corporations and society do not have 
any control in how the macroeconomics of the country are managed. This is where the 
role of the State shows itself. The State needs to have sustainable economic outlook 
while making sure that the managers of large public corporations are behaving 
responsibly in order to be a pioneer for other corporations. 
 
In many developing countries such as Iran, the State has not yet provided stable socio-
economic conditions leading to proper social services and supporting disadvantaged 
people. At the same time, the State rather than being an unbiased player in the market, 
is a major competitor in the market, leading to the excessive distribution of 
commodities or services that the private sector is able to provide. Considering the 
advantageous situation of the State as compared to the private sector, a competitive 
 217 
market is unlikely to happen. 
 
The importance of the role of the State in promoting CSR policies in developing 
countries such as Iran is undeniable. In a survey done by Alireza Omidvar,611 it was 
proven that in spite of constant complaints of managers in Iran about intervening 
policies of the State in their business, 92% of managers agreed that the State has a 
vital role in promoting CSR policies in Iran. Seventy-five per cent of managers 
thought that CSR regulations should be in place. Fifty-six per cent identified the State 
as the most important organization to promote CSR policies. He has also argued in 
favour of mandatory CSR policies in Iran, stating that most corporations in Iran do 
not take into account the least mandatory requirements of taking care of the 
environment and paying minimum wages, let alone voluntary CSR. But the point he 
fails to take into consideration is the fact that if corporations do not take preliminary 
regulations into account, what is the use of more regulations? If the State is capable of 
implementing regulations, it should implement the preliminary ones first. And second, 
if socially responsible behaviour has its root in cultural and religious beliefs in Iran, 
changing them to mandatory regulations might discourage the businessmen involved 
in them, since they see it as a burden or an expense from the government on their 
business. 
 
The State can play different roles in promoting CSR policies. First, it can lead by 
providing guidelines showing how CSR goals can be best achieved. Second, making 
an example by pioneering CSR-related activities in the State corporations to create a 
model that could be followed by private corporations. Third, the State can facilitate 
                                                
611 A survey by Alireza Omidvar: The questionnaires were sent to 101 managers of big corporations in 
Iran, of which 37 answered the survey. 
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the introduction of CSR policies by encouraging and facilitating a competitive market 
while moving towards provision of a stable and predictable market where return on 
investments can be secured. Moreover, the State should not intervene with the 
traditional styles of CSR in Iran but rather encourage the traditional ways. 
 
The Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran’s government 
established the Institute of Productivity and Human Resource Development Institute. 
The purpose of this institute is to improve management quality in Iran. This institute 
is responsible for the Iranian National Productivity and Excellency Award, which is 
very desireable to obtain by Iranian corporations. One of the conditions of receiving 
this award is being socially responsible. This award targets managers of corporations. 
It defines productivity and excellence in taking into account the benefits of 
stakeholders. Stakeholders consist of the State, consumers, employees, competitors, 
shareholders, creditors and society. The logic of this award is that if one of these 
stakeholders does not perform well because of dissatisfaction, the whole production 
line will be harmed; therefore, a productive and excellent manager is the one who 
identifies the key stakeholders and strategically co-operates with them.612 
 
6.7 The UN Role in Promoting CSR Policies in Iran 
UNPD have institutionalized sustainable development in its programmes, leading to 
the “UN Millennium Project” in 2002 in order to develop a concrete action plan for 
the world to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to reverse the grinding 
poverty, hunger and disease affecting billions of people. After final reports on “UN 
Millennium Project” in 2005, a specialist team worked in an advisory capacity to 
                                                
612 An interview with Masood Homayounfar, the head of the Industrial Development and Renovation 
Organization: http://csriran.com/?page_id=25  
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support the implementation of the Project's recommendations, leading to the 
“Millennium Development Goals” with the deadline of 2015. The Millennium 
Development Goals are the world's time-bound and quantified targets for addressing 
extreme poverty in its many dimensions – income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of 
adequate shelter and exclusion – while promoting gender equality, education and 
environmental sustainability. They also cover basic human rights – the rights of each 
person on the planet to health, education, shelter and security. 
 
In Iran, the UNPD have started co-operating with the private sector. They have held 
educational workshops for managers, non-governmental organizations and the public 
in different cities. They have also translated UN leaflets on the “Millennium 
Development Goals” and given them to the participants.  
 
The main purpose of these undertakings is improving the general knowledge about 
the concept of sustainable development and the “UN Millennium Goals”. The UN in 
Iran has recognized a couple of issues impeding the enhancement of sustainable 
development;613 the main issue is the general lack of education and understanding. 
That is why most of the UN programmes are directed to address this issue. Another 
issue is to increase the amount of co-operation between the private sector and the 
State. One of the ways to resolve this issue has been identified as promoting socially 
responsible behaviour so that the private sector will undertake some functions of the 
government. If the relationship between the State and private sector is not ameliorated 
and macroeconomics is extremely faulty, expecting the private sector to be socially 
                                                
613 An Interview with Dr. Mohammad Ali Farzin, the head of the UNPD projects in Iran: 
http://csriran.com/?page_id=20  
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responsible is simplistic since they face more important obstacles to overcome than 
being socially responsible. 
 
Another issue that the UN tries to address in Iran is to promote team thinking and 
teamwork. The main purpose here is to put the managers of large corporations under 
the pressure of public opinion to act socially responsible. 
 
At the same time, in order to promote CSR polices and sustainable development in 
Iran, a long-term mindset should be encouraged.614 In the current economic conditions 
in Iran, the element of time is closely related to interest rate. In other words, there is a 
relationship between management capacity in optimizing expenses for future 
investments and interest rates, which are controlled by the State. Therefore, if the 
interest rate is low, managers’ time horizon for investment is longer and if the interest 
rate is high, the managers have to circulate the investment quickly to get quick results. 
In this situation, managers do not think long term and are not ready to look at human 
resources or the environment as investments but rather as expenses and consumptions. 
  
6.8 The Stock Exchange’s Role in Promoting CSR Policies 
In late 2004, the Tehran Stock Exchange Research and Development Centre 
published the first edition of the Iranian Code of Corporate Governance. This code 
consisted of 22 Articles including: definitions, board of directors and shareholder 
responsibilities, financial disclosure, accountability and auditing. The Code was 
amended in 2005 to further include ownership structure, capital market and the 
                                                
614 An Interview with Dr. Mohammad Ali Farzin, the head of the UNPD projects in Iran: 
http://csriran.com/?page_id=20 
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relationship with the Trade Law.615 The implementation of the Code is not mandatory 
but many corporations have done so. The ratification of this code of practice was the 
most important step towards accountability and responsibility of the corporation. 
 
The code of practice has two major underlying purposes: first, risk reduction by 
enhancing accountability, closure and responsibility, and second, enhancing long-term 
performance by avoiding dictatorship and irresponsibility by top managers. The code 
guards shareholders’ benefits against misappropriation by the directors while 
attempting to direct the company to take into account long-term benefits rather than 
the short-term ones. 
 
A study on Iranian corporations’ boards in 2008 has shown that the average number 
of members on the board of directors is 7.96, with about 22% of them being non-
executive or independent members, in 42% of cases the CEO is also the Chair and in 
46% of the cases, there is an institutional investors’ representative on the board. The 
firms’ average size is 12.88 people, EPS is 1832 Rials,616 ROA (Return On Assets) is 
12%, and ROE (Return On Equity) is 65%. Iranian corporations have a high debt ratio 
of 60%, indicating their high default risk. The average life of corporations listed in the 
Tehran Stock Exchange is 8.88 years.617 
 
6.9 Difficulties of Promoting CSR Policies in Iran 
One of the most important obstacles to improving CSR policies is the short-termism 
that is cultivated in our commercial culture. Most business enterprises are established 
                                                
615 Bita Mashayekhi and Mohammad S. Bazaz, ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Iran’ 
4 Jorunal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 156 159 
616 Iranian local currency, 1 Rial is approximately 0.0000966979 US Dollars 
617 Bazaz 163 
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under general titles that enable them to operate within a huge variety of business 
activities. This allows them to do a bit of everything and to leave after a bit of profit is 
made.  
 
Another difficulty is the lack of general knowledge about CSR. The pressure from the 
public is the most effective pressure on corporations to act socially responsible in Iran 
since it is acceptance from the public which brings legitimization. The increase in 
general knowledge and education is the most important element in promoting CSR 
policies in developing countries such as Iran since it accelerates sustainable 
development, leading gradually to institutionalize the concept of CSR. 
 
At the same time, there is a gap in the civil society in Iran. There is almost no co-
operation between civil society and the public sector. In a gathering in 1998 in 
Booshehr (south of Iran) between representatives of the governmental organizations 
and representatives of non-governmental organizations some obstacles to the 
relationship between the society and the government were recognized: 
 
1. Excessive bureaucracy 
2. The State’s suspicion of associations and unions 
3. Lack of general knowledge  
4. Lack of co-operation between the private sector and public sector 
 
6.10 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed CSR policies’ current status in Iran. Iran is an Islamic country 
located in the Middle East with strong Persian cultural elements and a French-Belgian 
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commercial legal system. Iran’s special characteristics make transplantation of new 
concepts a very complex matter. The new concepts will be affected by local socio-
legal-political conditions leading to their acceptance or rejection. Digging deeply into 
these elements might show that there exists an Iranian style of CSR that just needs to 
be strengthened and encouraged rather than changed or renewed. 
 
Literature on CSR in Iran is very rare. Even the few attempts at research that do exist 
are shallow and in many cases contradictory. They do not explore CSR in an Iranian 
concept of CSR but rather try to explain why Iran does not have CSR in a Western 
style, arguing that Iran is not economically ripe for Western CSR concepts. While this 
argument might be partially correct when it comes to securing investments for large 
corporations, not having a Western-style CSR is not in itself a bad thing.  
 
In this chapter, first, CSR key players in Iran were shown. Second, the main CSR 
activities undertaken by CSR key players in Iran were demonstrated. Third, examples 
of domestic and foreign company activities were presented. Fourth, the State role in 
promoting CSR policies was discussed, concluding that the State has an important 
role. Fifth, the UN role in promoting CSR policies was debated, showing different 
initiatives that were taken by the UNDP in Iran to encourage sustainable 
development. Sixth, the Stock Exchange role in promoting CSR policies was 
demonstrated. In this section a summary of the Iranian Code of Corporate Governance 
ratified by the Tehran Stock Exchange was presented. Seventh, the difficulties of 
promoting CSR policies in Iran were discussed. Finally, CSR in oil companies in Iran 
and the role of ministry of oil was debated. 
Chapter 7: Data Analysis 
 
Key proposition 1: The Effect of Socio-Economic-Legal 
Conditions on CSR Transplantation 
 
The process of transplanting CSR into another legal system is likely to be 
affected by local socio-economic-legal conditions, cultural values and 
institutional arrangements. 
 
Introduction 
Pistor et al’s findings emphasized the importance of the role that socio-economic-
legal conditions, cultural values and institutional agreements play in promoting CSR 
policies in developing countries. They suggested that legal transplants cannot function 
in the transplant countries in the same way as they do in the origin countries.618  
 
In the same fashion, Blankenburg stressed the importance of “legal culture”. He 
explained “legal culture” as a complicated inter-relation between different levels in a 
society such as the level of values, beliefs and attitudes towards law, patterns of 
behaviour, institutional characteristics and the body of substantive and procedural 
law.619 
 
Mattei maintained that different legal systems may develop different solutions to the 
same problem that is consistent with their legal tradition, which may be as efficient as 
                                                
618 Katharina Pistor, ‘Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six 
Countries’ 99 
619 Valderrama 274 
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the agreed legal theory by the competitive market. It is not a rule of “one size fits 
all”.620  
 
In contrast, Alan Watson argued that legal change might happen without any 
relationship with social change. His view is contrary to the views of contextualists 
and culturalists who see law as mirroring culture and society.621 
 
In the analysis of the first Key proposition, attempts will be made to analyse the effect 
of local socio-economic-legal conditions, cultural values and institutional 
arrangements in the process of transplanting CSR into another legal system.  
 
In order to analyse this Key proposition, initially the interviewees were asked if they 
believe there is a demand for CSR in Iran, where they think this demand comes from 
and what they believe would stand as the key feature of CSR in Iran. Additionally, the 
interviewees were asked about the extent to which they believe that successful CSR 
policies depend on the existence of social structure (such as unions, professional 
associations, etc) sometimes referred to as “civil society”. Moreover, in order to 
further assess the social and cultural aspect of this Key proposition, the interviewees 
were asked how flexible they believe Iran’s legal and cultural system is in response to 
changing economic and cultural conditions. 
 
Is there a Demand for CSR in Iran? 
 
                                                
620 Mattei, ‘Efficiency and Equal Protection in The New European Contract Law: Mandatory, Default 
and Enforcement Rules’ 6 
621 Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Differences ’ 16 
 226 
In order to assess the effect of socio-economic-legal conditions and cultural values, 
the interviewees were asked if they believe there is a demand for CSR. If they believe 
there is a demand, where they think this demand comes from and if they believe there 
is no demand for CSR, what their reasons are for this negative answer. Finally, the 
interviewees were asked to give their opinion regarding what they believe would 
stand as the key feature of CSR in Iran. 
 
In the answer to the question of “Is there is a demand for CSR in Iran?”, half of the 
interviewees answered “No” and the other half answered “Yes”. 
 
Most of the interviewees who believed there is no demand for CSR in Iran, believed 
CSR concept already exists in Iran’s ancient culture and religious values such as 
Waqf.622  This is in line with Visser’s623 argument that categorized “cultural 
traditions” as one of the major internal drivers of CSR in developing countries, 
arguing that despite the common belief that CSR is a new concept, it has been argued 
that business ethics have a deep root in developing countries’ ancient culture. 
 
The interviewees admitted that there are several cases of CSR in Iran but pointed out 
that these cases are personal preferences of individual managing directors rather 
than an accepted culture or an institutionalized concept. They also strongly presumed 
that the attitude of a managing director constitutes the most important driver for CSR 
in Iran. 
 
                                                
622 Waqf is an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, typically denoting a building or plot of 
land for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. 
623 Visser 480-488 
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They enumerated the following reasons for believing there is no demand for CSR in 
Iran: 
 
1. Iran’s economic and cultural development level is low. Economically, Iran has not 
gone through the necessary transitional period for transformation of companies that 
would lead to CSR. Moreover, the structures necessary for CSR to happen do not 
exist in Iran. 
 
Culturally, Iran’s society is not at the cultural level to be able to balance benefits that 
companies draw from society with benefits they give back to society in return. Some of 
the interviewees held that Iran’s society has been going through a huge regression in 
morality and spirituality compared to 40 years ago, mainly for three reasons: first, 
combining religion with politics.   Second, religious concepts like Waqf have been 
used as a tool by companies to protect themselves from misuses624 of the government 
and to defraud the government in order to escape their legal duties.  Third, due to 
Iran’s social problems, paying attention to “myself” has increased while paying 
attention to “others” has considerably decreased. 
 
According to the World Bank, the economy of Iran is the eighteenth largest in the 
world by purchasing power parity (PPP) 625 and according to Iranian officials’ claims 
is going to become the 12th largest by 2015.626 The economy of Iran is a mixed and 
transitional economy with a large public sector and some 50% of the economy 
                                                
624 The interviewees believed and brought many examples of government taking over businesses by 
force when they boom and become successful. 
625 WorldBank, ‘Statistics ’ (2010)   
626 Press TV, ‘Iran to be World's 12th Economy in 2015’ (24 December 210)  
<http://www.presstv.com/detail/156979.html>  
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centrally planned.627 It is also a diversified economy with more than 40 industries 
directly involved in the Tehran Stock Exchange.628 Yet, most of the country’s exports 
are oil and gas, accounting for a majority of the government’s revenue in 2010.629 
 
A unique feature of Iran’s economy is the presence of large religious foundations, 
whose combined budgets make up more than 30% of central government spending.630 
 
2. It is widely believed that there is no competition in Iran due to the governmental 
economy in which the State is the key force of the economy. The interviewees believed 
that the recent move towards privatization in Iran is at the very earliest stage; that is, 
big companies are half private-half governmental and still strongly influenced by 
direct intervention of government in their business or governmental organizational 
culture.  
 
Iran’s economic system is a “State capitalism” system. State capitalism is a system in 
which state-owned business enterprises are the dominant form of corporations. The 
most significant examples of this kind of economy are corporatized government 
agencies and a State that owns controlling shares of publicly listed corporations. The 
State usually uses markets primarily for political gains.631 In Iran the primary actors 
of State-owned capitalism are national oil corporations and State-owned enterprises. 
                                                
627 The Economist, ‘A Survey of Iran: Stunted and Distorted’ (The Economist, 2003)  
<http://www.economist.com/node/1522098>  and Press TV, ‘Iran Offers Incentives to Draw Investors’ 
(26 April 2010)  <http://previous.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=124450>  
628 TV, ‘Iran Offers Incentives to Draw Investors’  
629 Press TV, ‘Iran Oil Exports Top 844mn Barrels’ (16 June 2010)  
<http://previous.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=130736&sectionid=351020102>  
630 Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan, ‘Oppressed and Disabled Veterans Foundation (MJF)’ (6 
February 2011)  <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/mjf.htm>  
631 Ian Bremmer, ‘State Capitalism Comes of Age’ 1 Foreign Affairs 3 
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In Iran, like Russia, any large corporation who wants to succeed in their business 
must have a good relationship with the government. 
 
According to the CIA World Factbook, following the cessation of hostilities with Iraq 
in 1988, the Iranian government declared its intention to privatize most State 
industries in an effort to stimulate the war-torn economy. The sale of State-owned 
factories and companies proceeded slowly, mainly due to opposition by a nationalist 
majority in the Iranian Parliament. By 2006 most industries, some 70% of the 
economy, remained State-owned. The majority of heavy industries including steel, 
petrochemicals, copper, automobiles and machine tools remained in the public sector, 
with most light industry privately owned.632 
 
This is in line with Visser’s633 argument that categorized “political reform” as one of 
the major internal drivers of CSR in developing countries. He argued that any kind of 
reform in developing countries cannot take place without taking into account the 
socio-political reform process. 
 
Similarly, Beck emphasized the importance of the role of the State in financial 
markets.  He maintained that legal traditions differ in terms of the priority they attach 
on the rights of private property owners vis-à-vis the rights of the State and this has 
consequences on the protection of private contracting rights as the basis of financial 
market development.634 The civil law tradition countries such as Iran tend to 
emphasize the development of institutions that advance the State’s power rather than 
                                                
632 CIA, ‘The World FactBook’   <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ir.html>  
633 Visser 480-488 
634 La Porta 9 & 24 
 230 
private property rights which adversely affected financial development.635 Similarly, 
LLSV state that: “(A) civil legal tradition, then, can be taken as a proxy for an intent 
to build institutions to further the power of the State ...”636 A powerful State will tend 
to create policies and institutions that divert the flow of society’s resources towards 
favoured ends and even with a responsive civil regulation, it will have difficulty not 
interfering with the market. Thus, according to these authors, the common law’s 
emphasis on private property rights and limiting the State’s power tends to support 
financial development to a greater degree than the civil law.637 In civil law nations 
and socialist nations, the principal mechanism of resource allocation is central 
planning. In common law nations and capitalist nations, this mechanism is the 
market.638 
 
This is also in line with the World Bank description of Iran stating that it is the second 
largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa in terms of GDP – US$400 
billion in 2011 (after Saudi Arabia) – and in terms of population – 78 million people 
(after Egypt). It is characterized by a large hydrocarbon sector, small-scale private 
agriculture and services, and a noticeable State presence in manufacturing and 
finance. In 2007 the service sector (including the government) contributed 56% to 
GDP, followed by the hydrocarbon sector with 25%, and agriculture with 10%. Iran 
ranks second in the world in natural gas reserves and third in oil reserves. It is the 
second largest OPEC oil producer; output averaged about 4 million barrels per day in 
recent years.  Iran’s chief source of foreign exchange comes from oil and gas. Thus, 
aggregate GDP and the government’s revenues are intrinsically volatile, fluctuating 
                                                
635 Beck 7 
636 Rafael La Porta, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ 2 31-2 
637 Beck 7  
638 Andrei Shleifer 2 
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with international prices of these commodities. So far, macroeconomic policies have 
typically not counteracted these boom and bust cycles in economic performance, 
which increase the uncertainty faced by the private sector, impeding investment and 
job creation.639  
 
3. There was a widely held view among interviewees that Iran is in a poor economic 
condition. There are more important basic matters that need to be taken care of 
before Iran moves to the next stages of development such as CSR. Employment is seen 
as the major problem facing Iran. The social responsibility of companies, if any, 
would be to generate jobs first, and second more investment on production, industry 
and agriculture. 
 
This is in accordance with Visser’s640 argument, which maintained that Carroll’s CSR 
pyramid levels641 have different significance and order in developing countries. He 
stated that “economic responsibilities” remain the most important level that involves 
providing investments, creating jobs and paying taxes. 
 
                                                
639 WorldBank, 
‘http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRANEXTN/0,,menuPK
:312966~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:312943,00.html’ (2011)   
640 Visser 491 
641 Carroll offered that “the social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical 
and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time”. He 
categorized it into four layers in his famous "Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility": first, 
required economic function of making profit; second, legal requirement of obeying the law; third, 
expected ethical behaviour and fourth, desired philanthropic actions. Jones recognizes three aspects for 
implementing CSR policies according to Carroll’s "Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility": first, 
principles aspect of recognizing social responsibilities, second, processes aspect of responding to social 
issues, and third, policies aspect of addressing those social issues. Carroll, ‘The Pyramid of Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders’’ Jones, 
‘Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics’ 
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In the CIA World Factbook, it was also emphasized that although inflation has fallen 
substantially since the mid-2000s,642 Iran continues to suffer from double-digit 
unemployment and under-employment. Under-employment among Iran's educated 
youth has convinced many to seek jobs overseas, resulting in a significant “brain 
drain”.643 
 
Similarly, the IMF in its 2011 report on Iran maintains that the Iranian authorities also 
view job creation as a key challenge. Unemployment remains high at about 14.5% in 
2010, and is particularly prevalent among the youth (at about 25%). There is also an 
increasing number of new entrants into the labour force, reflecting a high number of 
university graduates, and increasing female participation. Staff’s preliminary 
estimates indicate that projected growth should allow new entrants in the labour force 
to be employed over the medium-term. With a more labour-intensive growth (that is, 
a higher elasticity of employment to growth), unemployment could decline in the 
medium term.644 
 
4. CSR comes to the surface in Iranian companies only when there is a situation that 
would end up either as a huge criminal matter that would bring about legal sanctions 
for the company or there is a situation that would threaten the political stability.  
                                                
642 According to the IMF 2011 report on Iran, with prudent macroeconomic policies, the medium-term 
outlook is positive. On the strength of high oil prices and expected efficiency gains resulting from the 
domestic subsidy reform, growth is expected to rebound to about 4.5% in the medium term. Moreover, 
compensatory payments to households and limited import substitution because of sanctions and higher 
tariffs on consumption goods should help mitigate the immediate negative impact of the subsidy reform 
on growth. Average inflation is expected to rise to about 23% in 2011/12 because of the step increases 
in the price level, but should come down to 12% in 2012/13 if the authorities maintain tight 
macroeconomic policies. The current account surplus is projected to rise in line with the increase in oil 
prices to reach about 9% of GDP in 2011/12. In: 
IMF11/241, Islamic Republic of Iran: Selected Issues Paper (August 2011) , ‘Iran Privatizes $63bn of 
State Assets’ 
643 CIA 
644 IMF11/241 12 
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Visser645 has also categorized “crisis response” as one of the major internal drivers of 
CSR in developing countries arguing that these crises are considered as catalysts of 
CSR. 
 
5. Professional and moral behaviour described by Western institutions (such as PMI646 
or PMP647), which CSR is included in their programme and obtaining their certificate 
is a fashion for businessmen in Iran at the moment but does not match Iran’s business 
customs.  
 
This is in line with Visser’s648 argument that categorized “socio-economic priorities” 
as one of the major internal drivers of CSR in developing countries. He maintained 
that the reason behind the failure of implementation of CSR policies is failing to take 
into account social and environmental problem in the region. 
 
6. There is a legal impediment against CSR. Companies that are established under 
Article 583 of the Commercial Law should work for the purpose of establishment of 
the company stipulated in the company’s Articles of Association (for the purpose that 
their shareholders want). At the same time, Article 118 of the Commercial Law holds 
that managing directors have full discretion except in two cases: first, the issues that 
are in the discretion of company assemblies and second, the issues that are not 
stipulated in the company’s subject of activities in the Articles of Association. 
                                                
645 Visser 480-488 
646 The Project Management Institute (PMI) is a not-for-profit professional organization for the 
project management profession with the purpose of advancing project management. 
647 Project Management Professional (PMP) is a credential offered by the Project Management 
Institute (PMI). 
648 Visser 480-488 
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Therefore, if CSR is not mentioned in the subjects of the company’s activities, the 
managing director will face legal sanctions.  
 
This view is in accordance with one of the opposing theories behind the corporation’s 
legal personality: Nexus of contract theory (shareholder-value theory). This theory 
rejects the legal personality of the corporation and the consequent imposition of a 
conscience and social responsibility. According to this theory, “the company is like a 
market; it is the product of a complex equilibrium process. In this theory company is 
viewed as a connection of contracts and all who deal with it are therefore expected to 
bargain for their respective positions via contract”.649 Since the corporation is created 
by shareholders and regulated by contract, shareholders as owners have the right to 
define the objective of the corporation. This theory explains why the only objective of 
the corporation and the sole purpose of the top managers have been considered to be 
profit maximization. Stakeholders in this view are supposed to secure their rights 
through contracts.  
 
Friedman, who originally framed the issue of social responsibility versus profit 
maximizing behaviours in terms of whether business managers should be what he 
called “civil servants” or alternatively agents of their shareholders, further developed 
this theory. Basically, Friedman argues that managers as agents owe the owners of the 
corporation, the shareholders, a duty to pursue their interests. In other words, 
managers should spend a corporation’s money in the way its owners would want. To 
the extent that CSR activities do not accord with the desires of shareholders, the agent 
violates that duty. His argument is a moral one, arguing that it is unethical for 
                                                
649 Hart 1757 
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corporate managers or an agent to engage in CSR activities because the agent violates 
his or her duty to act in the interests of the principal.650 
 
In contrast, Visser651 has categorized “governance gap” as one of the major internal 
drivers of CSR in developing countries, arguing that CSR policies work better as 
national regulation in developing countries. In response to Visser’s argument, it has 
been contended that much reliance on corporations’ capacity to render social services 
is wrong. A corporation’s primary responsibility is towards its shareholders; 
therefore, the company might change the country it is operating in because of issues 
affecting its profitability. At the same time, since corporations are profit-oriented, 
they might support either directly or indirectly the national-state’s corrupt activities. 
Additionally, CSR is a concept beyond territorial mechanisms that addresses the 
limitations of the nation-state in regulating the global economy.652 
 
The interviewees who believed that there is a demand for CSR in Iran also confirmed 
that participation of business in social projects, so-called CSR, has been in Iran’s 
culture and religious values for a long time through concepts such as Waqf and 
Khoms.653 They also maintained that the CSR infrastructure in Iran is religion and is 
very different from the West. But one of the interviewees emphasized that the existing 
ideology in Iran that considers CSR as subsidising weaker levels of society, so-called 
“fatherly dictatorship”, is wrong.  
 
                                                
650 Salazar 144 
651 Visser 480-488 
652 Andy Lockett 124 
653 According to Shia Islamic legal terminology, it means one-fifth of certain items which a person 
acquires as wealth, and which must be paid as an Islamic tax. 
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Similarly, Matten and others argued that CSR in developing countries represents “the 
formal and informal ways in which business makes a contribution to improving the 
governance, social, ethical, labour and environmental conditions of the developing 
countries in which they operate, while remaining sensitive to prevailing religious, 
historical and cultural contexts”.654 
 
The interviewees enumerated the following reasons for believing that there is a 
demand for CSR in Iran: 
 
1. In Tax Law companies are allowed to spend a certain percentage of their profit on 
charity projects and get tax exemption for that percentage of their profit. 
 
2. CSR is a mutual co-operation between society and a company that brings success to 
the company through marketing. CSR is a form of doing business through 
advertisement. One of the effective methods of advertisement is making news. CSR is 
a way of making news. They held that this aspect of CSR is still weak in Iran because 
of lack of competition in the market. 
 
3. CSR is covered by basic international laws such as human rights that have already 
been taken care of in Labour Law, Civil Liability Law and Criminal Law. 
 
Buhmann also argued that there are two roles that law can play within the scope of 
CSR: first, that corporations need to abide by the law primarily to be able to go 
beyond the law then, second, compliance with international law. Many CSR demands 
                                                
654 Wayne Visser  
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and corporate CSR actions appear to be based exactly on assessments of compliance 
with international law, especially human rights and labour law.655 Buhmann sees the 
significance of international law in the role it plays “as guidance for CSR self-
regulation and for reporting and benchmarking”.656  
 
4. CSR is a sustainable development which means paying attention to the “human 
being” in the process of development. If a country wants to develop, it needs to 
develop in all aspects: society and economy. They held that this aspect of CSR is 
stronger in Iran.  
 
5. CSR is necessary for the survival of a company since the social impact of a 
company’s behaviour affects the public perception about the company. 
 
6. CSR is increasing environmental standards, having happy neighbours, increasing 
employment, increasing intellectual ability and expertise of the company’s immediate 
surroundings.  
 
Similarly, Moon and others argued that in developing countries, due to serious socio-
economic issues, the focus is on social-economic themes including poverty 
alleviation, health-care provision, infrastructure development and education. 
Secondly, in developed countries the CSR literature is dominated by quantitative 
methods (80%) while in developing countries this literature more likely to be 
qualitative.657 
 
                                                
655 Buhmann 189 
656 Ibid 193 
657 Andy Lockett  
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The Dependence of the Success of CSR Policies on the Existence of 
Social Structures 
In the second step, in order to assess this Key proposition and assess the effect of 
social conditions on the process of implementing CSR policies in Iran, the 
interviewees were asked the extent to which they believe that successful CSR policies 
depend on the existence of social structure (such as unions, professional associations, 
etc) sometimes referred to as “civil society”. 
 
Most of the interviewees (23 out of 28) believed that the existence of social structure 
such as unions is effective in having successful CSR policies. They underlined that 
unions have the specialist role in each profession. Unions defend and represent that 
profession in the government. They need to be innovative in guiding and suggesting 
new laws and regulations to the government. But they all emphasized that this is not 
happening currently in Iran. 
 
International Labour organization also reported that although Iranian workers have a 
theoretical right to form labour unions, in actuality there is no union system in the 
country. Ostensible worker representation is provided by the Workers' House, a State-
sponsored institution that nevertheless attempts to challenge some State policies.658 
Unions operate locally in most areas but are limited largely to issuing credentials and 
licences. The right of workers to strike is generally not respected by the State. Since 
1979 strikes have often been met by police action.659 
 
                                                
658International Labor Organization, (2001)  
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/arm/irn.htm>  
659 Ibid 
 239 
Visser660 has also categorized “stakeholder activism” as one of the major external 
drivers of CSR in developing countries. These activities include: “development 
agencies, trade unions, international NGOs and business associations. These four 
groups provide a platform of support for local NGOs, which are not always well 
developed or adequately resourced to provide strong advocacy for civil regulations 
and CSR”.661 
 
The interviewees enumerated the following reasons for their answers: 
 
1. Unions are very corrupted and one of the sources of misuse in Iran. They are after 
their own benefits. They have the least moral values and do not have the proper 
professional behaviour. They are usually under the influence of one company and 
represent that company’s interest instead of the whole profession’s interests. At the 
same time, unions have not been able to co-operate with the government and 
persuade the government that in order to have stable sovereignty abiding by some 
rules is necessary.  
 
2. Unions have lost their function, which is arranging the economy of their industry, in 
Iran. First Chambers of Commerce and then NGOs in the form of Friendship 
Councils, such as the Friendship Council of Iran and Japan, have replaced unions.  
 
3. Iran’s society and culture has a very weak group work and collective action culture. 
Civil society elements in Iran are still very weak. 
 
                                                
660 Visser 480-488 
661 Ibid 487 
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4. Unions in Iran, instead of being innovative, are the government’s followers. At the 
same time, Iran’s economy is governmental and big corporations are responsible 
towards government, not society, so social structures like unions could be effective in 
holding corporations accountable. 
 
5. Managers reject accepting unions’ authority and guidance. They want full authority 
to make decisions. Therefore, for CSR policies to be successful, co-operation within 
the company (internal) would be more effective rather than external forces such as 
unions. 
 
The interviewees (5 out of 28), who gave a purely positive answer and maintained 
that unions have been very effective, essential and are doing their best, were all 
managers of big, previously governmental corporations that were recently privatized 
(the so-called “half private-half governmental” corporation). One of the interviewees 
that gave a positive answer supported his answer by drawing attention to Consumer 
Protection Law 1388, in which the formation of unions has been stipulated. He 
believed that this shows that regulators have paid attention to unions. Another 
interviewee, who was the managing director of one of the biggest banks in Iran, 
mentioned that unions are the source of getting information about other companies. 
 
The Flexibility of Iran’s Legal and Cultural System to Change 
In the third step, and in order to further assess the social and cultural aspect of this 
Key proposition, the interviewees were asked how flexible they believe Iran’s legal 
and cultural system is in response to changing economic and cultural conditions. 
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Beck emphasized the importance of flexibility in a legal and cultural system in 
response to changing economic and cultural conditions. He argued that legal systems 
that adapt quickly to minimize the gap between the financial needs of the economy 
and the legal system’s ability to support those needs will foster financial development 
more effectively than would more rigid legal traditions. He also maintained that the 
major legal traditions differ in terms of their ability to evolve changing commercial 
conditions.  
 
Several scholars also argue that common law systems embrace case law and grant 
substantial discretion to judges, inefficient laws are challenged in the courts and “... 
through the process of litigation and re-litigation inefficient rules will be replaced by 
efficient rules”;662 therefore, it tends to be more responsive to changing economic 
conditions.  
 
Most of the interviewees (22 out of 28) believed that Iran’s legal and cultural system 
is not flexible to changing economic conditions. However, many of the interviewees 
highlighted that Iran’s society will accept a new culture if it feels the imported culture 
is superior to Iran’s culture. Valderrama663 also classified “prestige and imposition” 
as one of the five drivers for legal transplantation. He argued that every legal culture 
has faith in itself and tries to impose its legal culture on other countries if it has the 
power to do so. For example, many developing countries with a civil law tradition 
have the desire to import the French system because it is considered a good-quality 
work and prestigious.664 
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664 Sacco 398 
 242 
One of the interviewees further explained that the reason for internal immigration to 
big cities in Iran is cultural, such as prestige and more freedom, rather than 
economic since the main financial source of many immigrants is in their city. 
 
They interviewees enumerated the following reasons for the lack of flexibility of 
Iran’s legal and cultural system: 
 
1. Civil law legal systems are not flexible. Judges cannot take decisions on their own. 
They need to find support for their decisions in the law.  
 
This view is in accordance with LLSV’s665 findings that tried to establish a link 
between the legal environment and financial markets. They argued that “countries 
with poorer investor protection, measured by both the character of legal rules and the 
quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets”.666 These 
results suggest that common law and French civil law operate in very different legal 
environments. They have argued that a highly protective legal environment that 
secure the investors from expropriation by entrepreneurs, raises their willingness to 
invest and thus expand the scope of capital markets.667 
                                                
665 Rafael La Porta, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ 
666 Ibid 11 31 
667 Their studies show two major findings: First, common law countries afford the best legal 
protections to shareholders. They frequently (39%) allow shareholders to vote by mail, they never 
block shares for shareholder meetings, they have the highest (94%) incidence of laws protecting 
oppressed minorities, and they generally require relatively little share capital (9%) to call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting. The only dimension on which common law countries are not 
especially protective is the preemptive right to new share issues (44%). Still, the common law countries 
have the highest average anti-director rights score (4.00) of all legal families. Many of the differences 
between common law and civil law countries are statistically significant.  
Second, French civil law countries afford the worst legal protections to shareholders. Although they 
look average on one-share-one-vote (29%) and cumulative voting (19%), and better than average on 
preemptive rights (62%), they have the lowest (5%) incidence of allowing voting by mail, a low (57%, 
though not as low as German civil law countries) incidence of not blocking shares for shareholder 
meetings, a low (29%, though not as low as Nordic countries) incidence of laws protecting oppressed 
minorities, and the highest (15%) percentage of share capital needed to call an extraordinary 
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In contrast, Pistor and others propose “the capacity of legal systems to innovate is 
more important than the level of protection a legal system may afford to particular 
stakeholders at any point in time”.668 The more innovative and adaptable a legal 
system is, the more likely it is able to respond to a changing environment. 
 
2. In Iran, everybody expects parliament to make all the changes, from enacting new 
laws to interpreting existing laws. This is wrong for two reasons: first, parliament 
simply cannot and does not have the time to do everything. Second, Iran’s parliament 
is hugely affected by the slightest flow of emotions and excitement in the society and 
the slightest political ups and downs. 
 
Similarly, Mele argued that the limitations imposed on business by the law have very 
limited and even sometimes-imperfect influences. It is neither possible nor convenient 
to regulate everything in business life. Furthermore, laws generally come after some 
undesirable impact occurs. Moreover, loopholes can easily be found in the law and 
many regulations strangle business creativity and entrepreneurial initiatives. In 
addition, a strong interventionism with laws, rules and other governmental actions is 
opposed to minimalist regulation of markets, also required for strong free 
competition”.669 
 
                                                                                                                                      
shareholders’ meeting. The aggregate anti-director rights score is the lowest (2.33) for the French civil 
law countries. The difference in this score between French civil law and common law is large and 
statistically significant. Interestingly, France itself, except for allowing proxy voting by mail and 
having a preemptive right to new share issues, does not have strong legal protections of shareholders. 
In Rafael La Porta, ‘Law and Finance’Table 2 18 
668Katharina Pistor, ‘Innovation in Corporate Law ’ 7 
669 Mele 61-62 
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It has also been argued that the idea that the law might make business responsible for 
CSR is not feasible in reality. Parker argues that CSR is supposed to ideally include 
‘compliance with business’ legal responsibilities, society, economic expectations”, 
“society’s ethical expectations” and “even society’s discretionary expectations”.670 If 
so, how is it possible for legislators to enact laws to encompass all the above-
mentioned areas?  
 
3. Iran has a traditional society. There are many cultural issues, such as lack of 
knowledge, that prevent new concepts and technologies from being accepted. This 
fact makes doing business in Iran very hard. Moreover, resistance has strong social 
and cultural roots in Iran. 
 
4. The cost of change in Iran is quite high. It has huge financial costs and is very time-
consuming. Change in Iran means dismantling outdated structures that will take a 
long time and will need tolerance and patience; characteristics that are fading away 
faster every day from Iran’s society because of the economic and political situation.  
 
5. Many of Iran’s laws are taken from other countries without studying Iran’s society, 
culture and people’s mindset about economy, well-being and people’s attitude 
towards group work. These laws have not been customized to Iran’s conditions. For 
example, Iran’s Industrial Cities Law and Environmental Law are more developed 
than necessary, therefore very hard to abide by. They are not workable and not 
enforceable. Many businesses just do not understand them.  
 
                                                
670 Parker 207 
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In a similar vein, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard argued that if the laws were 
introduced in a legal system that was both unfamiliar with those laws and unreceptive 
to new laws, adherence to the rule of law today is significantly lower than in countries 
where the introduction of new laws was smoothed by cultural closeness and legal 
adaptation.671 
 
Mattei argued that in developing countries the law cannot be considered the result of 
social rule-making. The mere fact that these imported laws actually do not work in the 
system shows that another interest, other than that of society’s specific interests, has 
been followed. In these countries, legal process is often determined by political 
relationships. “The very notion of limiting powers by formal law is completely 
incontinent with the philosophy of rule-making in those countries”.672 
 
6. Iran’s society does not trust the government and corporations’ managers to be 
flexible towards the changes they introduce. At the same time, Iran does not have 
proper officials to perform the changes either. 
 
The interviewees (6 out of 28) who believed that Iran’s legal system is flexible to 
changing economic conditions, emphasized the Iranian character of adapting quickly 
to political and social pressures as an indication of flexibility. One of the 
interviewees, who was the managing director of one of the biggest insurance 
companies and a politician who has been involved in making many policies, 
maintained that Iran is trying to develop changes through “12-step Anonymous”673 
                                                
671 Daniel Berkowitz10 
672 Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal System’ 28 
673 A Twelve-Step Programme is a set of guiding principles outlining a course of action for recovery 
from addiction, compulsion or other behavioural problems. 
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groups, aiming at preparing people internally for changes according to a new model 
for development called the “Islamic-Iranian Development Programme”. 
 
Conclusion 
In the first step, most of the interviewees who believed there is no demand for CSR in 
Iran, believed CSR concepts already exists in Iran’s ancient culture and religious 
values such as Waqf.674 They enumerated the following reasons for their negative 
answer: low cultural and economic development, no competition and governmental 
economy, bad economic conditions. 
 
The interviewees admitted that there are several cases of CSR in Iran but they are 
personal preferences of managing directors rather than an accepted culture or an 
institutionalized concept. They also strongly presumed that the attitude of a managing 
director constitutes the most important driver for CSR in Iran. 
 
The interviewees who believed that there is a demand for CSR in Iran also confirmed 
that the participation of business in social projects, so-called CSR, has been in Iran’s 
culture and religious values for a long time through concepts such as Waqf and 
Khoms.675 They also maintained that the CSR infrastructure in Iran is religion and is 
very different from the West. They enumerated the following reasons for their 
answers: CSR is necessary for the survival of the company, CSR is basic human 
rights and already exists in Iranian laws such as the Tax Law and Labour Law, CSR is 
sustainable development and a great way of advertisement for the company. 
                                                
674 Waqf is an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, typically denoting a building or plot of 
land for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. 
675 According to Shia Islamic legal terminology, it means one-fifth of certain items which a person 
acquires as wealth, and which must be paid as an Islamic tax. 
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In the second step, most of the interviewees (23 out of 28) believed that the existence 
of social structures, such as unions, are effective in having successful CSR policies. 
They underlined that unions have a specialist role in each profession. Unions defend 
and represent that profession in the government. They need to be innovative in 
guiding and suggesting new laws and regulations to the government. But they all 
emphasized that this is not happening currently in Iran. They enumerated the 
following reasons for their answers: Unions are corrupt, act in their own self interest, 
have lost their function and are the government’s followers. Moreover, Iran has a very 
weak group work and collective action culture, while managers refuse to accept union 
guidance for fear of losing their authority. 
 
Most of the interviewees (22 out of 28) believed that Iran’s legal system is not 
adaptable to changing economic conditions. However, many of the interviewees 
highlighted that Iran’s society will accept a new culture if it feels the imported culture 
is superior to Iran’s culture. They enumerated the following reasons for their answers: 
lack of flexibility in civil law countries, society’s expectation that the parliament 
should make all the changes, cultural issues – lack of knowledge, traditional society, 
high cost of legal change, copying the laws from other countries without studying 
Iran’s society and also lack of trust in the government. 
Key proposition 1.1, 1.2. and 1.3: The Connection between 
Legal Rules and CSR Principles 
 
• The connection between corporate legal rules and CSR principles is largely a 
reflexive one;  
• The so-called “law-matters” thesis needs to be assessed by reference to what 
has been referred to as “functional equivalents” to law in transitional 
economies such as Iran;  
• The act of borrowing is usually simple, whereas buildingup a theory of 
borrowing on the other hand is more complex.  
 
Introduction 
Previously, the effects of local socio-economic-legal conditions, cultural values and 
institutional arrangements on the process of transplanting CSR into another legal 
system were analysed. In this section, the connection between corporate legal rules 
and CSR principles, the applicibility of “law-matters” thesis and the complications of 
the act of borrowing from other countries will be discussed. 
 
Roe argued that factors other than corporate law need to be taken into consideration 
since “corporate law is not just the ‘the-law-on-the-books’ alone, but as ‘law-on-the-
books’ plus the quality of the regulators and judges, the efficiency, accuracy and 
honesty of the regulators and the judiciary, the capacity of the stock exchanges to 
manage the most egregious diversions, and so on”.676 
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Similarly, a series of studies by Katharina Pistor and others showed the deficiencies 
of transplanted laws in their new legal environment. They concluded that legal 
institutions in transplant countries were less developed compared with those in the 
origin countries due to a lack of complementarities, 677 and transplant countries were 
less innovative than the origin countries.678  Pistor has further argued that law should 
be developed by society and made “part of the institutional fabric of society”.679 Legal 
institutions here means the institutions that create, support and enforce laws. It 
therefore covers a whole range of institutions – courts, legislative bodies, law-making 
and drafting agencies, enforcement agencies, law schools and bar associations. This 
does not mean that legal transplants are impossible and will be rejected immediately. 
It means that they need to take into account the specific cultural values and needs of a 
particular society and evolve; therefore, they cannot function in the same way or 
produce the same results. 
 
Pistor and others believed that three variables are important in measuring the 
effectiveness of a legal system: adherence to the rule of law, effectiveness of 
corporate law and ability of a legal system to enforce laws to protect private property 
rights and enforce contracts.680 
 
Furthermore, Visser maintains that legal responsibilities in developing countries 
involve ensuring good relationships with government officials.681  
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In order to assess these key propositions, first, the interviewees’ opinion was sought 
on the impact of corporate law on economic growth in Iran and the extent to which 
economic growth is facilitated by adherence to the rule of law (which comes first?). 
Second, the interviewees were asked about their opinion about the extent to which 
they believe Iranian courts and regulators rely upon corporations to regulate their own 
affair (e.g. self-regulation as opposed to government regulation), the extent to which 
they believe corporate law principles are applied within courts and the effectiveness 
of Iran’s corporate regulators in enforcing corporate law. Third, the interviewees were 
asked how effective they believe Iran’s corporate law is in dealing with self-dealing 
by corporate officials. Fourth, the interviewees were asked to describe the level of 
compliance upon the part of Iranian companies with legal and regulatory rules (e.g. 
re-disclosure). They were also asked what they believe is available as formal and 
informal institutions to make up for weak corporate law. 
 
The Impact of Corporate Law on Economic Growth 
In the first step, the interviewees’ opinion was sought on the impact of corporate law 
on economic growth in Iran and the extent to which economic growth is facilitated by 
adherence to the rule of law (which comes first?). 
 
All of the interviewees believed that ideally good corporate law is effective in 
economic development but not in Iran’s case since Iran’s current corporate law is an 
impediment to economic development. 
 
The interviewees enumerated the following reasons for their answers: 
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1. Iran’s Commercial Law that includes corporate law is old, weak, inefficient and 
problematic. It was enacted in 1933 and the corporate law part of it was last updated 
in 1969. It needs to be updated according to business practice. 
 
2. Iran’s current Commercial Law can solve no problem. Therefore, business practice is 
not based on law. It is based on friendship and trust, which is the very reason for 
companies’ conflicts and separation leading to companies’ short lifespans in Iran.  
 
Similarly, Pistor argued stagnation may actually show the irrelevance of formal legal 
systems, which might be an indication of the effectiveness and efficiency of informal 
governance mechanisms which render the formal law irrelevant, or there is little or no 
demand for that particular set of rules; therefore their governments might decide not 
to invest in the institutions necessary to implement new legal change, or the economic 
condition of the transplant country is sufficiently different from that of the origin 
country, or the State may direct economic activities through administrative rules and 
regulations, leaving too little room for private actors to make differences in the 
market. Whatever the reasons, legal stagnation signals rejection or only partial 
reception of legal transplants.682  
 
It has also been argued that whatever the benefits of free market economies may be, it 
is impossible to impose them on countries where “informal trust relations between 
business partners are organized differently or where dominant social groups grasp 
                                                
682 Katharina Pistor, ‘Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six 
Countries’ 108 
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power in large firms when they are rapidly privatized under pressure.”683 In such a 
situation since the formal and informal rules of the game are contradictory, this 
imposed Westernization will bring about more negative rather than positive results.684 
 
3. Laws in Iran have many exceptions. A good law, first, should not exclude anybody 
from it. Second, it should also have broad definition. In Iran every little thing has a 
law; therefore, everything is against the law. That is why people break the law and do 
not feel guilty about it. People have become used to breaking the law. Third, breaking 
laws should have legal sanctions. In Iran, people get away easily with breaking the 
law. 
 
4. Commercial Law needs to be in favour of business and remove the burden of proof 
from business. Commercial Law came into existence to replace the traditional Civil 
Liability Law but at the moment in Iran, in order to get businessmen’s rights, lawyers 
would stand a better chance of winning if they litigate through Civil Liability Law. 
 
5. There is no disclosure from either corporations or the government. Disclosure 
produces social pressure and changes the cycle. The reason for this lack of disclosure 
and clarity is that Iran’s society lives in obscurity and likes it. Iranians are even 
proud of their obscure life style.  
 
6. Many of Iran laws are taken from other countries without taking into account Iranian 
society’s needs and social and cultural background. Also, laws should be 
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Review 313 
684 Ibid 314 
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interdependent, not in conflict with one another, and in accordance with Iran’s 
development programme. 
 
The laws in Iran are copies. They have not been customized to Iran’s conditions. For 
example, Iran’s Industrial Cities Law and Environmental law are too developed for 
Iran. therefore abiding by them and enforcing them is impossible.  
 
This is in line with contemporary comparative law scholars’ point of view that law is 
culture-specific, and cannot be transferred from one society to another and have 
exactly the same effect. The transplanted law will change as it interacts with local 
laws and conditions.685 Otto Kahn-Freund maintained that it cannot be assumed that 
all laws are transplantable.686 
 
7. Abiding by the law is more important than enacting laws. Changing the law-on-the-
books has no effect on economic development. Iranians have a huge problem with 
abiding by law and law enforcement. There are several reasons for this: first, Iran’s 
society needs social development and cultural change. Second, Iranians do not trust 
the government and are disappointed by the way it enforces the law, so they escape 
the law. Third, the public has no knowledge about law. Culturally, Iranians deal with 
the law only when they are in trouble. 
 
This is in accordance with Roe’s argument claiming that the rules-on-the-books could 
be very much the same in two nations but the quality of enforcement (because of a 
corrupt, incompetent or inefficient judiciary or regulatory system) might make 
                                                
685 Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ 313 
686 Kahn-Freund 14 
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corporate governance systems differ greatly. A flawed corporate law might work well 
in a system where contractual understanding and business practices counteract.687 In 
other words, low-quality law might in some nations be a symptom of weak 
preparation for big corporations but not its baseline cause.688  
 
The effectiveness of legal institutions and the process of law-making have been 
empirically proven to be a much better predictor of financial market development 
than the content of legal rules. Even in transitional economies the effectiveness of 
legal institutions proved to be a strong predictor of financial market development.689  
 
Similarly Pistor and others show that the absence of effective legal institutions or 
“legality” is the most important constraint on development of financial market. They 
argue that “legality has overall much higher explanatory power for the level of equity 
and credit market development than the quality of the-law-on-the-books”.690 
 
Pistor and others argue that “the strength of a legal system is not encapsulated in 
particular legal provisions found in statutory law but in the extent to which it 
promotes innovation and change without creating a control vacuum”.691   
 
Law can create or destroy formal arrangements so law is not irrelevant, but it is a 
second-order phenomenon. Other institutions primarily control the economic 
conditions of a country including business conditions, incentives, professionalism, 
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capital structure, product and managerial labour market competition.692 These 
institutions are the primary control, with the law just assisting or impeding. 
 
Furthermore, Kingsley argued that designing the right legal system is a fundamental 
challenge when attempting to promote economic growth in a developing country. 
“Law will not solve all the ills of the developing world – it will not provide food for 
the hungry or electricity for those without power – it will, however, allow developing 
countries to have a legal infrastructure to assist their development in order to attain 
these very important social rights”.693 
 
The interviewees also believed that law determines the framework of a country’s 
economy. If this framework gives security to investors, they invest more, leading to 
economic development.  
 
Soskice694 also argued that bad and inefficient corporate law indirectly brings about 
economic losses in several forms: first, the prospect of managerial expropriation 
makes investors demand a higher ex ante return as a security on their investment and 
they choose corporations which potentially are able to generate this additional return 
that practically means an increase in capital cost, which might lead to loss of some 
investment opportunities. And second, inefficient corporate rules may induce greater 
agency costs since shareholders feel the need to protect themselves by monitoring 
managers by themselves; something which can truly be expected from an efficient 
corporate law. 
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Visser695 has also categorized “investment incentives” as one of the major external 
drivers of CSR in developing countries, arguing that the greater is the social welfare 
in a country, the more multinational investments they attract. 
 
The interviewees conceived that Commercial Law in Iran had the purpose of 
economic development when it was enacted but it did not fulfil its purpose. They also 
believed that the purpose of creation of publicly held companies was to collect 
people’s small investments in order to invest in big projects. But it did not happen for 
the following reasons: 
 
1. Iran’s society does not have a group work culture. 
 
2. There is no security in Iran’s economy. When a corporation becomes successful, the 
government will either misuse it or take over it. 
 
Homa Katouzian696 argued that the reason that the ruler has absolute power in Iran is 
that the ruler has been considered God’s representative on Earth and is in no way 
answerable to anyone, and has had absolute power over the life and property of all his 
people. He further explains: “When the ruler as the personification of the State is 
completely independent from the society, there may be no rights independently from 
him.” This means nobody has any rights unless it is bestowed by the ruler, which can 
be taken away by the ruler at any time. “It was a privilege rather than a right which 
the State (i.e. the ruler, or local governors backed by him) could take away from him 
at will.” It leads to a situation where there will not be any legal code or procedure that 
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may limit the power of the State, or be invoked against its transgressions. This is the 
simple reason why there was not and there could not be private property in Iran in any 
sense that exists in the history of Europe.697 
 
3. Iran has had three decades of pure governmental economy. There has not been 
incentive for big private companies to take form. Even now, Iran is not still ready for 
them.  
 
Katouzian contended that the short-termism of Iranian society is “both a cause and an 
effect of lack of structure in Iranian history. This lack of structure, in turn, was a 
consequence of the arbitrary State, which represented personal arbitrary rule, and the 
arbitrary society, which tended towards chaos whenever the weakness of the State 
loosened its grip over it”.698	  	  
 
Most of the interviewees (16 out of 28) were of the conviction that economic growth 
comes before adherence to the rule of law.  Some (7 out of 28) believed that economic 
growth comes after adherence to the rule of law. And some (5 out of 28) believed that 
economic growth and adherence to the rule of law move in parallel and are 
interdependence.  
 
Different studies699 have suggested that getting the “right” law on the books will boost 
financial market development. However, there are reasons to caution against such 
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simplistic conclusions. The results of these studies could not be replicated in 
transitional economies since massive legal change, especially in corporate law, has 
had remarkably little impact on the development of financial markets.700 Moreover, 
the law on the books has not always been the cause for economic growth. It has been 
argued that countries with strong shareholder protection (mainly common law 
countries) have had better economic growth but there is no straightforward evidence 
showing that these countries necessarily had better laws on the books when they 
developed their corporate law. Indeed, they improved the law in response to 
challenges posed by the growth of the corporate and financial sectors. 701  
 
It has been difficult to prove empirically that law and legal institutions have 
contributed to economic growth and legal development.702 Case studies on individual 
countries or regions are numerous but, due to the lack of reliable data, a broader 
empirical research on the development of law and legal institutions is rare.703 
 
In recent years, the assumption that legal harmonization will lead to legal institutional 
improvement has been questioned by several authors. It has been argued that these 
attempts tend to ignore the main elements of successful economic development which 
are the constant change, innovation and adaptation of institutions and organizations in 
a competitive environment. Instead of improving domestic legal systems, 
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standardization or harmonization may actually undermine the development of 
effective legal systems. Pistor has argued that: “for developing effective legal 
systems, the contents of the supplied laws is of only secondary importance to the 
process of law development and the compatibility of the new laws with pre-existing 
conditions, including existing legislation and legal institutions”.704  
 
There are two reason reasons that account for the importance of compatibility. These 
two reasons are embedded in features of legal systems: (I) the interdependence of 
legal rules and concepts that comprise a legal system, meaning that legal rules cannot 
be fully understood and enforced without reference to other legal terms and concepts. 
This means that without developing necessary complementarities for implementing 
the new rules, they might actually distort the domestic legal system. (II) Law is a 
cognitive institution, meaning that for it to be effective and actually change 
behaviour, the application and enforcement of rules must be fully understood and 
embraced not only by law enforcers, but also is determined by the perception of those 
using the law.705 
 
One of the interviewees, while emphasizing that business practice and customs should 
be in place before laws, believed that it is not possible in Iran. He pointed at the lack 
of proper government supervision in Iran: if the market is suddenly freed to regulate 
itself, it will result in total chaos and great losses.  
 
Another interviewee who believed adherence to the rule of law brings about economic 
growth, challenged the World Bank’s argument that claimed no matter what the law 
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is, if a country is at peace, investment and employment will increase. He argued that 
peace comes from having proper law and proper enforcement of the law; therefore, 
adherence to the rule of law comes before economic growth.  
 
Visser also accounts for “improved ethical responsibilities, incorporating good 
governance”, to be granted “the highest CSR priority in developing countries and… 
that governance reform holds the key to improvements in all the other dimensions, 
including economic development, rule of law and voluntary action”.706 
 
In contrast, Pistor argues that “the fact that the transplantation of similar if not 
identical laws within decades after their enactment in the Western origin countries did 
not produce similar results questions the importance of formal law on the books for 
economic development. However, there may be more to effective law-making than 
getting the rules on the books right. Without a demand for law, which could be 
spurred by socio-economic development, the law will live a book-life, but will be 
ignored in practice”.707 
 
Self-regulation as opposed to government regulation 
In the second step, the interviewees were asked their opinion about the extent to 
which they believe Iranian courts and regulators rely upon corporations to regulate 
their own affairs (e.g. self-regulation as opposed to government regulation), the extent 
to which they believe corporate law principles are applied within courts and the 
effectiveness of Iran’s corporate regulators in enforcing corporate law. 
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Salim holds that there are other criteria which affect the efficiency of corporate 
governance regulation in developing countries, including culture and value systems, 
the quality of legal institutions, access to courts and the amount of State intervention 
in businesses. These issues cannot be resolved merely by reforming the law-on-the-
books or by importing laws from other legal systems. Reforms should pay attention to 
the uniqueness of the local setting.708 
 
Most of the interviewees (23 out of 28) believed that the extent to which courts and 
regulators rely upon corporations to regulate their own affairs is very low. They 
emphasized that laws are impediments to doing business in Iran and if companies 
abide by the law they cannot do business.  
 
From this point of view of the interviewees one can conclude that Iran has a 
“mandatory legal system”. Pistor maintained that a “mandatory legal system” is a 
system in which legislatures function as lawmakers, while judges’ responsibility is 
just to implement these pre-made rules and they have little law-making function. By 
limiting the ability of private agents to experiment with new legal forms and 
restricting the court’s ability to review them, a legal system adversely affects statutory 
legal change, which serves to implement abrupt radical legal change and consequently 
it limits the source of legal innovation.709 The more mandatory a legal system, the less 
legal innovation will take place and vice versa, and the greater is the need for the 
institutional innovation.710 
 
The interviewees enumerated several reasons for their answers:  
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1. Laws bring about many limitations that makes doing business impossible, especially 
Social Security, Labour Law and Insurance. At the same time, these limitations are 
not balanced with social benefits that laws give back to a society.  
 
2. Laws need to be up-to-date and reformed to match Iran’s current needs especially 
after the privatization according to Article 44 of the Constitutional Law and the 
removal of subsidies. Iran’s laws are copies of the most developed international laws, 
which makes them impossible to abide by since they do not match the business 
realities in Iran. Therefore, what is in practice in Iran is not the written law but 
rather the unwritten law.  
 
Similarly Kingsleyargued that law reforms imposed upon developing nations have 
traditionally failed to meet the indigenous commercial and social needs because the 
reforms have focused on the needs of the colonizer or international community, rather 
than on facilitating the development of domestic communities, commerce and 
markets.711 
 
3. Laws in Iran are not stable, not interdependent and do not move towards a common 
goal of economic development. They are also full of contradictions.  
 
4. The government’s direct involvement in business activities in Iran and its competition 
with private companies have turned the government into the business practice 
                                                
711 Kingsley 498 
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determiner, which has made it even more impossible for companies to regulate their 
own affairs.  
 
In State-owned capitalism countries such as Iran, commercial decisions are usually 
taken by political actors who have limited or no experience in commercial matters. 
Bremmer argues that “their decisions make markets less competitive and therefore 
less productive”. He further argues that since these corporations have political support 
and competitive advantages (State subsidies), they threaten their private sector 
rivals.712 
 
This result is a reflection of a fundamental problem in developing countries in 
transition from central planning to the market. Pistor argues that “this transition 
requires at its core the transformation of the role of the State from direct co-ordinator 
of economic activity to an important arbiter”. But the lack of adherence to the rule of 
law in developing countries indicates that this transformation remained flawed and 
partial in favour of the State in these countries.713  
 
5. The cost of abiding by the law is very high. 
 
6. Iran has a huge problem with implementation of the law. The government officials are 
either very late to react, or after their own personal interests through bribery. 
Officials do not understand the spirit of the law, which is economic development and 
entrepreneurship. They are not balanced in implementing the law. They are either too 
strict or too easy and after their own personal interest.  
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Motivation is highly relevant to this analysis. Motivation must be considered both 
from the law reformers initially responsible for the transplant, and the legal actors714 
with the potential to use and implement it. 
 
The interviewees who believed the extent to which courts and regulators rely upon 
corporations to regulate their affairs is good were managing directors of big 
previously governmental companies that were recently privatized (the so-called “half 
private-half governmental companies”). But they also emphasized that the laws need 
to be up-to-date and reformed according to Iran’s current needs. 
 
They maintained that companies are free to regulate their own affairs except in two 
cases: first, in matters of public policy and national security and second, in the matter 
of endangering shareholders’ benefits. They also believed the fact that courts refuse 
to dismiss director’s decision-making is an indicator of the freedom of companies in 
regulating their own affairs.  
 
The Effectiveness of Iran’s Legal System in Dealing with Self-dealing 
In the third step, the interviewees were asked how effective they believe Iran’s 
corporate law is in dealing with self-dealing by corporate officials.  
 
The interviewees believed that Iran’s corporate law mechanisms are quite effective in 
dealing with illegal self-dealing by corporate officials. 
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Self-dealing has been dealt with in Articles 129-133 of Commercial Law. Managers 
cannot do any commercial activities that are in competition with or the same as the 
company’s activities. Also, Article 200 stipulates that managers cannot get a loan 
from the company unless the company is a bank. If a manager breaches these laws, 
they are held liable. The interviewees believed that these articles have been enforced 
properly.  
 
The interviewees emphasized that the common public perception that managers 
always misuse the company is not true. This perception comes from the fact that, after 
the revolution, the government advertised quite successfully against capitalism, 
underlying that whoever has money is a bad, immoral person. But now the Iranian 
government has changed policies and is looking for investors after privatization but 
the effects of those advertisements are still there and people’s mindset about wealthy 
people has not changed yet. 
 
The Level of Compliance on the Part of Iranian Companies with Legal 
and Regulatory Rules 
 
In the fourth step, the interviewees were asked to describe the level of compliance on 
the part of Iranian companies with legal and regulatory rules (e.g. re disclosure). They 
were also asked what they believe is available as formal and informal institutions to 
make up for weak corporate law. 
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All of the interviewees believed that the level compliance on the part of Iranian 
companies with legal and regulatory rules especially disclosure, tax, insurance and 
social security is very low.  
 
Four of the interviewees who were managing directors of big, previously 
governmental companies that have been recently privatized (the so-called “half 
private-half governmental companies”) believed that the level of compliance in the 
governmental companies that are listed in the Stock Exchange is good while in 
private companies it is low. One of the interviewees who was a lawyer for a couple of 
big corporations further explained that there are two reasons for compliance on the 
part of these companies: first, they can get a loan from a bank as that requires 
showing the bank that they have credit by paying social security and tax. Other 
companies that are not listed, no matter how big they are, will not be able to get a 
loan from the bank. Second, these companies are governmental; they are spending the 
government’s money and they do not care if the company is not making any profit. It 
is governmental organizational structure that automatically pays tax and social 
security. 
 
The interviewees enumerated the following reason for their answers: 
 
1. Iran’s society does not trust the government. The government does not disclose 
anything itself; everything is hidden. At the same time, Iranians live their life in 
obscurity and they like it. Therefore the same goes with companies and the 
government. Culturally, Iranians have always been very secretive about their 
financial affairs.  
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2. Unions do not play their proper role in Iran; therefore, industries and professions 
have problems in communicating their issues to the government. 
 
3. It is a cultural problem. In Iran the cultural level is low, therefore abiding by the law 
is low. 
 
4. Iranians have a lack of legal knowledge. They do not deal with the law unless they are 
in trouble. 
 
5. Laws in Iran are an impediment to doing business. They are not based on business 
realities. If companies abide by the law, they cannot do business. One of the 
problematic laws is the Labour Law. This law is strongly in favour of labour. It makes 
doing business very hard, therefore it leads to less investment, that decreases 
employment and that leads to a decrease in salary since the current labour needs to 
sell his expertise cheap to stay in his job. Law is not the borderline anymore. The 
borderline is goodness or badness in the culture.  
 
The International Labour Organization called Iranian Labour Law “comprehensive,” 
since it covers all facets of labour relations, including hiring of local and foreign staff. 
This law also provides a broad and inclusive definition of the individuals it covers, 
with written, oral, temporary and indefinite employment contracts all recognized. 
Considered employee-friendly, the Labour Law makes it extremely difficult to lay off 
staff. Employing personnel on consecutive six-month contracts (a practice that is used 
to avoid paying benefits) is illegal, as is dismissing staff without proof of a serious 
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offense. Labour disputes are settled by a special labour council, which usually rules in 
favour of the employee.715 
 
Pistor and others’ findings also suggested that in developing countries the proportion 
of firms who do not trust the legal system to enforce their rights is quite high. For 
example, in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, three-quarters of all 
corporations do not trust the legal system to protect their rights.716  
 
6. Disclosure has always been to the detriment of companies and businesses. That is 
why Iranians are wary of disclosure. 
 
7. There are no strict legal sanctions in the case of false disclosure. 
 
8. Iran’s society does not see the effects of paying tax. Nothing changes. 
 
The interviewees maintained that while a large part of bad law just stays bad and 
companies just avoid the law and are in a constant fight with the government in order 
to make up for bad law, the following formal and informal institutions are in place: 
 
1. Companies bribe the tax officials. Most tax officials in Iran are companies’ financial 
consultants too. 
 
2. The government is easy on companies unless it is a matter of national security. 
Sometimes the government is strict and exerts pressure, therefore companies abide by 
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law but still they do so in a very incomplete way and with the least possible 
compliance. 
 
3. Sometimes courts meddle in a corporation’s affairs and force companies who are not 
economically beneficial to go bankrupt.  
 
4. Some of these bad laws are made up for by friendship and trust. Many business 
relations in Iran are based on the unwritten law of friendship and trust. That is the 
very reason for companies’ conflicts and separation, leading to the short lifespan of 
many big companies in Iran. 
 
This indicates another role of law through the informal law. Informal law might 
appear as a set of normative ideas, patterns of behaviour and action that are not based 
on a sharp distinction between law and morality. In other words, they are not enacted 
by the State and their validity does not rely on State sanctions but rather moral or 
practical sanctions.717  
 
Moreover, as the size of transactions, and consequently markets, grow the informal 
governance mechanisms become less effective.718 That is, if formal rules are not in 
place to govern the market, informal mechanisms surface, which in order to be 
effective reduce the size of the transactions and consequently the markets. Applying 
this proposition to corporations would mean that the more formal law in place to 
increase shareholder and stakeholder protection, the more prosperous the economy 
will get.  
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Here the importance of the notion of “network” shows itself. An economic 
interpretation of “legal culture” leads us to the notion of “network”.719 Networks 
reduce transaction costs between market actors. The more actors accept them, the 
more valuable they become, which might cause monopolization by the actors within 
that network, leading to rent-seeking. A driving force behind the network 
characteristic of legal culture is that there are significant scales of economic benefits 
for those using a specific network. The added value that the network actors draw is 
from the fact that large numbers of other agents also use that network.  
 
At the same time, Roe maintained that existing legal rules also might have an 
efficiency advantage because institutions and structures might have already developed 
certain solutions to address needs and problem arising under these rules. In such a 
case replacing the existing rules might make the existing institutional and professional 
infrastructure obsolete or ill-fitting. Replacing these rules would require new 
investments and adaptation to the new rules by different actors.720 
 
Conclusion 
In the first step, all of the interviewees believed that ideally good corporate law is 
effective in economic development but not in Iran’s case since Iran’s current 
corporate law is an impediment to economic development. They enumerated the 
following reasons for their answers: Iran’s Commercial Law is old, inefficient, not in 
favour of business, cannot solve any problems and has too many exceptions. At the 
same time, business in Iran is based on friendship and trust, not law. Moreover the 
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main problem in Iran is abiding by the law since breaking the law has become a habit. 
There is no disclosure and laws are copied from other countries. 
 
The interviewees also believed that law determines the framework of a country’s 
economy. If this framework gives security to investors, they invest more, leading to 
economic development.  
 
The interviewees conceived that the Commercial Law in Iran had the purpose of 
economic development when it was enacted but it did not fulfil its purpose. They also 
believed that the purpose of the creation of publicly held companies was to collect 
people’s small investments in order to invest in big projects. But it did not happen for 
the following reasons: weak group work culture, no security in the economy and a 
governmental economy culture. 
 
Most of the interviewees (16 out of 28) were of the conviction that economic growth 
comes before adherence to the rule of law.  Some (7 out of 28) believed that economic 
growth comes after adherence to the rule of law. And some (5 out of 28) believed that 
economic growth and adherence to the rule of law move in parallel and are 
interdependent.  
 
In the second step, most of the interviewees (23 out of 28) believed that the extent to 
which courts and regulators rely on corporations to regulate their own affairs is very 
low. They emphasized that laws are impediments to doing business in Iran and if 
companies abide by the law they cannot do business. They enumerated the following 
reasons for their answers: laws bring many limitations, which makes doing business 
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impossible, laws need to be updated and reformed, laws are not stable and do not 
move towards a common goal, the government’s direct involvement in business has 
made it the business practice determiner, costs of abiding by law are high and there 
are many problems with implementing the law. 
 
In the third step, the interviewees believed that Iran’s corporate law mechanisms are 
quite effective in dealing with illegal self-dealing by corporate officials. 
 
All of the interviewees believed that the level of compliance upon the part of Iranian 
companies with legal and regulatory rules especially disclosure, tax, insurance and 
social security is very low. They enumerated the following reasons for their answers: 
no trust in the government, no role for unions, low cultural level, lack of legal 
knowledge, laws are impediments to doing business, no disclosure and no strict legal 
sanctions for false disclosure. 
 
The interviewees maintained that while a large part of bad law just stays bad and 
companies just avoid the law and are in constant fights with the government, in order 
to make up for bad law, the following formal and informal institutions are in place: 
bribing the tax officials, the government turns a blind eye on non-compliance, courts, 
friendship and trust. 
Key proposition 2: The Effect of Internal Norms on CSR 
Values within Corporations 
 
The impact of CSR values upon corporations in transitional economies, such as 
Iran, is likely to be shaped by the internal norms in these corporations.  
 
Introduction 
In the previous section, the connection between corporate legal rules and CSR 
principles, “law-matters” thesis and the complications of the act of borrowing were 
discussed. In this section, the effects of internal norms on shaping CSR values within 
corporations will be discussed. 
 
In order to asses if the impact of CSR values upon corporations in transitional 
economies, such as Iran, is likely to be shaped by the internal norms in these 
corporations, it was of critical importance to see how CSR policies are implemented 
at lower levels in Iranian companies.  
 
In order to do this, intially the interviewees’ opinion was sought as to the extent to 
which they believe different stakeholder groups are likely to impact upon the 
decision-making process of Iranian companies and if support from multiple 
stakeholders is important for the success of their company in Iran. Furthermore, the 
interviewee’s opinion was sought as to who they believe are the most influential 
stakeholders in their company. 
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Second, the interviewees were asked if and in what way positive public perception is 
important for the success of their company in Iran. 
 
Third, the interviewees were asked how they believed CSR values within corporations 
are shaped by the internal norm in these corporations. The interviewees’ opinion was 
also sought as to the extent to which managers/directors of large Iranian companies 
are accountable to different stakeholder groups (e.g. employees, shareholders, 
consumers, etc). 
 
Fourth, the interviewees were asked if they think more employee participation would 
further promote CSR policies in Iranian companies. 
 
Fifth, the interviewees were asked to explain if they see the company as an economic 
player or as a socio-political player. 
 
Sixth, the interviewees were asked why they think companies decide to get involved 
with CSR and how, if at all, companies benefit from CSR. 
 
Finally, the interviewees were asked if they believe corporations have extra 
responsibility for social development beyond the development that arises incidentally 
from their responsibility to their shareholders to generate profit. 
 
The Effect of Stakeholders on the Decision-making Process  
In order to asses this key proposition, in the first step, the interviewees’ opinion was 
sought as to the extent to which they believe different stakeholder groups are likely to 
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impact upon the decision-making process of Iranian companies and if support from 
multiple stakeholders is important for the success of their company in Iran. 
Furthermore, the interviewee’s opinion was sought as to who they believe are the 
most influential stakeholders in their company. 
 
These questions were asked to see how stakeholder value theory is seen in the Iranian 
business mindset. Stakeholder value theory aims at broader accountability for 
corporations. It maintains that no group that has contributed to corporate success 
should remain unrecognized. The advocates of this theory argue that shareholders are 
but one of the many stakeholders and contend that employees and other 
constituencies’ interests should be considered in the corporate decision-making 
process.721 Kiarie argues that the success of a corporation depends on stakeholders as 
much or even more than it does on shareholders.722  
 
In contrast, Jensen doubts the practicality of stakeholder value theory since the 
advocates of this theory do not specify how managers should handle the competing 
interests of different stakeholder groups. He further argues that managers are left with 
a theory “that makes it impossible to make purposeful decisions” and keep score of 
managers’ decisions. This will make managers “unaccountable for their actions”.723 
 
The interviewees gave very mixed answers to the issue of stakeholders’ influence 
upon corporation decision-making. However, many of them (25 out of 28) believed 
that in general stakeholders have either very limited or no impact at all upon the 
decision-making process in Iranian companies due to the governmental economy, 
                                                
721 Dean 66 
722 Kiarie 5 
723 Jensen in Abstract  
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lack of competition and cultural underdevelopment. However, they gave a ranking of 
what stakeholder group they thought is the most important one: 
 
1. Public opinion (11 out of 20) 
2. Consumers (10 out of 20) 
3. The attitude of the managing director and board of directors (7 out of 20) 
 
They gave the following reasons for their answers: 
 
1. Public opinion: if public opinion is negative about a company, it is a negative 
advertisement that threatens the company’s reputation. 
 
Colbert et al.’s approach also focused on exploiting CSR activities in order to build a 
reputation and legitimacy. They advocated alignment with political-social norms and 
expectations while addressing elements in the political-cultural context in order to be 
known as a responsible brand in the operating domain.724 
 
2. Consumers: Unless someone makes a huge noise and threatens a company’s 
reputation, companies do not care about consumers. At the same time, if consumers 
want to complain, the process is time-consuming and costs a lot. There are couple of 
organizations in Iran that are established for consumer protection such as “Producer 
and Consumer Protection Organization”, “Consumer and Producer Co-operative” 
and courts. But in practice the complaints go nowhere. 
 
                                                
724 Elizabeth C. Kurucz 94 
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Consumers in Iran have no power due to lack of competition and choices in the 
market.  
 
At the same time, evidence also suggests that at present many consumers are not 
particularly concerned about a corporation’s environmental track record.725 It is true 
that certain customer segments, such as members of socially responsible groups or 
older people, have been found to be willing to pay premium prices for products from 
high-CSR corporations, but these purchasing decisions cannot be generalized to the 
whole population of consumers.726 
 
3. The attitude of the managing director and board of directors. 
 
4. Shareholders: in big companies, the government is the controlling shareholder and 
the rest of the shareholders have no idea what is happening in the company because 
of the dispersed ownership system. Additionally, shareholders have no say in 
choosing the managers. On paper they vote, but in practice the managers have been 
already chosen behind closed doors. 
 
The governmental economy and small amount of shareholders means that companies 
are not rooted in society. One of the interviewees mentioned having many 
shareholders (as a form of the pressure of public opinion) has been used as a form of 
strategy to prevent governmental misuses and take-overs. 
 
                                                
725 Gunthe 68 
726 Orlitzky, ‘Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A research Synthesis’ 122 
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5. Employees: There is the Labour Law for employee protection but it is easy to avoid it. 
At the same time, employee participation in a company’s decision-making process 
will impair the company’s affairs since it is not in Iran’s culture and employees forget 
their place. Moreover, due to a governmental economy, Iran has a governmental 
organizational system in big companies. In other words, employees are just obedient 
to managers and only want their salary. They do not care who the boss is or the fact 
that the company is not making money since it is the government’s money. 
Additionally, employees want to keep their job due to the current high unemployment 
rate. 
 
According to the head of the Organization for Investment, Economic and Technical 
Assistance of Iran (OIETAI), Iran ranked 142 among 181 countries in terms of 
working conditions in 2008. Iran stands at number 96 in terms of business start-up, 
165 in obtaining permits, 147 in employment, 147 in asset registration, 84 in 
obtaining credit, 164 in legal support for investments, 104 in tax payments, 142 in 
overseas trade, 56 in contract feasibility and 107 in bankruptcy.727 Iran ranked 62nd in 
the World Economic Forum's 2011 analysis of the global competitiveness of 142 
countries.728 Between 1992 and 2008 firms from more than 50 countries invested in 
Iran, with Asia and Europe being the largest participants.729 
 
                                                
727 ‘Working Conditions to Improve’ (Iran Daily, 9 November 2008)  <www.nitc.co.ir/iran-
daily/1387/3265/html/economy.htm>  
728 ‘Iran Ranks 69th out of 139 in Global Competitiveness’ (Global Competitiveness Report, World 
Economic Forum, 2010)  <http://payvand.com/blog/blog/2010/09/13/iran-ranks-69th-out-of-139-in-
global-competitiveness-world-economic-forum/> and ‘Iran's Competitiveness Rank Up 7 Places: WEF 
’ (Tehran Times,, 9 August 2011)  <http://www.payvand.com/news/11/sep/1074.html>  
729 ‘$34b Foreign Investment in 16Years’ (Iran Daily, 7 December 2008)  <http://www.nitc.co.ir/iran-
daily/1387/3289/html/economy.htm>  
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The Effect of Positive Public Perception on the Success of Iranian 
Companies 
 
In the second step, the interviewees were asked if and in what way positive public 
perception is important for the success of their company in Iran. 
 
Soule has argued that social movements often target corporations rather than 
governments as a more direct means to achieve social ends, from economic equality 
and civil rights to product safety and accountability for negligence. 730 
 
The interviewees fell into two groups of negative and positive answers with a slight 
inclination towards a positive answer. The point that needs to be taken into 
consideration is that most of the interviewees giving a positive answer were managing 
directors of big, previously governmental companies (the so-called “half private-half 
governmental companies”) and they did not provide sufficient grounds for their 
positive answer. 
 
Some of the interviewees (15 out of 28) assumed that positive public perception 
among the company’s target group is important for a company’s success.  
 
Similarly, Cordeiro731 emphasized that positive public perception and support from 
multiple stakeholders is necessary for MNCs to be successful in emerging 
economies.732 
                                                
730 Sarah A. Soule, Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
54 
731 Cordeiro 1 
732 Reed 238 
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The interviewees supported their positive answer (positive public perception is 
important for the success of the company) with the following reasons: 
 
1. Negative public perception wastes a company’s energy to fight it off. 
 
2. There are different public perceptions. In Tehran, the society is more educated but in 
the rest of Iran, the public likes charity work a lot and is hugely affected by television 
and advertisements. 
 
3. The government pays more attention to public perception due to its fear that public 
pressure or negative reaction could lead to political instability.  
 
4. Positive public perception attracts more customers for the company and the company 
will sell more.  
 
Similarly Soule argues that social movements generate change in business practices 
by introducing new cognitive frames with which organizational actors must contend 
as they seek to legitimate new products and expand their operations. Social 
movements also have the capacity to bring about new institutional orders in a variety 
of settings beyond capitalist enterprises.733 
 
5. Good quality products/services and keeping up that good quality gives families a 
sense of security about that product/service, leading to more production.  
                                                
733 Soule 186 
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The other half of the interviewees (13 out of 28), while assuming that positive public 
perception would be important for the success of the company, believed it did not 
apply in Iran’s current situation. 
 
They enumerated the following reasons for their negative answers: 
 
1. Public opinion becomes important in Iran whenever the public puts pressure on the 
government or the government’s reputation is in danger. 
 
2. Government officials always trick the public and put on an act claiming that public 
opinion is important to them. The public knows it and does not trust the government. 
 
3. Iran has a governmental economy. There is no competition and the public does not 
have choices. At the same time, companies do not have a role in this market. It is the 
government’s policies that determine everything. 
 
4. Iran is in a bad economic condition. People do not have enough money to increase 
their choice of product purchases. 
 
5. Iran’s society does not have the social coherence to stand against companies’ actions. 
A collective action and group work culture does not exist in Iran either. 
 
This is against Soule’s opinion of the importance of social contention in CSR. Soule 
argues that activist campaigns do encourage greater CSR, and that social movement 
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campaigns often target both states and companies simultaneously in order to effect 
change through multiple means. Corporations seem to benefit by being the subject of 
protest, as Soule states clearly: ‘‘while they may not acquiesce to all claims made on 
them by activists, they do change. Thus, we can think of social movements and anti- 
corporate activists as important engines driving corporate innovation’’.734 
 
6. Companies do not worry about public perception since the importance of “brand” 
does not usually exist in Iran. Companies do not last long. If something goes wrong 
that endangers the company’s reputation, it simply changes its name and starts all 
over again. In rare cases where “brand” is important, the public does not pay 
attention to quality or performance. It only cares about the name. 
 
7. Iran is in a transitional period; that is, Iran is still not developed enough for CSR 
concepts and does not have the necessary conditions and infrastructure either. 
Managers still do not have enough knowledge and expertise. The public likes CSR but 
it does not see it as a company’s duty. And the public certainly does not know that it 
has the right and power to want companies to behave in a socially responsible way. 
The public does not pay attention unless a company’s action leads to a huge criminal 
matter.  
 
Katouzian also argues that Iranian society has not reached the stage of development 
corresponding to that of post-Renaissance Europe. Between the two Iranian 
revolutions (The Constitutionalism Revolution and Islamic Revolution) in the 
twentieth century, Iran did produce new institutions, organisations, goods and services 
                                                
734 Ibid 144 
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simply because of arbitrary and unsystematic copying from Europe. This was mostly 
achieved through the 1960s and 1970s because of large and increasing oil revenues. 
“But the relationship between the State and society remained essentially the same, 
such that in the second revolution (1977-78) the propertied classes either supported it 
or remained neutral, much as they had done in the first one (1905-1909)”.735 
 
8. Consumer Protection Law went into parliament in 2002. It came out in 2009. It took 
seven years for the parliament to realize the necessity of consumer protection. This 
example shows that Iran is still not ready to take into account public perception.  
 
The Accountability of Directors to Stakeholders in Iranian Companies 
 
In the third step, the interviewees were asked how they believe CSR values within 
corporations are shaped by the internal norms in these corporations. The interviewees’ 
opinion was also sought as to the extent to which managers/directors of large Iranian 
companies are accountable to different stakeholder groups (e.g. employees, 
shareholders, consumers, etc). 
 
This discussion refers to the two different corporate responsibility policies: explicit 
and implicit. Firstly, explicit CSR refers to the corporate policies which reflect the 
company’s own discretion and initiative for certain societal interests. In contrast, 
implicit CSR has been referred to as the corporations’ policies as a reflection of wider 
policy arrangements embedded in the formal and informal institutional environment. 
Implicit CSR normally occurs in the form of values, codified norms and rules which 
                                                
735 Katouzian 26 
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result in mandatory and customary requirements defining the proper obligations of 
corporate actors.736 
 
All of the interviewees, while assuming that external conditions, such as, pressure 
from the government or public are more effective than internal elements, believed that 
CSR values within corporations are shaped by the attitudes of the managing director 
and board of directors. They all emphasized that the most important driver of CSR 
would be the managing director’s attitude. They argued that managing directors in 
Iran are governmental, powerful, experienced and have a huge say in how a company 
is run. One of the interviewees further explained that CSR falls into the category of 
organizational culture and culture in an Iranian company comes from the top 
(managers) down (to employees). Managers need to build the right culture and 
educate their employees in order to institutionalize CSR in their company. 
 
Jones also argued that the empirical evidence shows CSR and Corporate Financial 
Performance (CFP) are most likely correlated in the sense that CSR helps improve 
managerial knowledge and skills, and therefore enhances corporate reputation. By 
balancing a large number of stakeholder interests, a corporation may increase various 
stakeholder groups’ confidence that the corporation will be understanding and non-
adversarial in resolving future stakeholder conflicts.737 CSR and CFP may influence 
one another in a way that good managers are capable of taking positive strategic 
action in both economic and social domains. Astute managers are able to identify and 
implement specific CSR activities through which their organization’s reputation can 
                                                
736 Moon, ‘"Implicit" and "Explicit" CSR: A Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Understanding 
of Corporate Social Responsibility’2-10 
737 Jones, ‘Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics’ 404 
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be enhanced in social or environmental domains. They also ensure that slack 
resources are invested wisely to promote these opportunities.738 
 
Most of the interviewees (25 out of 28) believed that managers/directors of large 
Iranian companies’ accountability to different stakeholders is weak in Iran.  
 
This is in line with “agency theory,” which maintains that the principal’s problem is 
to motivate the agent to do what he or she was asked to do leading to higher as agency 
costs. This issue arises due to the fact that the agent because the agent (managers) has 
more information about the company than the principal (shareholders). Agency 
theorists generally assume that managers will pursue their own interests whenever 
possible, rather than those of the principal.739  
 
One of the major attacks on agency theory is the “team production” theory.740 
According to this theory the mere focus on agency costs should shift to a focus on 
“protecting specific investments,” meaning that public corporations today need more 
than one individual or group to invest.741 In this way the managers’ goal would be 
protecting “the wealth-creating potential of the entire corporate team”.742 
 
The team production theory has been strongly criticized by the advocates of 
shareholder wealth maximization theory who argue that under the team production 
theory it is impossible to mediate between different claims on the corporation. 
                                                
738 Orlitzky, ‘Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A research Synthesis’ 123 
739 Salazar 144 
740 Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business 101 
741 Stout, ‘Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law ’ 
742 Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ 296 
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Bebchuk supports the team production model of the board as a vehicle for protecting 
stakeholders’ interests, but criticizes the model on the grounds that it leaves 
stakeholders with too little power and directors “accountable to no one.”743  
 
The interviewees enumerated the following reasons for believing that 
managers/directors of large Iranian companies’ accountability to different 
stakeholders is weak in Iran: 
 
1. In big companies, managers are governmental. They do not directly deal with 
stakeholders and do not care unless the stakeholder is powerful too. It is the 
government’s money, not theirs, since they are not shareholders of the company. 
Moreover, managers do not have job security and all their energy goes into keeping 
their position and drawing personal benefits instead of into the company’s economic 
and social development.  
 
2. Managers are scared since they are not required by the law to implement CSR 
activities. CSR activities need to be either stipulated in the company’s Articles of 
Association or have the permission of Annual General Assembly. Another reason for 
this fear is the fact that there have been some cases that managers took CSR 
initiatives and were held responsible for them due to political reasons. In other 
words, if a manager’s good political status turns a bit bad, these initiatives will be 
used against them, therefore managers try to be very careful and get permission from 
the top. This procedure can be very long, during which managers either lose incentive 
or forget about the whole thing. 
 
                                                
743 Bebchuk 57 
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This issue shows the problems that arise from not having a particular definition for 
CSR. These problems are more evident in practice rather than on paper. In practice 
managers need to have a proper definition to know what is expected from them, what 
are the limits of CSR and the issues for which CSR exists to be able to form strategies 
to respond to those issues.744   
 
This highlights one of the positive points of stakeholder theory in that it fills in the 
conceptual gap and obscurity of current CSR theories by addressing concrete interests 
and practices and demonstrating specific responsibilities towards specific groups of 
people affected by business activity. Therefore, it is not a mere ethical theory 
disconnected from business management, but a managerial theory related to business 
success.745 
 
On the contrary, some of the proponents of shareholder value theory this theory in a 
more efficient way so it creates the best environment for the creation of wealth. If 
making profit is the primary objective of the corporation, it incentivises the businesses 
to create the goods and services demanded by consumers. At the same time, requiring 
managers to deal with social concerns or stakeholders will distract them from their 
main task and pushes them to take decisions on an issue out of the scope of their 
knowledge or experience. Directors as entrepreneurs are experienced in business 
matters, not in balancing social interests.746  
 
In the same fashion, Jensen famously stated that it is impossible for managers to seek 
to maximize more than one meaningful objective. This objective is long-term value 
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maximization or value-seeking. Jensen then connects this principle to stakeholder 
theory through what he calls “enlightened stakeholder theory”. Jensen states: 
“(E)nlightened stakeholder theory adds the simple specification that the objective 
function of the firm is to maximize total long-term firm value”.747 While enlightened 
stakeholder theory appears to utilize the structure of stakeholder theory, “but accepts 
the maximization of long-term value of the firm as a criterion for making the requisite 
trade-off among its stakeholders”.748 Henderson,749 while generally accepting CSR 
initiatives, argued that the pursuit of objectives other than shareholder profit 
maximization might reduce the society’s general welfare due to multiple objectives. 
 
3. Because of Iran’s bad economic conditions, managers are very busy trying to meet 
the company’s primary economic goal of making profit and keep the company 
running from one day to another. They simply do not have time for CSR and do not 
prioritize it. 
 
4. Managers in Iran cannot be held accountable due to the unstable economic 
conditions leading to sudden decreases/increases in profit. They cannot have long-
term planning either. Some managers do try to ipmlement CSR but it is due to 
personal reasons, such as benefits, lobbying and religious beliefs, or it is an order 
from the top. It is not classic CSR like in the West and obviously it is not programmed. 
 
5. There is no competition in the market and consumers do not have choices; therefore, 
managers do not fear or feel threatened by negative public perception.  
 
                                                
747 Jensen 4 
748 Ibid in Abstract 
749 Henderson quoted in Ararat 2 
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6. Since Iran’s society does not ask for CSR and does not see CSR as a company’s duty, 
the same goes for companies and their managers. The managers are part of this 
society and their mindset and behaviour matches their society’s mindset and 
behaviour. 
 
A small number of the interviewees who happened to be the managing director of 
previously governmental companies (the so-called “half private-half governmental 
companies”) did not measure managing director’s behaviour and did not comment on 
this issue. They just said that the attitude of the managing director is the most 
important factor in promoting CSR policies in the company. 
 
The Effect of More Employee Participation in Promotion of CSR 
Policies in Iranian Companies 
 
In the fourth step, the interviewees were asked if they think more employee 
participation would further promote CSR policies in Iranian companies. 
 
Most of the interviewees (18 out of 28) believed that more employee participation not 
only does not further promote CSR policies in an Iranian company but it might hurt 
the company. 
 
The interviewees enumerated the following reasons for their negative answers: 
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1. Iran is in bad economic shape. Therefore, if employees are given more power and 
responsibility, they will seek their primary economic needs instead of promoting CSR 
policies. 
 
2. Iranians have a short-term mindset. Employees are considered as short-term assets of 
the company and in return employees consider the company a short-term place to be 
in, therefore they do not think about the future of the company. One of the 
interviewees who was the lawyer for some big corporations believed that in Iran 
neither managers nor employees have any effect in promoting CSR for two reasons: 
first, managers are appointed by the government; they did not go through different 
levels of hierarchy and did not work their way up. Second, neither managers nor 
employees are shareholders of the company. That is the reason they do not feel that 
the company and its profits belong to them; it belongs to the government. 
 
Considering the two reasons above and the short-term mindset, the culture of 
“sustainable employment” will never improve in Iran. This culture allows managers 
and employees to stop spending all their energy on keeping their positions and to 
start thinking about the long-term economic and social development of the company.  
 
Katouzian in his article about short-termism in Iranian society wrote: “lack of long-
term continuity, by definition, resulted in significant change from one short period to 
the next, such that history became a series of connected short runs. In this sense, 
therefore, change was more frequent – usually also more drastic.”750 
 
                                                
750 Katouzian 2 
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He further supports his argument by the most visible example of the short-term nature 
of Iranian society. Iranians have a habit of declaring a building sound in foundation 
and structure as a “pick-axe building” (sakhteman-e kolangi). The only reason for this 
behaviour is simply that their architecture and/or interior design is not according to 
the latest fashion or whims. Therefore, rather than building a new house on a new site, 
thus adding to the stock of existing physical capital, the owner destroys the existing 
house and builds a new one on its site. This shows that Iran is a society where many 
of its socio-political aspects are constantly in danger of receiving the “pick-axe” 
treatment because of a short-term mindset.751 
 
3. There are some cultural issues in giving power and responsibility to employees. First, 
in Iran employees have never participated in policy-making due to governmental 
organizational behaviour in which there is a huge distance between managers and 
employees. There has always been a top-down organization in Iran. Second, in 
Iranian culture responsibility equals interventions. Employees will soon forget their 
position as employee and see themselves as manager. For example, in Housing Co-
operatives and Producer-Consumer Co-operatives, employees are chosen as 
managers. Not only has this not had an effect on the promotion of CSR, the appointed 
employees have also started behaving like any other Iranian managers in getting the 
best things for themselves. 
 
4. Employees in Iran are not educated enough, and do not have enough knowledge and 
incentive; therefore, this extra power might result in the misuse of power or wrong 
reactions upon the part of employees. 
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5. An employee’s duty is to do his job, not to intervene in policy-making. This is the job 
of managers. They are the ones responsible for governing and running the company. 
 
6. Employee participation is an internal affair of the company. It does not have an 
external effect; therefore, it does not have an effect on an external concept such as 
CSR. 
 
Evidence also suggests that the integration of prior CSR-corporate financial 
performance research shows that “although the internal-skills perspective is 
substantiated empirically to some extent, the internal learning effects of CSR tend to 
be 33% smaller than the reputation effects emanating from high CSR”.752 
 
Some of the interviewees (8 out of 28) believed that more employee participation 
would promote CSR policies in Iranian companies. They emphasized that 
participating makes employees feel they belong to a company. This will increase their 
efficiency level by carrying out decisions better. They will also behave better with 
stakeholders. This situation will guarantee an increase in profit and the company’s 
success.  
 
Two of the interviewees believed that employee participation and its efficiency 
directly depends on the managing director and board of directors’ attitude. The other 
interviewees also indirectly mentioned this fact while answering the question.  
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The Debate between Economic and Socio-political Justifications for 
CSR  
 
In the fifth step, the interviewees were asked to explain if they see the company as an 
economic player or as a socio-political player. 
 
This is a debate between economic and ethical justifications for CSR. It is a debate 
between two fundamental understandings of what a corporation is: a disconnected, 
simple entity with one-dimensional, stable interests, or an interconnected, complex 
self with multidimensional, dynamic interests, taking responsibility for a greater 
common good.753  
 
All of the interviewees emphasized that the economic role is the primary function of a 
company.  
 
Most of the interviewees (20 out of 28) believed that a company is both an economic 
and socio-political player, with a great emphasis on the political role. 
 
Corporations that base their business case for CSR on this approach take on a political 
role including a complex mix of political and economic interests and dynamics. “The 
power and position of the corporation in society is the central concern; the 
organization accepts social duties and rights or participates in some form of social co-
operation as an expected part of doing business”.754 
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The interviewees supported their opinion by the following reasons: 
 
1. Iran has a governmental economy. Economic and politics are interwoven in Iran. 
Politics directly affects companies in several ways: first, politics increases or 
decreases society’s feelings of security. Second, sanctions are negatively affecting 
companies in Iran. The government policies and foreign relations have taken away 
many international markets from companies in Iran. Third, in all elections companies 
have been forced to donate money to candidates’ campaigns. All big successful 
companies are doing their business with political connections. Fourth, companies are 
considered a driver and performer of the government’s policies in managing the 
capital market to achieve its purposes and ideologies. 
 
According to the World Bank, the fourth round of international sanctions in 2010 has 
increased the cost of doing business, limited access to foreign direct investments and 
foreign technologies, and exacerbated international trade and financial transactions. 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions include a ban on financing 
and exports related to Iran’s nuclear and military programmes. Additional sanctions 
beyond those called for by the UNSC pose constraints on some international financial 
transactions, particularly in the euro and the US dollar.755 
 
Similarly, the IMF 2011 report on Iran stated that new international sanctions in 2010 
have in practice increased the cost of doing business, limited FDI and technology 
transfer, and affected international trade and financial transactions.756 
                                                
755 WorldBank, 
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756 IMF11/241 3 
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Iran is one of the few major economies that has maintained positive growth in the 
aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, despite sanctions imposed by the 
international community as a result of the country's nuclear programme.757 
 
2. When a company gets bigger and operates internationally, it becomes a socio-
political player automatically since, first, it deals with many people; and second, the 
survival and success of the company depends on its role as a socio-political player. 
 
3. Economy and society are interwoven. If the economy goes bad, society goes bad too.  
 
Mele758 also argued that business and society are two interwoven systems; therefore, 
since corporations exist and operate in a shared environment, they should be socially 
responsible like any other member of that environment. A corporation would risk its 
reputation if its performance were contrary to the expectations of those people who 
constitute the corporation’s social environment.  
 
In similar fashion, Stiglitz maintains “politics and economics are intricately 
interwoven: corporations have used their financial muscle to protect themselves from 
bearing the full social consequences of their actions”.759  
                                                
757 Farnaz Fassihi, ‘Iran's Economy Feels Sting of Sanctions ’ (Wall Street Journal, Middle East, 12 
October 2010)  
<http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748703735804575535920875779114-
lMyQjAxMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.html>  and ‘Tehran Exchange Extends Advance’ (Financial 
Times, 25 AUgust 2010)  <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/99a1b6dc-b06d-11df-8c04-
00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0
%2F99a1b6dc-b06d-11df-8c04-
00144feabdc0.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FEconomy_of_Iran#ax
zz1eXfWQBxc>  
758 Mele 52 
759 Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work: The Next Step to Global Justice 209 
 296 
 
The interviewees who maintained companies are just economic players highlighted 
that ideally a company’s socio-political involvement is a good phenomenon, but not in 
Iran’s current situation.  
 
They believed that, besides the fact that a company’s raison d’être is economic and its 
purpose is profit making, Iran’s economic situation does not allow companies to play 
a socio-political role either. 
 
They supported their answers with the following reasons: 
 
1. Due to Iran’s internal political situation that has made it extremely dangerous to be 
politically active, no company has the incentive to be a socio-political player.  
 
2. Iran is in a bad economic situation, therefore; companies need to be able to take care 
of their primary function of generating profit first before introducing CSR. 
 
3. In developing countries such as Iran in which the economy is governmental, the 
government is a powerful partner in business and always takes its share from the 
businesses’ success in the form of high tax. Therefore, it is the government’s duty to 
be the socio-political player. 
 
One of the interviewees believed that in Iran companies are neither economic players 
nor socio-political players but rather companies are played with by the government’s 
policies. Big companies are governmental and the private companies have either no 
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role because of the bad economic conditions or, if they have enough investment, they 
try to stay away from politics because of security reasons. 
 
The Reason and Benefits of Getting Involved in CSR for Iranian 
Companies 
 
In the sixth step, the interviewees were asked why they think companies decide to get 
involved with CSR and how, if at all, companies benefit from CSR. 
 
Kurucz argues that having a CSR approach within the corporation focuses on building 
competitive advantages through strategic management of resources in order to satisfy 
the legitimate demands of stakeholders. Stakeholder demands are viewed more as 
opportunities to be used by sharp managers for the benefit of the corporation and less 
as constraints on the organization.760 
 
Most of the interviewees (25 out of 28) believed that making more profit is the main 
reason for getting involved with CSR. They argued that due to morality regression in 
Iran and bad economic conditions either the government needs to exert pressure and 
press for CSR or companies need to see an increase in profit. 
 
The interviewees maintained that one of the effective forms of doing business is a 
strategic move of advertising and marketing through “making news about company’s 
activities”, and today pursuing CSR policies is one way of making news.  
 
                                                
760 Elizabeth C. Kurucz 94 
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One of the interviewees believed that advertising through CSR would have negative 
results for the company since in Iranian culture charity is highly valued if it is hidden. 
He held that the public might think that the company is misusing their emotions to 
gain more profit. Another interviewee disagreed with this assumption, arguing that 
charity work is so highly valued in Iranian culture that even if the public knows that 
CSR activities are just for show and making profits, it will result in positive public 
perception about that company.   
 
Another reason that many interviewees (15 out of 28) gave as the main reason for 
getting involved in CSR is the survival of the company. They emphasized that a better 
reputation in society brings about positive public opinion regarding the company’s 
activities, leading to less political and social pressure on the company. Companies 
can attract people’s attention in order to have their support and loyalty through doing 
CSR activities. 
 
It has been argued that corporations view stakeholders as part of the environment that 
needs to be managed, rather than as a driver for corporate strategic decisions. Paying 
attention to stakeholder concerns helps to reduce corporate risk by avoiding decisions 
that will push stakeholders to oppose the corporation’s objectives. Establishing 
trusting relationships with key stakeholders is seen, from this perspective, as having 
the potential to significantly lower costs for the corporation.761  
 
Moreover, running a successful corporation involves balancing multiple claims, 
among which conflicting stakeholders’ interests in an important one. If stakeholders 
                                                
761 Ibid 88 
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feel insecure, they will ask for more return as a guarantee on investments or services. 
This situation will lead to an increase in capital-raising costs which, since most 
corporations cannot ensure that they make this surplus profit, will lead to less 
investment and less opportunities for the corporation.762  
 
Evan and Freeman base the legitimacy of the stakeholder theory on two ethical 
principles: “Principle of Corporate Rights” and “Principle of Corporate Effects”. Both 
principles are based on Kant’s theory of Respect for Persons.763 The “Principle of 
Corporate Rights” holds that “the corporation and its managers may not violate the 
legitimate rights of others to determine their future”. The “Principle of Corporate 
Effects” focuses on taking responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions, 
holding that “the corporation and its managers are responsible for the effects of their 
actions on others”.764 
 
A small number of the interviewees mentioned personal reasons, such as religious 
and moral values, and increasing employee efficiency as other reasons for getting 
involved with CSR.   
 
Some of the interviewees underlined that CSR inevitably will bring extra costs to 
companies. They believed companies should take into account their long-term 
survival and profit, not the immediate result of CSR, which is the extra costs. 
 
                                                
762 Dunfee 350. In Ibid. 
763 Kant thought that humans occupy a special place in creation. Animals have value inso-far as they 
serve humans’ purposes. Things only have the value that humans give them. Humans cannot be used as 
a means to an end but animals can. Humans have dignity because they are rational agents capable of 
making their own decisions and guiding their conduct by reason; therefore, we have the duty of 
beneficence, doing good, to all persons. 
764 Freeman 
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Do Iranian Companies have Extra Responsibility for Social 
Developments? 
 
In the seventh step, the interviewees were asked if they believe that corporations have 
extra responsibility for social development beyond the development that arises 
incidentally from their responsibility to their shareholders to generate profit. 
 
Almost half of the interviewees answered positively and the other half answered in 
the negative. There was a slight inclination towards the negative answer. 
 
The ones who answered positively emphasized the fact that a company needs to be 
economically successful and generate profit before any plans for social development. 
Peter Drucker argues that profitability and responsibility are compatible and the 
challenge is to convert business’ social responsibilities into business opportunities. He 
wrote: “…the proper ‘social responsibility’ of business is to tame the dragon, that is, 
to turn a social problem into economic opportunities… economic benefit, into 
productive capacity, into human competence, into well-paid jobs, and into wealth”.765 
 
Orlitzky argues that high levels of CSR may provide the slack resources necessary for 
a corporation to engage in corporate social responsibility; at the same time, CSR often 
represents an area of relatively high managerial discretion, so that the initiation and 
maintenance of voluntary social and environmental policies may depend on the 
availability of excess funds. In other words, no matter how much the executive 
leadership and organizational culture is supportive of CSR, the primary condition to 
use their discretion is profits and thus slack resources represent the necessary 
                                                
765 Drucker 62 
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conditions for high CSR. That is, a corporation’s prior profit level, if it is low, may 
act as a factor inhibiting CSR activities and investments.766  
 
The interviewees enumerated the following reasons for their positive answers: 
 
1. A company’s survival depends on long-term social development programmes because 
of pressure from society. 
 
2. A company’s raison d’être is for social development, especially increasing 
employment. 
 
3.  Social development programmes increase their profit. 
 
The ones who gave a negative answer mostly believed that ideally corporations have 
extra responsibility for social development, but not in Iran. They enumerated the 
following reasons for their negative answers: 
 
1. In Iran in recent years following the revolution, society has had a huge regression in 
moral values. The only goal of companies today is making short-term profits, even if 
it means sacrificing the whole society. 
 
2. Companies do not last long in Iran because the economy is not strong enough. This 
fact makes companies make short-term plans, and social development should be a 
long-term plan. 
                                                
766 Orlitzky, ‘Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A research Synthesis’ 122 
 302 
 
3. A company’s raison d’être and main function in society is to generate profit. It is 
wrong to expect social and political behaviour from it. These are the duties of other 
institutions in society, such as charity organizations. However, many of the 
interviewees mentioned that many charity organizations do business themselves in 
Iran which is, as they argued, very wrong since, first, the public does not trust charity 
organizations anymore, and second, commercial activities are not charity 
organizations’ function in society. 
 
4. Companies would like to have social development programmes in Iran but they do not 
have enough facilities to do so. 
 
5. Social development is more charity work rather than business. Companies need to see 
whether having social development projects increases their profit and success, 
otherwise it is a moral duty, not a commercial one. 
 
6. In Iran there is no competition and no disclosure. If there is a competitive market, 
having social development plans would have a positive economic effect for the 
company. 
 
7. Companies require social development projects from the government for two reasons: 
first, companies see their social responsibility as being towards their employees, not 
the whole society; neither do they have the capacity to do it. Second, according to 
Constitutional Law the government has the responsibility for social fairness, social 
well-being, employment and fair distribution of income. At the same time, the 
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government is getting quite a high tax revenues from companies. The government is 
getting its share from businesses; therefore, many companies expect that it does its 
duties, including CSR, properly. Companies are not going to do the government’s 
function for it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this section attempts were made to see if the impact of CSR values upon 
corporations in transitional economies, such as Iran, is likely to be shaped by the 
internal norms in these corporations.  
 
In the first step, the interviewees gave very mixed answers to the issue of 
stakeholders’ influence upon corporation decision-making. However, many of them 
(25 out of 28) believed that in general stakeholders have either very limited or no 
impact at all upon the decision-making process in Iranian companies due to a 
governmental economy, lack of competition and cultural underdevelopment. 
However, they gave a ranking of what stakeholder group they thought is the most 
important one: 1. Public opinion (11 out of 20), 2. Consumers (10 out of 20), 3. The 
attitude of the managing director and board of directors (7 out of 20).  
 
In the second step, the interviewees were asked if, and in what way, positive public 
perception is important for the success of their company in Iran. The interviewees fell 
into two groups of negative and positive answers, with a slight inclination towards a 
positive answer. The point that needs to be taken into consideration is that most of the 
interviewees with positive answers were managing directors of big, previously 
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governmental companies (the so-called “half private-half governmental companies”) 
and they did not provide sufficient grounds for their positive answer. 
 
Some of the interviewees (15 out of 28) assumed that the positive public perception of 
a company’s target group is important for that company’s success. They supported 
their positive answer with the following reasons: negative public opinion wastes 
companies’ energy in fighting it off, the government is scared of pressure from 
negative public opinion, positive public opinion will lead to more customers and more 
profit. 
 
The other half of the interviewees (13 out of 28), while assuming that positive public 
perception would be important for the success of the company, believed that it was 
not important in Iran’s current situation. They enumerated the following reasons for 
their negative answers: public opinion is important only when it endangers the 
government’s reputation, there is no trust in the government’s actions, companies do 
not last long, a governmental economy and no competition, bad economic conditions, 
a weak culture of collective action and group work, Iran is in transitional period and 
not sufficiently developed, and managers do not have enough expertise.  
 
All of the interviewees, while assuming that external conditions such as pressure from 
the government or public is more effective than internal elements, believed that CSR 
values within corporations are shaped by the attitudes of the managing director and 
board of directors. They all emphasized that the most important driver of CSR would 
be the managing director’s attitude. They argued that managing directors in Iran are 
governmental, powerful, experienced and have a huge say in how a company is run. 
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One of the interviewees further explained that CSR falls into the category of 
organizational culture, and culture in an Iranian company comes from the top 
(managers) down (to employees). Managers need to build the right culture and 
educate their employees in order to institutionalize CSR culture in the company. 
 
In the third step, most of the interviewees (25 out of 28) believed that 
managers/directors of large Iranian companies’ accountability to different 
stakeholders is weak in Iran. They gave the following reasons for their answers: 
managers are governmental, the money belongs to the government, not managers, 
managers do not have job security therefore they spend most of their energy scurrying 
to keep their position or drawing personal benefits, CSR is not required by law and 
might even in some cases be considered against the law. Bad and unstable economic 
conditions mean managers are busy with the everyday business of the company, there 
is no competition and consumers do not have choices, and the public does not have 
enough knowledge about CSR. 
 
A small number of the interviewees who happened to be the managing director of 
previously governmental companies (the so-called “half private-half governmental 
companies”) did not measure managing directors behaviour and did not comment on 
this issue. They just said that the attitude of the managing director is the most 
important factor in promoting CSR policies in the company. 
 
In the fourth step, most of the interviewees (18 out of 28) believed that more 
employee participation not only fails to further promote CSR policies in an Iranian 
company but it might hurt the company. They enumerated the following reasons for 
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their negative answers: a short-term mindset combined with bad economic conditions 
make employees think only about their own benefits, employees are not used to 
having power; cultural issues, the lack of knowledge and skills leading to 
mismanagement and misuse of power, dealing with CSR is the managers’ job and 
CSR is an external affair of the company, while employee participation is the internal 
affair of the company. 
 
Some of the interviewees (8 out of 28) believed that more employee participation 
would promote CSR policies in Iranian companies. They emphasized that 
participation makes employees feel they belong to a company. This will increase their 
efficiency level by carrying out decisions better. They will also behave better with 
stakeholders. This situation will guarantee an increase in profits and the company’s 
success.  
 
In the fifth step, all of the interviewees emphasized that the economic role is the 
primary function of a company. Most of the interviewees (20 out of 28) believed that 
a company is both an economic and socio-political player, with a great emphasis on 
the political role. They supported their answers with the following reasons: a 
governmental economy, survival and success, and economy and society are 
interwoven. 
 
The interviewees who maintained that companies are just economic players 
highlighted that ideally a company’s socio-political involvement is a good 
phenomenon, but not in Iran’s current situation. They believed that, besides the fact 
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that a company’s raison d’être is economic and its purpose is profit-making, Iran’s 
economic situation does not allow companies to play a socio-political role either. 
 
In the sixth step, most of the interviewees (25 out of 28) believed that making more 
profit is the main reason for getting involved with CSR. They argued that due to 
moral regression in Iran and bad economic conditions either the government needs to 
exert pressure and force for CSR to happen, or companies need to see an increase in 
profits. 
 
The interviewees maintained that one of the effective forms of doing business is a 
strategic move of advertising and marketing through “making news about the 
company’s activities,” and today doing CSR is one way of making news.  
 
Another reason that many interviewees (15 out of 28) gave as the main reason for 
getting involved in CSR is the survival of the company. They emphasized that a better 
reputation in society brings about positive public opinion regarding the company’s 
activities, leading to less political and social pressure on the company. Companies can 
attract people’s attention in order to have their support and loyalty through 
untertaking CSR related activities. 
 
In the seventh step, the interviewees were asked if they believe corporations have 
extra responsibility for social development beyond the development that arises 
incidentally from their responsibility to their shareholders to generate profit. 
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Almost half of the interviewees answered positively and the other half answered in 
the negative. There was a slight inclination towards a negative answer. 
 
The ones who answered positively emphasized the fact that a company needs to be 
economically successful and generate profit before making any plans for social 
development. The ones who gave a negative answer mostly believed that ideally 
corporations have extra responsibility for social development, but not in Iran.  
Key proposition 3: The Importance of Political 
Determinants of CSR 
 
The political determinants of CSR are fundamental to explaining its impact; 
these will vary from developed to transitional economies:  
1. The State has a major influence in developing countries, such as Iran, 
upon the adoption of CSR in many companies;  
2. Transitional economies, such as Iran, present major obstacles to the 
adoption of a dispersed ownership model of the corporation.  
3. The relationship between the legal rule to be transplanted and the socio-
political structure of the “origin” jurisdiction will determine the rejection 
or acceptance of legal transplants. 
 
Introduction 
In the previous section, the effects of internal norms on shaping CSR values within 
corporations were discussed. In this section, the State influence over the adpotion of 
CSR policies in developing countries will be discussed.  
 
Power and participation are two key issues that require further exploration in the CSR 
and development debate. CSR is an arena of political contestation “both in the 
‘macro’ sense of defining relations between the market and the State, and between 
different actors and social groups, and in relation to participation in decision-
making”.767 Who has the power to make decisions, what power structures are implicit 
                                                
767 UNRISD, 2003, ‘Conference news: corporate social responsibility and development: towards a new 
agenda’, Geneva: UNRISD, P, 21. 
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in CSR, and who has a voice in the debate are all questions that we need to 
consider.768  
 
The significant effect of politics on ownership structure is shown in the fact that “it 
can determine who owns corporations, how big it can grow, what it can produce 
profitably, how it raises capital, who has the capital to invest, how managers or 
employees see themselves and one another, and how authority is distributed inside the 
firm”.769 As Stiglitz puts it: “politics and economics are intricately interwoven: 
corporations have used their financial muscle to protect themselves from bearing the 
full social consequences of their actions”.770  
 
Moreover, legal rules are often the product of political processes combining public 
features and the interest of powerful economic-political groups. To the extent that 
interest groups play a role, each interest group will push for rules that favour it.771 
Control over corporate resources provides political power; therefore, the set of rules 
that might be easier to pass are those that would not directly lower those groups’ 
interests,772 but instead simply allow transactional changes.773 
 
Additionally, bringing change often requires the co-operation of those parties who 
control the corporation. And the fact that a change would be efficient would not 
                                                
768 Marina Prieto-Carron 984 
769 Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact 1 
770 Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work: The Next Step to Global Justice 209 
771 Hart 97 
772 Rent-seeking occurs when an individual, organization or firm seeks to earn income by capturing 
economic rent through manipulation or exploitation of the economic environment, rather than by 
earning profits through economic transactions and the production of added wealth. 
773 Hart 104 
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ensure that controlling parties would always want it to occur. The controlling parties 
might prevent an efficient change if it reduces their private benefits.774 
 
Wilks argues that it is impossible to understand the “structural dependence” between 
the state and the corporation without studying the corporation in its mould as a 
political actor.775 
 
In order to analyze the State influence in developing countries such as Iran upon the 
adoption of CSR in many companies, attempts were made to see if the political 
determinants of CSR are fundamental to explaining its impact, whether transitional 
economies, such as Iran, present major obstacles to the adoption of a dispersed 
ownership model of the corporation, and whether the relationship between the legal 
rule to be transplanted and the socio-political structure of the “origin” jurisdiction will 
determine the rejection or acceptance of legal transplants. 
 
In order to assess this key proposition, in the first step, the interviewees’ opinion was 
sought to see if CSR policies contradict any social/political values in Iran in a way 
that they would induce a backlash. They were also asked what local conditions have 
caused difficulties in transplanting commercial laws in Iran.  
 
In the second step the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the role of 
the State (the government), if any, in promoting CSR policies. They were also asked 
what source, if any, the government has used to promote CSR policies and what has 
the State done to encourage CSR policies. The interviewees’ opinion was also sought 
                                                
774 Ibid 80  
775 Wilks 56 
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as to how they believe the private sector/their company benefit from CSR 
partnerships with the government and if they think that promoting CSR policies will 
increase the level of co-operation between the public and private sectors in Iran.  
 
In the third step, the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the factors 
they believe promote the adoption of CSR values in Iran. 
 
The Effect of Local Conditions and Social/Political Values in 
Introducing CSR in Iran 
 
The interviewees’ opinion was sought to see if CSR policies contradicted any 
social/political values in Iran in a way that would induce a backlash. They were also 
asked what local conditions have caused difficulties in transplanting commercial laws 
in Iran. 
 
Otto Kahn-Freund holds that distinctive “environmental” conditions in each country, 
particularly the political environment in the form of constitutional structure and 
interest group coalitions, make successful transplants rare.776 Kahn-Freund argues that 
“anyone contemplating the use of foreign legislation for law-making in his country 
must ask himself: how far does this rule or institution owe its existence or its 
continued existence to a distribution of power in the foreign country which we do not 
share? How far would it be accepted and how far rejected by the organized groups777 
                                                
776 Kahn-Freund 7: By politics, Kahn-Freund means constitutional structure of government as well as 
interest group pressures. 
777 By ‘organized groups’, he means not only groups representing economic interests: big business, 
agriculture, trade unions, consumer organisations, but equally of organized cultural interests, religious, 
charitable, etc. All these share in the political power, and the extent of their influence and the way it is 
exercised varies from country to country.  
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which, in the political sense, are part of our constitution?”778 And consequently the 
strongest “organic” element in the law today is “its close link with the infinite 
variations of the organization of power in culturally, socially, economically very 
similar countries”.779 
 
For example, from the very beginning of introducing economic reforms in developing 
countries, serious attempts have been made to strengthen creditor and shareholder 
rights. But Pistor el al.’s studies, which compared the scope of change in developing 
countries using their various shareholder rights indices, showed “that legal change did 
not focus exclusively on the strengthening of minority shareholder rights”.780 Their 
studies also demonstrated that “while management has been a clear target of the 
reform efforts, suggesting that the classic corporate governance paradigm has 
influenced reforms, anti-block holder rights, as well as the supervision of stock 
markets were also improved substantially”.781 They also found little evidence that 
countries followed a particular governance model in designing a legal change 
package. “Rather an all-round improvement of shareholder and creditor rights has 
taken place”.782 
 
Another example is associated with implementing the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance in developing countries, among which the most prominent is 
the agency theory that shapes the baseline of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system. The nature of agency problem in this system means aligning 
directors’ interests with shareholders’ interests, whereas this problem in developing 
                                                
778 Kahn-Freund 12 
779 Ibid 12 
780 Katharina Pistor, ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ 4 
781 Ibid 4 
782 Ibid 4 
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countries has been historically between majority and minority shareholders where one 
of the families is the controlling shareholder, ignoring the interests of the small 
shareholders.783 
 
Moreover, many analysts argue that corporations’ various economic performance or 
policies derive more or less directly from differences in the formal organization of the 
political economy.784 The organization of a nation’s political economy is inextricably 
bound up with its history in two respects: on the one hand, it is created by statutory-
legal implementation means and their operating procedures; on the other, repeated 
historical experiences build up a set of common expectations that leads actors in 
certain directions in order to co-ordinate effectively with each other.785  
 
The important question here is whether a market-oriented approach to corporate 
governance is feasible for developing countries looking to develop equity markets. 
For many authors, the answer to this question has been negative for since the market-
oriented approach assumes the existence of markets with a non-legal market 
institutions infrastructure to protect shareholders instead of formal laws. The 
existence of non-legal complementarities represents little need for strong laws. 
However, developing countries do not yet have the mature market institutions that 
make a market-based model of governance with weak legal protections for protecting 
shareholders possible. Indeed, the whole endeavour is to create markets.786  
 
                                                
783 Rafael La Porta, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ 27 
784 Buhmann 12 
785 Ibid 13 
786 Kiarie 1911-1913 
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Most of the interviewees (20 out of 28), while highlighting that CSR and doing charity 
work have roots in Iranian culture and religious views, believed that implementing 
CSR policies in Iran would induces a backlash for the following reasons: 
 
1. Iran is in bad economic shape. Private companies will consider CSR as extra cost and 
a new burden. Companies need to be justified about the economic benefits of CSR and 
the profit they can derive from it in the long-term. In other words, if CSR has a 
negative effect on profit-making, companies will stand against it. 
 
According to the World Bank, economic growth in Iran increased by 3.5% in 2009/10 
while prudent macroeconomic policies reduced inflation to about 10% and ensured a 
fiscal surplus. The initial impact of the removal of the substantial energy and food 
subsidies in December 2010 did not suppress Iran’s economic performance despite 
stricter economic sanctions. Nevertheless, growth is projected to decline to 2.5% and 
inflation to increase to above 20% due to the impact of the substantial increase in 
energy prices. However, maintaining tight monetary and fiscal policies is expected to 
bring inflation back to 12% in 2012/13. The medium-term outlook for economic 
growth is positive (around 4.5% ) but crucially depends on sound macroeconomic 
management and the capacity of the corporate sector to adjust to higher energy 
costs.787 
 
2. Iranian society and Iranian companies need to be educated about CSR, which needs 
to be justified and explained to them. If they do not know about it, they will resist it. A 
culture needs to be developed taking into account Iranian society’s needs and 
                                                
787 WorldBank, 
‘http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRANEXTN/0,,menuPK
:312966~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:312943,00.html’ 
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characteristics. Moreover, Iranians like copying and following; therefore, if some big 
companies become pioneers in Iran, other companies will follow those standards. 
 
An example of this education is that companies in Iran should learn to fear that if they 
do not try to find solutions to community problems, the government might increase its 
role, leading to new obligations and greater intervention in the labour market. “Many 
companies prefer to be one step ahead of government legislation or intervention, to 
anticipate social pressures themselves and hence be able to develop their own policies 
in response to them”.788 
 
As for education in Iran, according to the World Bank, Iran’s social indicators are 
relatively high by regional standards. Most human development indicators have 
improved noticeably based on the government’s efforts to increase access to 
education and health. Virtually all children of the relevant age group were enrolled 
into primary schools in 2008, while enrolment into secondary schools increased from 
66% in 1995 to 80% in 2008. As a result, youth literacy rates increased from 86% to 
94% over the same period, rising significantly for girls. Consequently, Iran is well 
placed to achieve the MDG target with regard to eliminating gender disparities. 
Currently, the number of Iranian women enrolled in university (at undergraduate 
level) is twice as high as the number of men. Similarly, Iranian women are playing an 
increasingly important role in the economy, though their market participation and 
employment rates remain limited.789  
 
                                                
788 Vogel 308 
789 WorldBank, 
‘http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRANEXTN/0,,menuPK
:312966~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:312943,00.html’ 
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3. If CSR produces any negative political effect through the way it is being implemented 
or through the purposes followed by institutions that are implementing it, it will 
induce a strong political backlash. One of the interviewees mentioned that Iran’s 
government does not differentiate between ownership and sovereignty. It believes 
ownership brings about sovereignty; therefore, if there is a rich socially influential 
owner (company), the government will stand against it and delete it. 
 
Roe also maintains that international agencies are often considered as a way of 
placing mechanical rules and basic institutional infrastructure for promoting 
international corporations in a nation; but these initiatives might induce a strong 
political backlash if that nation’s underlying politics is not in line with those of 
international agencies. These differences will eventually lead to political instability 
and, over time, less productivity and less efficiency; hence, in order to implement 
changes, international agencies should focus on what can be changed; not to examine 
the political bedrock if changing it, at least in short run, is impossible.790 
 
4. Because of the governmental economy and lack of competitive market, the main 
functions of CSR are impaired in Iran. For example, CSR tries to push private 
companies to accept responsibility towards society and public authorities or CSR 
pushes companies to satisfy customers more. These functions are applicable in a 
competitive market that has big private companies. 
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Ogus also argued that competition between national legal orders is the chief engine 
for change.791 Lawmakers, especially in small jurisdictions, are aware of a country’s 
need of investment by multinational corporations and domestic industries which 
usually threaten to migrate and operate under another jurisdiction if the national legal 
system imposes higher costs on them than those incurred by their competitors 
operating in different jurisdictions. This pressure resulting from competition between 
different legal suppliers can heavily influence politicians and subsequently motivate 
lawmakers; however, competition might not always prevail if having more 
competitive laws endangers key players’ potential benefits.792  
 
Additionally, another obstacle to competition in developing countries is that they do 
not tend to liberalize their laws. Indeed, in many developing countries the body in 
charge of securities market regulation is not an independent agency, but rather under 
the direct control of the Ministry of Finance, or an equivalent governmental 
organization. That is: “rather than using securities regulation as a complementary 
control device for shareholders and investors, it was frequently used as an instrument 
of direct State control”.793 
 
The IMF reported that, despite the fact that banking remains the backbone of the 
financial system, Iran’s equity markets have become viable, though still small, 
channels of finance for the real economy. Market capitalization has doubled in dollar 
terms between 2006 and 2010, as a result of more listings, significant IPOs under the 
government’s privatization plans, as well as sharp increases in prices in 2009-10. Iran 
has two venues for listing and trading shares: the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) and 
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an OTC (Over The Counter) exchange for small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
two venues list some 500 companies. The TSE hosts a main board for the more liquid 
shares and stronger companies, and a secondary board for less liquid shares. The OTC 
exchange lists companies with less of a track record. The 5th FYDP provides that 
companies which have issued shares under public placements must be listed on the 
OTC exchange, regardless of their performance. As a result, another 1,500 companies 
will be listed by 2012 and therefore comply with minimum requirements of 
transparency and governance.794 
 
5. Iranian society does not trust the government; therefore, anything that comes from the 
government will induce resistance and backlash. 
 
6. If a company pays attention to CSR more than is common practice, it will raise the 
bar and interfere with the societal arrangements; therefore, the government and 
society will stand against it. 
 
Some have argued that when a foreign law is transplanted it will either lead to 
integration or repulsion. Teubner argued that the transplanted institutions “work as a 
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected 
events”.795 He further stated that “legal irritants” cannot be domesticated; they are not 
transformed from something alien into something familiar, not adapted to a new 
cultural context, rather they will unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the 
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external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context will undergo 
fundamental change.”796 
 
7. CSR should not contradict Iranian culture and religious values. It cannot be 
implemented in Iran according to Western values.  
 
8. Despite the fact that CSR exists in Iran’s culture and religious beliefs, putting them 
into practice will be very hard. Iranian society is traditional and superstitious. 
Changing behaviour will be a very long and hard process. 
 
Mattei holds that differences in different legal systems do not imply inefficiencies.797 
Different legal systems may develop different solutions to the same problem that is 
consistent with their legal tradition, which may be as efficient as the agreed legal 
theory by the competitive market. It is not a rule of “one size fits all”. 
 
William Bratton and Joseph McCahery in their influential work on comparative 
corporate governance assert that each national corporate governance system is a 
significant system in itself.798 No empirical research demonstrates a clear necessity or 
requirement for convergence of corporate governance laws.799 Therefore, there is a 
place for developing individual national models of corporate governance and no need 
for developing nations to simply cut and paste Western laws into their law books. 800 
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Some of the interviewees (8 out of 20) believed that if the society and companies are 
educated and have knowledge about CSR, it would not induce a social/political 
backlash. They maintained that Iranians are prepared and have the necessary 
grounds already existing in Iranian culture and religion for CSR values. They 
emphasized that CSR values need to be in conformity with Iranian politics, religion 
and culture. 
 
The Role of the Iranian State in Promoting CSR Policies  
 
In the second step, the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the role of 
the State (the government), if any, in promoting CSR policies. They were also asked 
what source, if any, the government has used to promote CSR policies and what has 
the State done to encourage CSR policies. The interviewees’ opinion was also sought 
as to how they believe the private sector/your company benefit from CSR 
partnerships with the government and if they think that promoting CSR policies will 
increase the level of co-operation between the public and private sectors in Iran. 
 
The World Bank has stated that Iran's economy is transforming towards a market-
based economy. The Iranian State still plays a key role in the economy, owning large 
public and quasi-public enterprises which partly dominate the manufacturing and 
commercial sectors. Over 60% of the manufacturing sector’s output is produced by 
State-owned enterprises; the financial sector is also dominated by public banks 
despite the entrance of four private banks in the early 2000s. Moreover, Iran’s 2010 
Doing Business ranking is in the bottom tier of the MENA region. However, the 
authorities have adopted a comprehensive strategy as reflected in their 20-year Vision 
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document and the 5th Five-Year Development Plan to ensure the implementation of 
market-based reforms.801 
 
Similarly, the IMF in its 2011 report on Iran maintains that the Iranian authorities 
view the transformation to a market-based economy as a means to enhance efficiency 
and increase its growth potential. Iran has a relatively well-diversified economy with 
a sizeable industrial base, but large-scale subsidies and inefficiencies have limited 
Iran’s ability to further develop its non-oil economy. Iran’s total factor productivity 
growth has been low and its energy-intensiveness increased in recent years. Despite 
some recent improvements, Iran only ranked 129 out of 183 in the ease of doing 
business criteria in 2010. FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) flows have also remained 
very low by comparison to a group of comparator countries,802 largely due to 
international sanctions but also on account of a difficult business environment.803 
 
The IMF also suggested that the following policies be taken by Iranian authorities: (i) 
to maintain short-term macroeconomic stability to support the reform process; (ii) 
transition further to a free market-based economy to foster growth and support job 
creation; and, (iii) strengthen the financial sector.804 
 
According to the World Bank, Iran’s government has launched a major reform of its 
indirect subsidy system, which, if successful would markedly improve the efficiency 
of expenditures and economic activities. The overall subsidies were estimated to cost 
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27% of GDP in 2007/2008 (approximately US$77.2 billion). The government has 
opted for a direct cash transfer programme while substantially increasing the prices of 
petroleum products, water, electricity, bread and a number of other products. 
Preliminary estimates suggest that the government’s comprehensive cash transfer 
programme accompanying the ongoing subsidy reform has reduced poverty and 
regional income disparities significantly.805 
 
Most of the interviewees (19 out of 28) believed that the government has never used 
any resources and had a very weak performance in promoting and encouraging CSR 
policies. 
 
This is in line with the CIA World Factbook’s opinion about Iran’s government’s 
economic performance. Iran's economy is marked by an inefficient State sector, 
reliance on the oil sector, which provides the majority of the government’s revenues, 
and statist policies, which create major distortions throughout the system. Private 
sector activity is typically limited to small-scale workshops, farming and services. 
Price controls, subsidies and other rigidities weigh down the economy, undermining 
the potential for private-sector-led growth. Significant informal market activity 
flourishes.806 
 
The interviewees enumerated the following reasons for their answers: 
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1. The government’s main purpose has always been only political and economic security 
for itself. 
 
Bremmer also argues that in State capitalism economies, the motivation behind 
decisions is political rather than economic. He further maintains that if politics and 
business are closely related, domestic political instabilities that threaten the State also 
threaten business.807 
 
Securing private property rights by the State has two opposing effects: on the one 
hand is controlling disorder, which means that investment must be secured, typically 
by the government, from expropriation; on the other hand is controlling the abuses of 
State intervention, implying that a government capable of protecting property against 
private infringement can itself become the violator. As both the Marxist and the 
public choice literature have identified long ago, politicians choose policies and 
institutions to stay in power and to get rich.808 
 
2. The government has lost people’s trust. It needs to regain people’s trust by being 
honest with the public.  
 
3. The government in Iran does not think big and long-term. 
 
Katouzian emphasized the importance of long-term planning. He stated that all the 
major theories of economic development are agreed that the industrial revolution 
happened because of long-term accumulation of, first, commercial then industrial 
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capital. Long-term accumulation was one of the necessary conditions of modern 
industrial development to provide the necessary investment in the commercial sphere, 
leading to continuous expansion of foreign trade and innovation.809 
 
Capital accumulation requires saving, which in turn requires a minimum degree of 
security and certainty concerning the future. In countries such as Iran, where financial 
and physical assets have been constantly under the threat of confiscation and 
expropriation, capital accumulation rarely happens.810 
 
4. The government in Iran has problems getting through its normal day-to-day affairs, 
let alone strategizing for a greater goal such as CSR. 
 
As Reed argued, even expecting most corporations to live up to a stronger 
understanding of a responsibility in developing countries is rather naive. Developing 
countries struggle with major challenges in their efforts to implement mechanisms to 
enforce Anglo-American corporate governance reforms and promote development: 
first, this model has developed some conditions, such as monitoring systems, to 
function effectively. How can developing countries introduce the same conditions? 
Second, even if they introduce these basic conditions, do they need to introduce other 
features to supplement the Anglo-American model in order to match with their special 
needs and effectively contribute to development? Third, whether the Anglo-American 
model is the best choice for promoting development in developing countries or 
whether, in the longer term, they need to consider other alternatives.811 It is currently 
being argued that the key to effectiveness does not depend on whether a country 
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adopts one model or the other, but more on whether it has a well-functioning legal 
system which supports the appropriate and timely enforcement of contracts812 and ties 
the reforms to the larger question of democratic political reforms which are being 
undermined by the notion of globalization.  
 
5. After the revolution, the government did its best to make people believe that 
capitalism, investment and money are bad concepts. Now after privatization, the 
government wants investment but people’s mindset has not changed yet. 
 
The IMF suggested that encouraging foreign investment and accelerating the ongoing 
privatization process will also support the restructuring of the economy. Greater 
participation of foreign investors would not only bring capital but also much-needed 
modern technologies, management know-how and access to foreign markets. The 
planned privatization of SMEs (Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises) with listing on 
Iran’s stock exchange would give these companies access to new capital, increase 
work incentives and reduce pressures for bailouts and quasi-fiscal activities.813 
 
Despite all these shortcomings in the government’s activities, all of the interviewees 
strongly believed that the government plays the most important role in promoting 
CSR policies. 
 
This is in accordance with Pistor’s opinion about the role of the State. She argues that 
“corporate governance is an integral part of State governance”; therefore, for the law 
on the books to make a difference and have more than a marginal effect “an effective 
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system of external private finance requires a credible commitment by the state that 
private rights will be honoured and enforced, and not undermined by State 
interventions”.814 
 
In the same fashion, Reed holds that governments in developing economies have a 
key role to play. Because of the relatively low costs of health and education 
programmes in these countries, which provide the necessary basis for long-term 
growth and development, a tremendous impact can be made without affecting the 
efforts to stimulate economic recovery.815 Liberalization policies of the Anglo-
American kind are based on developments in private corporations which, however, 
undermine the social programmes undertaken by the governments and are funded by 
tax revenues; they also are said to induce a “race to the bottom” by engaging in what 
has been termed “regulatory competition”.816  
 
Some have argued that CSR is “mutually exclusive” with the role of the State as 
regulator since CSR is going beyond regulation; whereas some insist that CSR is the 
relationship between the State and market actors.817 In contrast, Black argues that 
different national and international regulation is what CSR is dealing with and it does 
not necessarily come from the State since it is a broader social phenomenon.818 In 
other words, regulation includes law but is not limited to it. In this way, she holds that 
the role of the State in CSR regulation is limited by nature. 
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One of the interviewees, who was a governmental official as well as the managing 
director of one of the biggest companies in the industry sector, raised the question of 
legitimacy that can be applied to business going too far from its role towards making 
public-interest decisions. He, along with two other interviewees, who were the 
managing directors of two of the most active companies in the Tehran Stock 
Exchange, believed that public interest is not part of corporations’ expertise. It is not 
what their structure asks them to do. So it can be argued that they are going out of 
their range, and certainly it is not democratic. They believed that it is not important 
what a CEO of a corporation says and wants in this respect. No one elected them. 
They do not have any power to speak for people. These are the decisions that should 
be made by governments, not by corporations. As one economist put it in a critique of 
CSR: “the proper guardians of the public interest are the governments, which are 
accountable to all citizens”.819 
 
The interviewees enumerated the following as the role that the government can play 
in promoting CSR policies: 
 
1. Iran has a governmental economy in which companies and the government are on one 
side and consumers on the other. Consumers will never be able to manage to make 
companies behave in a socially responsible way. Moreover, companies’ relationship 
with the government is not financial but rather they are part of the government’s 
annual budget, leading to companies not caring about profit-making. This needs to 
change. 
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Roe, along with the interviewees, asserted that even radical sudden legal change will 
not change pre-existing legal institutions overnight. This will take time and may not 
even succeed fully since rent-seeking may get in the way. Those who enjoy rents in 
the pre-existing legal system and not in the new one will use all their lobbying power 
to either block the new rule-making or make it practically ineffective and ignored. 
Typically, this type of change occurs in response to a crisis.820 
 
The IMF emphasized the importance of the financial sector’s role in Iran’s growth 
strategy. In line with the 1983 Law on Usury (Interest) Free Banking, the banking 
system and the CBI (Centre for Promotion of Imports) support a broader set of goals 
and policies of the government, which aim at enhancing economic growth and job 
creation with low inflation. More recently, Iran’s capital markets Tehran Stock 
Exchange (TSE); OTC network (commodities exchange) have gained importance in 
the government’s strategy of promoting a more market-oriented economy and 
mobilizing private capital for the financing of the economy. The strategy 
encompasses the 2010 subsidy reforms, as well as a wide-ranging privatization 
programme in line with Principle 44 of the Constitution that affirms the primacy of 
private property in Iran’s economic development. Finally, the 5th FYDP that lays out 
Iran’s development strategy for the period 2010-15 contains an important chapter on 
strengthening and liberalizing the financial system.821 
 
2. The government can use a reward/punishment method to promote CSR policies. It can 
use tax exemption and bank loans as rewards. Many of the interviewees brought up 
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tax exemption as the best way for the encouragement of CSR policies by the 
government and the best way to increase voluntary compliance with CSR rules. 
 
Pistor has further explained the effect of a level of compliance. She argues that if the 
level of voluntary compliance is high, law enforcement by the State and State 
intervention will be limited to a few cases and can be effective. And if the level of 
compliance is low, the ability of the State to enforce the law and improve its 
effectiveness is rather limited. She further argues that “voluntary compliance requires 
a credible threat that defection will be sanctioned. Effective law enforcement by the 
State may not be the exclusive element but is certainly an important element in 
making this threat viable”.822 
 
3. The government needs to have a supervisory and controlling role and it needs to stop 
meddling in business. The government needs to allow the market to grow and manage 
itself. Iran needs a competitive market. The government needs to gradually reduce its 
presence and surrender its place to private companies. 
 
The IMF also suggested that in order to achieve higher growth and create jobs, the 
authorities should adopt a comprehensive multi-pronged strategy as reflected in their 
20-year Vision document and 5th Five-Year Development Plan. The strategy should 
aim at promoting a market-based economy by reducing the role of the government, 
privatizing enterprises and increasingly allowing prices to reflect market forces. To 
support the phasing out of subsidies, enterprises that are most energy-intensive can 
qualify for subsidized loans to invest in energy-efficient technologies. In addition, the 
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government has set up incentive programmes to improve management and 
productivity.823 
 
As for the design of this reform in the State’s role, two camps have emerged in the 
debate: on the one hand, there are proponents of the “big bang” approach, who argue 
for a quick and all-at-once introduction of all reforms; on the other hand, there are 
those who stand for a “gradualist” approach and emphasize the step-by-step and 
sequencing of reforms. The advocates of the big-bang approach argue that reform 
packages complete one another and should be introduced simultaneously and in a 
comprehensive way; thus, introducing partial reforms would eliminate their positive 
effects and disorganize the economy.824 
 
On the other hand, the proponents of gradualist reform have argued that gradualist 
reform packages have higher feasibility and may be easier to get started, and the 
sequencing of reforms may create constituencies for further reforms and increase the 
irreversibility of enacted reforms and reduce the costs of reversal in case of 
rejection.825 
 
4. The government can use parliament for passing new regulations about CSR or for 
interpreting current regulations to promote CSR policies. It can increase standards of 
working conditions in the Labour Law, such as increasing the minimum salary and 
reducing working hours. 
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Aguilera maintains that the laws which governments pass to encourage CSR have 
significant influence in two aspects: first, the standards established by laws and 
mandatory regulation, while not immediately translated into action in any realistic 
portrait of global organizational practice, have a particularly strong influence on 
establishing social expectations about responsible corporate behaviour. Second, once 
the social expectation is created, a number of other forces, including consumer 
demands, institutional investor demands, community demands and NGO demands 
press for the standards set out in the law. Third, the laws and policies that the 
governments enact send a strong signal about the importance of a subject, possible 
future legislations and the individualistic versus collectivist nature of the country’s 
underlying political and social philosophy.826 
 
5. The government controls radio and television. It can use this means to advertise for 
CSR.  
 
6. The government needs to establish and strengthen civil society institutions, such as 
unions and NGOs. 
 
Evidence from these countries shows that with the “weak civil society and market 
institutions and sometimes over-arching governments there has only been a slow and 
tentative development of explicit CSR”827 For example, in Russia the absence of long-
term social capital and of habits of business responsibility are the main reasons for the 
slow CSR development. “But where markets, civil society and the government are 
relatively autonomous, mutually reinforcing and non-parasitic, explicit CSR may 
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emerge within the range of governance solutions as evidenced in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary (coincidentally countries which retained some vestiges of civil society 
through communism)”.828 
 
7. The government needs to educate people from an early age to be able to build a 
culture. Iran’s society needs to learn how to do group work and collective action. 
 
8. The government needs to determine general policies and strategies. It needs to define 
a framework within which companies move towards a mutual goal. Iran’s economy 
has been governmental for a long time. Companies are still used to governmental 
organizational structure in many so-called “half private-half public companies”. 
Even Iranian managers have governmental organizational behaviour. They need a 
model and a plan otherwise they will mess up the economy. At the same time, Iran’s 
society is used to the government’s intervention in business due to a governmental 
economy; therefore, they will accept CSR from it. 
 
Pistor maintains that in many transition economies, privatisation simply led to the 
explicit recognition of State control rights through the allocation of ownership titles to 
insiders. She argues that: “Despite changes in ownership structures, the State has in 
many ways retained direct influence even over privatized companies. The direct 
provision of financing is not the most important vehicle for exercising this influence. 
Rather the State has traded access to subsidies and regulatory favours for influence 
and in many instances allowed soft budget constraints to be perpetuated by 
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widespread tax arrears. In many large companies the State retains effective control 
rights as the largest single shareholder or through golden share provisions.”829 
 
9. In developing countries such as Iran everything starts from top to bottom. 
 
10. The government needs to appoint knowledgeable and skilled managers that do not 
have a governmental organizational mindset and behaviour. 
 
Richard Eells contends that assuming political life for corporations brings about 
inescapable political issues. In the light of this political life, the responsibilities of 
corporate managers should be correctly spelled out, while new ways should be 
recognized to hold them accountable. But there is still the constitutional crisis that 
arises from political life.830 Eugene V. Rostow has argued against corporate 
democracy as a solution to constitutional crisis. He holds that “shareholder 
democracy” is impractical and there is no solution for it even in theory. He further 
argues that the best way to hold corporate managers accountable is to restrict their 
ability to direct the corporation for the sole purpose of profit maximization for their 
shareholders. By this, he implies that the employees’ interests should be taken care of 
by unions, while protecting public interests is the concern of government.831  
 
11. Iran is in bad economic shape; therefore, the government needs to incentivize 
employees by increasing their well-being. 
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12. The government can use its power and push governmental companies to allocate a 
certain amount of their time and profit to socially responsible projects. 
 
Some of the interviewees (9 out of 20), who all happened to be previous governmental 
managers and recent “half private-half governmental company” managers, did not 
properly give their opinion about whether the government has used any resources to 
encourage CSR policies. They simply emphasized the importance of the government’s 
role and almost all of them directly asked for guidelines from the government. They 
believed that it is a company’s duty to move within the framework defined by 
government and strongly suggested that all companies’ function is to fulfil the 
government’s purposes. All of them believed that if government did not provide them 
with a framework, the economy would be a huge mess. 
 
It has been argued that governments also informally use corporations’ help for 
implementing public policies and that this will cause excessive dependence by States 
on big corporations.832  
 
In answer to the question of whether CSR policies would increase the level of co-
operation between the public and private sectors, many interviewees did not give any 
answer or explanation. The ones who answered (11 interviewees) gave a strongly 
negative answer. They emphasized that there is a huge distance and mistrust between 
government and private companies. The government always tricks the public by 
putting on a socially responsible face but the outcome of its behaviour is never 
socially responsible. The government has always used force against private 
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corporations; there has never been any spirit of co-operation. At the same time, the 
government is the biggest businessman in Iran. It is the reason for many 
corporations’ lack of success. The government competes with companies in the 
market and due to its power, financial status and extension, always wins. Moreover, 
the government’s concern has never been CSR. The rare times that they pay attention 
to CSR, it is because its reputation and security is in danger. 
 
The Factors that Promote Adoption of CSR Values in Iran 
 
In the third step, the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the factors 
that they believe promote the adoption of CSR values in Iran. 
 
Paredes has suggested: “instead of an enabling corporate law, a much more 
mandatory corporate law regime for developing countries that basically fills the void 
left by the lack of market institutions in these countries”.833  
 
Most of the interviewees (24 out of 28) held the conviction that as long as there is a 
governmental and political economy in Iran, CSR will not be developed. They also 
agreed that the ground for developing CSR policies in Iran is not ready and would 
take a long time. The government is the main economic player in Iran and does not 
consider CSR as its responsibility. Social security, retirement conditions and 
minimum wages systems in Iran are weak. Priority needs to be given to correcting 
these systems rather than CSR, which is on a higher level. 
 
They believed that the following factors will promote CSR policies in Iran: 
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1. The government needs to stay away from the economy and doing business, and a 
liberal economy needs to be developed in Iran. As a consequence, there would be 
competition in the market since consumers would have more choices. Moreover, 
political economy is to the detriment of companies. The slightest political issue has a 
direct negative effect on companies. This situation is making it almost impossible to 
do business in Iran. 
 
The IMF in its 2011 report on Iran holds that the Iranian authorities’ economic reform 
strategy, anchored in privatization, reduction of the role of government and market-
based prices for energy and agricultural goods should help achieve higher growth and 
create jobs. In particular, the ongoing restructuring of existing enterprises through the 
adoption of energy-efficient technologies, and the steadfast implementation of 
initiatives to support the creation of new enterprises, are critical to move Iran to a 
higher growth path. The IMF also suggested that the development of new growth 
sectors will require rebalancing of the economy, and should be supported by labour 
market reforms, including adequate unemployment benefits. Ongoing programmes to 
enhance skill-matching and retrain workers should help remove labour market 
frictions. To avoid weakening incentives for effective corporate restructuring, 
subsidized financial support should not be provided to non-viable enterprises. At the 
same time, encouraging foreign investment and accelerating the ongoing privatization 
process will also bring new financing and support the restructuring of the economy.834 
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2. The government needs to have a supervisory role. It also needs to stop subsidizing 
and arranging companies’ affairs for them. Companies need to take decisions 
themselves so society will be able to expect responsibility from them. With freedom 
comes responsibility. Another reason for removing the government from the economy 
is the fact that the money keeps going from one governmental company to another; it 
never reaches society so private companies can participate in cash flow in society and 
thereby develop.  
 
3. Managers need to become shareholders and have longer management tenures to be 
able to focus on the financial and social development of the company instead of on 
keeping their position. They also need to be educated about CSR in order to have the 
necessary knowledge and skills. 
 
A useful point of departure for an analysis of corporate governance in transition 
economies is to think about the problems of corporate control under central planning. 
Pistor argues that corporate structure under central planning has two particular 
characteristics: first, they do not need to worry about “raising external finance” since 
budget control is done by central planning; therefore, “the concept of financial 
discipline or accountability was essentially absent from the socialist firm”. Second, 
the State is the owner of most assets. It faces the problem of monitoring the managers 
of corporations to act according to the targets set out by central planning. “The two 
problems are inter-related. If sanctions for not acting according to financial discipline 
such as “cutting off supplies and ultimately forcing an enterprise to close down” are 
not available, problems of corporate control could never be resolved.”835 
                                                
835 Katharina Pistor, ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ 3 
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This is in line with the view of the advocates of globalism, who are convinced that an 
unlimited and borderless global economy will lead to better common good. They 
argue that the primacy of market imperatives over political regulation will leave 
everybody better off.836 In other words, the “invisible hand”837 of the market will 
direct private corporations to do less harm and move towards the common good. They 
assume that corporations can be considered as the solution to the global regulation 
gap and public well-being.838  
 
4. The government needs to build a culture through education and advertising, a culture 
that develops a sense of responsibility and a long-term mind-set in society, since 
companies are a part of society and will imitate the behaviour of the society. A 
responsible society will demand responsible companies. At the same time, growth is a 
package that includes a collection of economy, culture, religion, social mindset and 
politics. These elements need to grow together for sustainable social and economic 
development to happen. Moreover, a financial disclosure and transparency culture 
needs to be developed starting from the government. In this way, the government can 
start regaining people’s trust. 
 
The IMF also noted that further enhancing transparency and data collection on 
economic activity is essential to facilitate policy-making. National income statistics 
                                                
836 Such as: Irwin, 2002; Krauss, 1997; Norberg, 2003; in, Palazzo, ‘Globalization and Corporate 
Social Responsibility’’ 416 
837 This term is used to describe the self-regulating nature of the marketplace. It is a metaphor first 
coined by the economist Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. For Smith, the invisible hand 
was created by the conjunction of the forces of self-interest, competition, and supply and demand, 
which he noted as being capable of allocating resources in society. This is the founding justification for 
the laissez-faire economic philosophy.  
838 Ibid.  
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should be published with minimum delays. High-frequency data across various 
sectors should be collected and analyzed. The presentation of fiscal accounts on the 
basis of the GFSM2001 manual would be an important step in increasing 
transparency on fiscal operations, and should be further improved by giving a more 
detailed presentation of transactions of financial assets and liabilities.839 
 
The IMF also reported on the Iranian government’s activities to promote 
transparency. Companies use the regulator’s electronic network to file and disclose 
quarterly statements within 30 days of quarter end, of which the mid-year and end-
year must be audited. Companies are required to post annual audited financial reports 
within 60 days of year-end, and to provide quarterly earnings guidance. Material 
developments of a financial or corporate control nature must be immediately 
disclosed to the market. As concerns enforcement, the Securities and Exchange 
Organization (SEO) requires that all company insiders (directors and senior officers) 
be registered and their market trades individually traceable (audit trail) on its central 
depository system, which handles all post-trade requirements of Iran’s capital 
markets. The SEO supervises the audit profession and retains its own auditors to 
verify that financial statements fairly represent management’s current knowledge. 
Iran has a dedicated court with judges specialized in capital market issues to prosecute 
market abuse and manipulation. This framework incorporates the lessons of several 
scandals that marred Iranian equity markets in the 1980s.840 
 
                                                
839 IMF11/241 15-16 
840 IMF11/242 11 
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5. Companies need to see an economic justification for CSR. They need to see an 
increase in profit or at least see the social impacts of doing CSR, while making sure 
at least they sustain no financial harm from doing it. 
 
6. Iran needs to develop big private companies. 
 
The IMF in its 2011 report on Iran also highlighted the importance of creating new 
enterprises to facilitate a structural change in transitional economies. Iran’s 
government has recently launched programmes to promote entrepreneurship, 
including private-run consultancy and training programmes, which are important 
steps in facilitating the creation and development of enterprises. The success of these 
initiatives should be assessed by monitoring the number of newly created enterprises 
and jobs. Further efforts should also be made to continue streamlining licensing 
procedures, particularly for small services.841 
 
7. Iran needs to have a reasonable tax and social security system. Consequently, 
companies will stop avoiding them. 
 
8. A model for CSR needs to be developed in order for companies to know what is 
expected from them. Companies need to know what the limits are for doing CSR to be 
able to keep a balance. Iran is a very emotional society. One of the reasons 
companies try to stay away from CSR is the danger that it might distract companies 
from their main function. 
 
                                                
841 IMF11/241 15 
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9. The public’s knowledge about CSR needs to be increased. The public needs to be 
informed about CSR. Iran’s society wants CSR but it does not have the knowledge to 
see it as a duty for corporations. 
 
A small number of the interviewees (4 out of 28), who were the managing directors of 
previously governmental companies (the so-called “half private-half governmental 
companies”), did not consider the governmental economy as a problem. They 
accounted for more government intervention through it providing a model and being 
able to use punishment/reward policies for developing CSR policies. One of the 
interviewees believed that the more religious values are promoted, the more CSR 
values would be promoted. He also emphasized that CSR will not be developed in 
Iran according to Western values but rather Islamic-Iranian values. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Although the economic aspects of the corporation have received the widest notice, the 
concept of the corporation as a political system is by no means unknown. Walton 
Hamilton argues against the Hobbesian concept of the corporation (which argues that 
the corporation is a lesser commonwealth), holding that in some cases the corporation 
is an even greater commonwealth. Merriam has observed business enterprises as 
private governments, concluding that in some cases this private government has 
controlled the public government. C. Wright Mills has also referred to corporations as 
political institutions. Berle also found politics in all manner of corporations, a view 
that he shares with Aristotle. 842 
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In order to analyze the State’s influence in developing countries such as Iran upon the 
adoption of CSR in many companies, attempts were made to see if the political 
determinants of CSR are fundamental to explaining its impact; whether transitional 
economies such as Iran present major obstacles to the adoption of a dispersed 
ownership model of the corporation; and whether the relationship between the legal 
rule to be transplanted and the socio-political structure of the “origin” jurisdiction will 
determine the rejection or acceptance of legal transplants. 
 
In order to assess this key proposition, in the first step, the interviewees’ opinion was 
sought to see if CSR policies contradict any social/political values in Iran in a way 
that they would induce a backlash. They were also asked what local conditions have 
caused difficulties in transplanting commercial laws in Iran.  
 
Most of the interviewees (20 out of 28), while highlighting that CSR and doing 
charity work have roots in Iranian culture and religious views, believed that 
implementing CSR policies in Iran would induces a backlash for the following 
reasons: the need for CSR to have an economic justification in Iran, lack of CSR 
culture, CSR might threaten Iran’s political stability, a governmental economy and 
lack of competition in the market, lack of trust in the government’s activities and 
initiatives by Iran’s society, and CSR might be in conflict with Iran’s culture and 
religion since it is a Western value. 
 
In the second step, the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the role of 
the State (the government), if any, in promoting CSR policies. They were also asked 
what source, if any, the government has used to promote CSR policies and what the 
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State has done to encourage CSR policies. The interviewees’ opinion was also sought 
as to how they believe the private sector/your company benefit from CSR 
partnerships with the government and if they think that promoting CSR policies will 
increase the level of co-operation between the public and private sectors in Iran.  
 
Most of the interviewees (19 out of 28) believed that the government has never used 
any resources and had a very weak performance in promoting and encouraging CSR 
policies for the following reasons: Iran’s government’s main purpose has always been 
to keep its economic and political security, Iran’s society does not trust the 
government, Iran’s government does not think big and long-term, Iran’s government 
has problems getting through its everyday and normal affairs, and the Iranian 
government’s advertising that money and capitalism are bad concepts.  
 
Despite all these shortcomings in the government’s activities, all of the interviewees 
strongly believed that the government plays the most important role in promoting 
CSR policies. They suggested the following roles for the government: stopping 
meddling in business, gradually staying away from the economy, stopping subsidizing 
companies, using a reward/punishment method, having a supervisory and controlling 
role, establishing and strengthening civil society institutions, educating society to do 
group work and collective action, determining a model and framework for CSR 
policing through general policies and strategies, and appointing skilled and 
knowledgeable managers.  
 
In the third step, the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the factors 
they believe promote the adoption of CSR values in Iran. Most of the interviewees (24 
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out of 28) held the conviction that as long as there is a governmental and political 
economy in Iran, CSR will not be developed. They also agreed that the ground for 
developing CSR policies in Iran is not ready and would take a long time. The 
government is the main economic player in Iran and does not consider CSR as its 
responsibility. Social security, retirement conditions and minimum wage systems in 
Iran are weak. Priority needs to be given to correcting these systems rather than CSR, 
in which is on a higher level. 
 
They believe that the following factors will promote CSR policies in Iran: promoting 
a liberal economy, the government needs to have a supervisory role, the government 
needs to stop subsidizing companies and arranging their affairs for them, managers 
need to become shareholders and hold longer management tenures, the government 
needs to build a CSR culture through education and advertisement, companies need to 
see an economic justification for CSR, Iran needs to develop big private companies 
and public knowledge about CSR needs to be increased.  
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, CSR literature review, attempts were made to show the importance of 
studying the political and cultural circumstances of developing countries. The 
relationship between politics and corporate governance rules was discussed. In order 
to demonstrate this, first “path dependence” theory was discussed. It was concluded 
that the patterns of history deeply influence the current patterns of politics. Then 
“convergence theory” was debated. The advocates of this theory claimed that 
corporate governance is on the reform agenda all over the world, moving towards the 
Anglo-American model of shareholding aiming at maximizing shareholder value. 
They argue that the success and prosperity of Common Law jurisdictions (which 
follow a shareholder value model) compared with other jurisdictions is an indicator of 
the superiority of the Anglo-American model. It was concluded that this model has 
many flaws and needs to be modified. The failures of this model were pointed out 
while proving that there is no one-size-fits-all model.  
 
The chapter continued by analysing the globalization of capitalism. This theory 
claimed that capitalism is the foundation of most of the advanced economies and 
convergence is happening towards the shareholding model of these advanced 
economies. It was argued that different countries follow different successful models 
that work for them. Differences in models do not mean inefficiency. Also, the flaws 
of capitalism were discussed to further prove this point.  
 
Moreover, the role of international institutions in bringing about these changes was 
discussed. It was concluded that international organizations need to pay careful 
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attention to the socio-political circumstances of the country they are operating in 
otherwise their activities will be rejected.  
 
Finally, the role of corporate law was discussed, concluding that law can create or 
destroy anything, so law is not irrelevant, but it is a second-order phenomenon. It was 
argued that other institutions primarily control managerial mistakes. They are: 
business conditions, incentives, professionalism, capital structure, product and 
managerial labour market competition.843 These institutions are the primary control, 
with the law just assisting or impeding.  
 
In this section Key proposition 3.2 was debated. This proposition maintained that 
transitional economies, such as Iran, present major obstacles to the adoption of a 
dispersed ownership model. This section was also related to Key proposition 1.1. 
Attempts were made to see whether the connection between legal rules and CSR 
principles is a reflexive one.  
 
Different definitions of CSR were discussed and attempts were made to show the 
diversity and lack of consensus on this matter. A conclusion was drawn to the effect 
that a good definition is the one that encompasses what is expected from corporations 
in terms of CSR policies. They are expected to balance their desire to maximise 
profits with respecting other stakeholders’ interests. 
 
Different CSR theories were discussed. It was concluded that it is not easy to say 
which theory is the best and a good normative theory needs to include a correct view 
                                                
843Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact 163 
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of human nature, business and society, and the relationship between business and 
society. 
 
Shareholder-value theory seemed to still have strong conceptual bases. Friedman’s 
“profit-maximization” theory and the agency theory seem to have lost a bit of their 
attraction due to the collapse of the market and growing concensus on the need for 
more socially responsible corporations, but they still remain the most significant 
criticism of CSR initiatives.  
 
In this section, Key proposition 2 was examined. This proposition argued that the 
impact of CSR values upon corporations in transitional economies such as Iran is 
likely to be shaped by internal norms in these corporations. Also Key proposition 3.2 
was debated. This proposition maintained that transitional economies such as Iran 
present major obstacles to the adoption of a dispersed ownership model. 
 
Different studies that have been conducted to show the link between corporate social 
performance and corporate financial performance were demonstrated. It was 
concluded that, in line with Friedman’s “Strategic CSR” and meta-analytic evidences, 
CSR might be considered as an important factor for better corporate financial 
performance, but not as an essential, internal resource. 
 
Furthermore, the role of globalization in CSR debates was debated. It was argued that 
“CSR as a rapidly developing business strategy is a response to globalization and the 
extension of global multinational enterprises across countries, with the implication 
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that State control over such enterprises is rarely fragmenting”.844 The role of States as 
compared to corporations in regulating the market and the problems associated with 
assuming political responsibility for corporations were discussed. 
 
In Chapter 3, Legal Transplants, it was concluded that differences in different legal 
systems do not imply inefficiencies.845 Different legal systems may develop different 
solutions to the same problem which are consistent with their legal tradition, which 
may be as efficient as the agreed legal theory by the competitive market. It is not a 
rule of “one size fits all”. 
 
In this chapter, the definition of legal transplants was discussed. Attempts were made 
to debate legal transplants’ development and its influence in the study of legal culture 
and legal systems. It was concluded that variation of transplantation process based on 
social, legal, economic, fiscal, financial and technical circumstances prevailing in 
each country’s “legal culture” and legal system should be taken into account. 
Different series of arguments including Watson’s argument, LLSV’s argument and 
Pistor et al.’s arguments were discussed. Additionally, the effect of costs that a legal 
system incurs through the legal transplantation process was discussed. Furthermore, 
the development of legal transplants in developing countries was discussed. It was 
suggested that legal transplantation is not an easy and short-term solution for 
developing countries in order to fill in the gap of less developed legal systems. “For 
law to play a role in economic activities and long-term economic development, it 
                                                
844Aguilera 453 
845 Mattei, ‘Efficiency and Equal Protection in The New European Contract Law: Mandatory, Default 
and Enforcement Rules’ 6 
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must be incorporated, meaning that it must develop solutions to problems that exist in 
the home jurisdiction”.846 
 
In this section, Key proposition 1.3 was discussed. This proposition argued that the 
act of borrowing is usually simple, whereas on the other hand, building up a theory of 
borrowing is more complex. Additionally, Key proposition 1.2 was examined. This 
held that the so-called “law-matters” thesis needs to be assessed by reference to what 
has been referred to as “functional equivalents” to law in transitional economies such 
as Iran. 
 
This chapter also discussed the first key proposition. This key proposition examined 
whether the process of transplanting into another legal system is likely to be affected 
by local socio-economic-legal conditions, cultural values and institutional 
arrangements. Furthermore, this chapter discussed Key proposition 3.3. This involved 
determining whether the relationship between the legal rule to be transplanted and the 
socio-political structure of the “origin” jurisdiction will determine the rejection or 
acceptance of legal transplants.  
 
In Chapter 4, CSR in Developing Countries, it has been argued that there is an urgent 
and persistent need for a critical study of the potentials, challenges and limitations of 
CSR initiatives in developing countries. The specific issues in different developing 
countries should be taken into account. 
 
                                                
846 Katharina Pistor, ‘Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six 
Countries’ 109 
 351 
As noted in Levine, financial systems exist to mitigate information and transaction 
costs in order to improve the allocation of capital within the market. Different types 
and combinations of information, enforcement and transaction costs in conjunction 
with different legal, regulatory and tax systems have motivated different financial 
contracts, markets and intermediaries across countries and throughout history.847  
 
In this chapter Key proposition 3.3 was further examined. Attempts were made to see 
whether transitional economies, such as Iran, present a major obstacle to the adoption 
of the dispersed ownership model of the corporation. Additionally, Key proposition 
1.2 was further debated. This held that the so-called “law-matters” thesis needs to be 
assessed by reference to what has been referred to as “functional equivalents” to law 
in transitional economies such as Iran. 
 
In this chapter, first, globalization and its effect on developing countries has been 
discussed. In this section, the different nature of CSR policies in developing countries 
was demonstrated and attempts were made to define a conceptual framework based 
on explicit and implicit CSR policies for studying comparative CSR. 
 
Second, the Anglo-American nature of reforms and the two contributing factors to 
development of this model of corporate governance, including the failure of Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and the influence of international financial bodies, 
were discussed. It was concluded that this model, besides the unavailability of 
evidence to confirm that it results in economic development, is not the ideal model for 
a variety of reasons. The Anglo-American model needs a number of modifications to 
                                                
847 Deetz 
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adapt to the special needs of developing countries. It has been also suggested that the 
developing countries might need to take this into account in the future. Further, team 
production theory as an alternative to shareholder wealth maximization was 
discussed. 
 
The theoretical stream arguing that social development is a result of economic 
development and counter-arguments were discussed. It was suggested that social 
development is not necessarily the result of economic development; on the contrary, 
stable economic development is a result of prior social foundations.  
 
In Chapter 5, Iran’s current social, political and legal systems were discussed, and in 
Chapter 6, CSR policies’ current status in Iran was discussed. Iran is an Islamic 
country, located in the Middle East with strong Persian cultural elements and a 
French-Belgian-Islamic commercial legal system. Iran’s special characteristics make 
transplantation of new concepts a very complex matter. The new concepts will be 
affected by local socio-legal-political conditions leading to their acceptance or 
rejection. Digging deeply into these elements might show that there exists an Iranian 
style of CSR that just needs to be strengthened and encouraged rather than changed or 
renewed. 
 
Literature about CSR in Iran is very rare, even the few pieces of researche that do 
exist are shallow and in many cases contradictory. They do not explore CSR in an 
Iranian concept of CSR but rather try to explain why Iran does not have CSR in a 
Western style, arguing that Iran is not economically ripe for Western CSR concepts. 
While this argument might be partially correct when it comes to securing investments 
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for large corporations, not having a Western-style CSR is not in itself a bad thing.  
 
In this chapter, first, the CSR key players in Iran were shown. Second, the main CSR 
activities undertaken by CSR key players in Iran were demonstrated. Third, examples 
of domestic and foreign company activities were presented. Fourth, the State’s role in 
promoting CSR policies was discussed, concluding that the State has an important 
role. Fifth, the UN role in promoting CSR policies was debated, showing different 
initiatives that were taken by the UNDP in Iran to encourage sustainable 
development. Sixth, the Stock Exchange role in promoting CSR policies was 
demonstrated. In this section, a summary of the Iranian Code of Corporate 
Governance ratified by the Tehran Stock Exchange was presented. Seventh, the 
difficulties of promoting CSR policies in Iran were discussed.  
 
In chapter 7, data was analysed in four parts: a) Key proposition 1, b) Key 
propositions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, c) Key proposition 2, d) Key proposition 3. Also, the 
methodology and the interview questions have been included as an index to this 
chapter at the end of the thesis. 
 
In the analysis of Key proposition 1 (the effect of socio-economic-legal conditions on 
the process of introducing CSR into Iran’s system), most of the interviewees who 
believed there is no demand for CSR in Iran, believed the CSR concept already exists 
in Iran’s ancient culture and religious values such as Waqf.848  They enumerated the 
following reasons for their negative answers: low cultural and economic development, 
lack of competition and a governmental economy, bad economic conditions, that CSR 
                                                
848 Waqf is an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, typically denoting a building or plot of 
land for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. 
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becomes important only when political stability is threatened, and the differences 
between business customs in Iran and the West. 
 
The interviewees admitted that there are several cases of CSR in Iran but they are the 
personal preferences of managing directors rather than an accepted culture or an 
institutionalized concept. They also strongly presumed that the attitudes of managing 
directors constitute the most important driver for CSR in Iran. 
 
The interviewees who believed that there is a demand for CSR in Iran also confirmed 
that the participation of business in social projects, so-called CSR, has been in Iran’s 
culture and religious values for a long time through concepts such as Waqf and 
Khoms.849  
 
Most of the interviewees (23 out of 28) believed that the existence of social structures 
such as unions is effective in having successful CSR policies. They underlined that 
unions have a specialist role in each profession. Unions defend and represent that 
profession within the government so they need to be innovative in guiding and 
suggesting new laws and regulations to the government, but they all emphasized that 
this is not currently happening in Iran. 
  
Most of the interviewees (22 out of 28) believed that Iran’s legal system is not 
flexible enough to changing economic conditions. However, many of the interviewees 
highlighted that Iran’s society will accept a new culture if it feels the imported culture 
is superior to Iran’s own culture.  
                                                
849 According to Shia Islamic legal terminology, it means one-fifth of certain items which a person 
acquires as wealth, and which must be paid as an Islamic tax. 
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In analysis of Key propositions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 (the connection between legal rules 
and CSR principles), initially all of the interviewees believed that ideally good 
corporate law is effective in economic development but not in Iran’s case since Iran’s 
current corporate law is an impediment to economic development.  
 
The interviewees also believed that law determines the framework of a country’s 
economy. If this framework gives security to investors they invest more, leading to 
economic development.  
 
The interviewees were convinced that Commercial Law in Iran had the purpose of 
economic development when it was enacted, but it did not fulfil its purpose. They also 
believed that the purpose of the creation of publicly held companies was to collect 
people’s small investments in order to invest in big projects but it did not happen for 
the following reasons: a weak ‘group work’ culture, no security in the economy, a 
governmental economy culture and not being ready for sudden reforms. 
 
Most of the interviewees (16 out of 28) held the conviction that economic growth 
comes before adherence to the rule of law. Some (7 out of 28) believed that economic 
growth comes after adherence to the rule of law. And some (5 out of 28) believed that 
economic growth and adherence to the rule of law move in parallel and are 
interdependent.  
 
Second, most of the interviewees (23 out of 28) believed that the extent to which 
courts and regulators rely upon corporations to regulate their own affairs is very low. 
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They emphasized that laws are impediments to doing business in Iran and if 
companies abide by the law they cannot do business.  
 
Third, the interviewees believed that Iran’s corporate law mechanisms are quite 
effective in dealing with illegal self-dealing by corporate officials. 
 
All of the interviewees believed that the level of compliance on the part of Iranian 
companies with legal and regulatory rules, especially disclosure, tax, insurance and 
social security is very low.  
 
The interviewees maintained that while a large part of bad law just stays bad and 
companies just avoid the law and are in constant fights with the government, in order 
to make up for bad law, the following formal and informal institutions are in place: 
bribing tax officials, the government turning a blind eye to non-compliance, courts, 
friendship and trust. 
 
In analysis of Key proposition 2 (the effect of internal norms of corporations in 
shaping their CSR values), initially the interviewees gave very mixed answers to the 
issue of stakeholders’ influence upon corporation decision-making. However, many 
of them (25 out of 28) believed that in general stakeholders have either very limited or 
no impact at all upon the decision-making process in Iranian companies due to a 
governmental economy, lack of competition and cultural underdevelopment. 
However, they gave a ranking of what stakeholder group they thought is the most 
important one: 1. Public opinion (11 out of 20), 2. Consumers (10 out of 20), 3. The 
attitudes of the managing director and board of directors (7 out of 20).  
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Second, the interviewees were asked if and in what way positive public perception is 
important for the success of their company in Iran. The interviewees fell into two 
groups of negative and positive answers, with a slight inclination towards a positive 
answer. The point that needs to be taken into consideration is that most of the 
interviewees with positive answers were managing directors of big, previously 
governmental companies (the so-called “half private-half governmental companies”) 
and they did not provide sufficient grounds for their positive answer. 
 
Some of the interviewees (15 out of 28) assumed that the positive public perception of 
a company’s target group is important for the company’s success.  
 
The other half of the interviewees (13 out of 28), while assuming that positive public 
perception would be important for the success of the company, believed that it didn’t 
apply in Iran’s current situation.  
 
All of the interviewees, while assuming that external conditions, such as pressure 
from the government or public, are more effective than internal elements, believed 
that CSR values within corporations are shaped by the attitudes of the managing 
director and board of directors. They all emphasized that the most important driver of 
CSR would be the managing director’s attitude. They argued that managing directors 
in Iran are governmental, powerful, experienced and have a huge say in how a 
company is run. One of the interviewees further explained that CSR falls into the 
category of organizational culture, and culture in an Iranian company comes from the 
top (managers) down (to employees).  
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Third, most of the interviewees (25 out of 28) believed that managers/directors of 
large Iranian companies’ accountability to different stakeholders is weak in Iran.  
 
Fourth, most of the interviewees (18 out of 28) believed that more employee 
participation not only does not further promote CSR policies in Iranian companies, 
but it might hurt the company.  
 
Some of the interviewees (8 out of 28) believed that more employee participation 
would promote CSR policies in Iranian companies. They emphasized that 
participation makes employees feel they belong in a company. This will increase their 
efficiency level by carrying out decisions better. They will also behave better with 
stakeholders. This situation will guarantee an increase in profits and the company’s 
success.  
 
Fifth, all of the interviewees emphasized that an economic role is the primary function 
of a company. Most of the interviewees (20 out of 28) believed that a company is both 
an economic and socio-political player, with a great emphasis on the political role.  
 
The interviewees who maintained that companies are just economic players 
highlighted that ideally a company’s socio-political involvement is a good 
phenomenon, but not in Iran’s current situation. They believed that, besides the fact 
that a company’s raison d’être is economic and its purpose is profit-making, Iran’s 
economic situation does not allow companies to play a socio-political role either. 
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Sixth, most of the interviewees (25 out of 28) believed that making more profit is the 
main reason for getting involved with CSR. They argued that due to moral regression 
in Iran and the bad economic conditions either the government needs to exert pressure 
and force for CSR, or companies need to see an increase in profits. 
 
Another reason that many interviewees (15 out of 28) gave as the main reason for 
getting involved in CSR is the survival of the company. They emphasized that a better 
reputation in society brings about positive public opinion about a company’s 
activities, leading to less political and social pressure on the company. Companies can 
attract people’s attention, have their support and loyalty through undertaking CSR 
activities. 
 
In the seventh step the interviewees were asked if they believe corporations have extra 
responsibility for social development beyond the development that arises incidentally 
from their responsibility to their shareholders to generate profit. 
 
Almost half of the interviewees answered positively and the other half answered in 
the negative. There was slight inclination towards a negative answer. 
 
The ones who answered positively emphasized the fact that a company needs to be 
economically successful and generate profit before any plans for social development. 
The ones who gave a negative answer mostly believed that ideally corporations have 
extra responsibility for social development, but not in Iran.  
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In order to analyze Key proposition 3 (the importance of political determinants of 
CSR), the State influence in developing countries such as Iran upon the adoption of 
CSR in many companies, attempts were made to see whether the political 
determinants of CSR are fundamental to explaining its impact; whether transitional 
economies, such as Iran, present major obstacles to the adoption of a dispersed 
ownership model of the corporation; and whether the relationship between a legal rule 
to be transplanted and the socio-political structure of the “origin” jurisdiction will 
determine the rejection or acceptance of legal transplants. 
 
In order to assess this key proposition, in the first step the interviewees’ opinion was 
sought to see if CSR policies contradict any social/political values in Iran in a way 
that they would induce a backlash. They were also asked what local conditions have 
caused difficulties in transplanting commercial laws in Iran.  
 
Most of the interviewees (20 out of 28), while highlighting that CSR and doing 
charity work have roots in Iranian culture and religious views, believed that 
implementing CSR policies in Iran would induce a backlash. 
 
Then the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the role of the State (the 
government), if any, in promoting CSR policies. They were also asked what source, if 
any, the government has used to promote CSR policies and what the State has done to 
encourage CSR policies. The interviewees’ opinion was also sought as to how they 
believe the private sector/your company benefit from CSR partnerships with the 
government and if they think that promoting CSR policies will increase the level of 
co-operation between the public and private sectors in Iran.  
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Most of the interviewees (19 out of 28) believed that the government has never used 
any resources and had a very weak performance in promoting and encouraging CSR 
policies. 
 
Despite all these shortcomings in the government’s activities, all of the interviewees 
strongly believed that the government plays the most important role in promoting 
CSR policies.  
 
Moreover, the interviewees were asked to give their opinion about the factors they 
believe promote the adoption of CSR values in Iran. Most of the interviewees (24 out 
of 28) were of the conviction that as long as there is a governmental and political 
economy in Iran, CSR will not be developed. They also agreed that the ground for 
developing CSR policies in Iran is not ready and would take a long time. 
 
They believed that the following factors will promote CSR policies in Iran: promoting 
a liberal economy, that the government needs to have a supervisory role, the 
government needs to stop subsidizing companies and arranging their affairs for them, 
managers need to become shareholders and hold longer management tenures, 
government needs to build a CSR culture through education and advertising, 
companies need to see an economic justification for CSR, Iran needs to develop large 
private companies and public knowledge about CSR needs to be increased.  
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Recommendations for future research 
 
One of the limitations of this research was that the interviewee sample was limited to 
publicly held companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. These companies are 
semi-governmental (half governmental and half private), meaning that the 
organizational system of government and the governmental mindset still lingers there. 
The reason behind choosing this sample was that these companies are the most 
influential and powerful in Iran. They are the avant-gardes in the business 
environment. If they develop a certain policy, other companies will follow their lead. 
Other studies could be performed using this study’s design, but using corporate 
leaders from only the private sector. 
 
Another limitation was that the interviewee sample was limited to managing directors 
and senior managers. It would be interesting to see the results of a similar study using 
a sample of the Iranian population or employees. Achieving such a sample would be 
very challenging, but would provide exceptional benefits to the overall knowledge of 
corporate social responsibility. 
 
Moreover, due to Iran’s political situation and sensitivity over foreign research in the 
country, the interview questions were designed in a way not to address anything 
politically sensitive. This limited the discussions during the interviews especially if it 
included criticizing the government. Usually interviewees criticized the government 
but the interviewer refrained from asking more questions to avoid causing any alarm 
in the interviewees. Another research project might be conducted in a more politically 
relaxed environment. This would allow the discussion to follow easily, shedding more 
light on the path that needs to be taken to promote CSR policies. 
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This study demonstrated that economic development comes before the rule of law. 
Also the common business practices are more important than the law-on-the-book. 
Many interviewees stated that laws in Iran were impediments to doing business. Most 
of the laws are outdated and some are over developed. They also emphasized that the 
level of legal compliance in Iran is very low. More research is needed to determine 
which parts of legal system need changing, where the change should come from 
(whether through transplantation or internal development) and the reasons behind this 
low compliance level. 
 
This thesis was the very first research on promoting CSR policies in Iran; therefore, in 
some parts it tends to address many issues at the same time. Other studies might be 
conducted addressing only one issue on a deeper level such as the stakeholder issue in 
promoting CSR policies in Iran or the government role in promoting CSR policies. 
 
Other research might be able to go deeper in to the reasons behind the limited 
stakeholder role in developing countries, specifically in Iranian companies. And what 
needs to be done to increase this role, or if it is a good idea to increase their role and if 
this increase would impair the proper functioning of the economic system. 
 
Another study might be able to reveal the resources that the government can use and 
policies it needs to develop to prepare the population to be more receptive to CSR 
polices and become more familiar with it. This thesis discovered that when it comes 
to CSR policies (basically all social concepts), it is believed that government plays the 
most important role in promoting the CSR policies. 
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A study could be performed to determine the role of education and public knowledge 
in promoting CSR policies in a developing country. This thesis revealed that 
according to the interviewees, public does not have enough knowledge about CSR or 
the fact that they have the right to ask corporations to behave in a socially responsible 
manner.  
 
 
Index: 
 
Index 1	   (Chapter 6): Summary of the Iranian Code of Corporate 
Governance850 
 
Chapter 1 (Descriptions) – Clause 1 
This chapter offers descriptions and definitions of important terms. 
 
Chapter 2 (Board of Directors) 
This chapter describes the characteristics of the board of directors such as structure of 
the board, duties of the board, selection criteria and number of board members.  It 
addresses issues such as: 
• Directors’ qualifications; 
• Effectiveness of the board; 
• Separation of duties between directors on the board and other managers; 
• Separation of CEO and the Chair; 
• Presence of non-executive directors;  
• Meeting at least once a month; 
• Formation of audit committee and delineating its responsibilities; 
• Having an effective internal control system which should be evaluated annually. 
 
Chapter 3 (Public Assembly) – Clauses 21-30 
In this chapter shareholders’ public assembly characteristics and responsibilities is 
covered. It addresses issues such as: 
• Procedure for Chairperson selection; 
                                                
850 Iranian Code of Corporate Governance 2004 and further amendments 2005. 
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• Structure of determining compensation for members of the board of directors; 
• The requirement of submitting board of directors’ reports and independent auditor’s 
report to the assembly meeting. These reports must be on public display at least 10 
days before the shareholders’ assembly; 
• The necessity to publish financial statements that have been approved by the 
shareholders’ assembly at most 10 days after the assembly. 
 
Chapter 4 (Accountability and Disclosure) – Clauses 31-36 
In this chapter these issues were addressed: 
• Annual financial statements; 
• Six-month interim financial statements; 
• Stock transaction information related to the board of directors, top executive 
managers and their families; 
• Insider-related information; 
• General information related to the organizational structure, product, human resources, 
social responsibilities and company environment. 
 
Chapter 5 (Frauds and Penalties)- Clauses 37-38 
 
Index 2 (Chapter 7): Interview Questions 
 
1. Is there a demand for CSR in Iran?  
2. What do you understand to be the key feature of CSR in Iran?  
2.1. Are oil companies different? 
3. To what extent are different stakeholder groups likely to impact your decision-
making process?  
3.1. How are CSR policies implemented at lower levels in Iranian companies? 
4. Why do companies decide to get involved in CSR? 
4.1. How do companies benefit from CSR? 
5. How can the private sector/your company mutually benefit from CSR partnerships 
with the government? 
6. What has the State/your company done to encourage CSR policies?  
7. Do you see the company as an economic player or as a socio-political player?  
7.1. Which role prevails? 
8. How are CSR values within corporations shaped by the internal norms in these 
corporations? 
9. Do corporations have extra responsibility for social development beyond the 
development that arises from their responsibility to their shareholders to generate 
profit? 
10. Is positive public perception important for the success of your company in Iran? 
11. Is support from multiple stakeholders important for the success of your company 
in Iran? 
11.1. Who are the most influential stakeholders? 
12. Do you think promoting CSR policies will increase the level of co-operation 
between the public and private sectors in Iran?  
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13. In your opinion, do CSR policies contradict any social/political values in Iran in a 
way that they would induce a backlash?  
14. In your opinion, how can CSR policies begin to be prompted in Iranian 
companies?  
15. What is the impact of corporate law on economic development in Iran?  
15.1. In your opinion, how well do Iranian courts deal with the application 
of corporate law principles? 
15.2. Are Iran’s corporate regulators effective in enforcing corporate law? 
15.3. To what extent do Iranian courts and regulators rely upon corporations 
to regulate their own affairs (i.e., self-regulation as opposed to government 
regulation)? 
15.4. To what extent do corporations in Iran avoid complying with legal and 
regulatory rules (i.e., re disclosure)? 
15.5. In your opinion, how effective is Iran’s corporate law in dealing with 
illegal self-dealing by corporate officials? 
15.6. What substitutes are available to make up for weak corporate law? 
16. What local conditions have caused difficulties while transplanting laws into Iran?  
17. How flexible is Iran’s legal system in response to changing economic conditions? 
18. In your experience, what are the principal costs of introducing CSR rules in Iran? 
19. Do you think that more employee participation would enhance promoting CSR 
policies in Iranian companies? 
20. What role has the government played in encouraging CSR policies? 
21. What resources, if any, has the government used to promote CSR policies? 
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22. In your opinion, to what extent do successful CSR policies depend on the 
existence of social structures (such as unions, professional associations, etc) 
commonly referred to as “civil society”? 
22.1. To what extent is economic growth facilitated by an adherence to rule 
of law ideas (chicken or egg issues)? 
23. To what extent are managers/directors of large Iranian companies accountable to 
different stakeholder groups (e.g. employees, shareholders, consumers, etc)?  
Index 3 (Chapter 3): Methodology  
 
Typically, CSR research uses survey; case studies are neglected. This imbalance is 
likely the result of prudential and ideological considerations.851 In their review of 94 
published empirical studies of ethical beliefs and behaviour in organizations, Randall 
and Gibson852 found that 81% of available empirical studies relied exclusively on 
survey data. Similarly, Ford and Richardson853 observe that over 95% of 46 published 
studies of ethical decision-making relied exclusively on questionnaires, open-ended 
questions, interviews or the subject’s response to a hypothetical scenario or vignette 
posed to them.854 
 
Such a heavy reliance on survey methods has been criticized as being conceptually 
naive in terms of weak theoretical bases, and having a lack of clear hypotheses and 
poor conceptualizations.855 Surveys introduce methodological problems such as 
measurement difficulty, limited potential to grasp the complexities and nuances of 
moral issues, information validity and respondents’ social desirability bias.856 
Reliance on secondary data and self-reporting does little to shed light on the 
complexities of cross-cultural research in CSR as well and suffers from inherent 
                                                
851 Stephen Brigley, ‘Business Ethics in Context: Researching with Case Studies’ 14 Journal of 
Business Ethics 219 and Abagail McWilliams Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten, Jeremy Moon and  Donald 
S. Siegel (eds), ‘Are You Ethical? Please Tick Yes or No on Researching Ethics in Business 
Organizations’ 20 Journal of Business Ethics 237 
852 D. M. Randall and A. M. Gibson, ‘Methodology in Business Ethics Research: A Review and 
Critical Assessment’ 9 Journal of Business Ethics 
853 Robert C. Ford and Woodrow D. Richardson, ‘Ethical decision making: A review of the empirical 
literature’ 13 Journal of Business Ethics 205 
854 Howard Harris, ‘Content Analysis of Secondary Data: A Study of Courage in Managerial Decision 
Making’ 34 Journal of Business Ethics 191 
855 Andrew Crane, ‘Are You Ethical? Please Tick Yes or No on Researching Ethics in Business 
Organizations’ and Gibson 
856 Donna M. Randall and Maria F. Fernandes, ‘The Social Desirability Response Bias in Ethics 
Research’ 10 Journal of Business Ethics 805 and Justin Tan, ‘Institutional Structure and Firm Social 
Performance in Transitional Economies: Evidence of Multinational Corporations in China’ 86 Journal 
of Business Ethics 171 
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desirability and selectivity biases.857 
 
In contrast, exploratory case studies, utilizing multiple sources of evidence, are 
conducted on a foundation of naturalistic interpretation of social action rooted in the 
context of organizational cultures and institutional systems and allows the researchers 
to determine the effective meaning of ethical beliefs and responsible practice within 
its real-life context to build up a more holistic understanding of the research issue.858 
Furthermore, given the relatively new and unexplored nature of the phenomenon – the 
development of CSR policies in a developing country such as Iran – this study 
adopted an exploratory research strategy.859 Qualitative research, rather than 
traditional quantitative empirical tools, is particularly useful for exploring implicit 
assumptions and examining new relationships, abstract concepts and operational 
definitions.860 The objective was to conduct an analysis of corporate business 
environment, managers’ mindset and current practices and strategies in Iran in order 
to see how CSR policies can be implemented there. Interviews were conducted with 
the managing directors of big corporations listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange. This 
would help to build theories on how companies see CSR in Iran’s business 
environment and to develop strategies that would facilitate future development of 
CSR policies in a developing country such as Iran. 
 
Moreover, an exploratory methodology such as this has been recognized as being 
                                                
857 Tan 
858 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods: (Applied Social Research Methods, 
Volume 5): 005, vol 5 (3rd edn, Sage Publications, Inc. 2003) and Tan 
859 Yin and Kathleen M Eisenhardt, ‘Building Theories From Case Study Research’ 14 The Academy 
of Management Review 532 
860 Richard A. Bettis, ‘Strategic Management and the Straightjacket: An Editorial Essay’ 2 
Organization Science 315 and Karl E. Weick, ‘Drop Your Tools: An Allegory for Organizational 
Studies’ Administrative Science Quarterly 301 
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particularly useful for researchers interested in examining strategies in emerging 
economies.861 In addition, qualitative research has provided critical insights into 
innovation,862 entrepreneurship,863 and alliances, as well as a variety of other 
phenomena, such as social issues’ organizational change,864 and proactive 
responsiveness to environmental uncertainty.865 
 
Since the issues relevant to transitional markets are under-examined,866 a qualitative 
approach is more able to reveal the sensitive and complex issue of implementing CSR 
policies in Iran.867 Such an approach facilitates within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparisons, which can greatly enhance the replicability and generalizability of 
conclusions elicited from the cases.868 In response to such calls, this thesis used mixed 
methods, including analyses of corporate documents and media reports, as well as 
interviews with a range of actors from the field to construct an understanding of 
legitimate CSR practices. Secondary data provide material when it is not possible to 
gather primary data, overcoming a substantial dilemma in conducting CSR studies. 
With its unobtrusiveness, the “eavesdropping” quality of the case study overcomes 
the social desirability response bias and the reluctance to respond to explicit ethical 
questions.869 Moreover, secondary data, generated at the time as the events being 
investigated, overcome problems of recollection and make longitudinal study 
                                                
861 Lorraine Eden Robert E. Hoskisson, Chung Ming Lau and Mike Wright, ‘Strategy in Emerging 
Economies’ 43 The Academy of Management Journal 249 
862 D. Charles Galunic and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, ‘Architectural Innovation and Modular Corporate 
Forms’ 44 The Academy of Management Journal 1229 
863 Paula Bassoff and Christine Moorman Anne S. Miner, ‘Organizational Improvisation and Learning: 
A Field Study’ 46 Administrative Science Quarterly 304 
864 Ted London and Stuart L Hart, ‘Reinventing Strategies for Emerging Markets: Beyond the 
Transnational Model’ 35 Journal of International Business Studies 350 
865 Harrie Vredenburg and Frances Westley Sanjay Sharma, ‘Strategic Bridging: A Role for the 
Multinational Corporation in Third World Development’ 30 Journal Of Applied Behavioral Science 
458 
866 Cordeiro 
867 Eisenhardt, ‘Building Theories From Case Study Research’ 
868 Ibid and Yin 
869 Harris and Fernandes and Tan 
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possible.870 
 
The initial literature review provided guidance for this study and helped to identify 
meaningful and relevant key propositions and questions for the interviews. More 
specifically, this included collecting data on the CSR literature, legal transplants, CSR 
in developing countries and the background of Iran’s culture, economy and legal 
system. The research was conducted over a period of three years and involved 
triangulation between a variety of different sources of data including analysis of stock 
exchange reports, press, politics, annual reports and the conducting of formal and 
informal interviews with managers at a number of listed companies in the Tehran 
Stock Exchange.871 
  
One point that should be taken into consideration is that Iran is a very politically 
sensitive country. Attempts were made to avoid touching upon sensitive political 
issues and not to approach politically sensitive industries such as oil/gas. However, in 
developing countries such as Iran politics tend to be involved in every aspect of 
people’s lives, therefore complete avoidance of the subject proved to be impossible. 
 
28 interviews were conducted. The interviewees included:  
 
• Seventeen managing directors of large Iranian corporations listed on the Tehran Stock 
Exchange. These managing directors were not chosen randomly. They were chosen 
from the fifty most active corporations in the Tehran Stock Exchange and preference 
was given to the biggest ones, which were the so-called half-private/half-
                                                
870 Harris 
871 Yin 
 374 
governmental corporations (previously governmental corporations). 
 
• Five well-known lawyers of major Iranian corporations listed on the TSE (all of 
whom had a PhD in law, were teaching at the university and had more than 15 years 
of experience). These people were chosen to cross-check the data collected from the 
interviews with the managing directors and also to further explore different aspects of 
developing CSR policies in Iran. 
 
• Five higher middle managers of the biggest industrial Iranian corporation. All of them 
had more than 15 years of experience of working in that industry. These people were 
chosen to cross-check the data collected from the interviews with the managing 
directors and to further explore different aspects of developing CSR policies in Iran. 
Convincing the managing directors of these companies to give an interview proved to 
be impossible and politically sensitive; therefore, higher middle managers were 
chosen. 
 
• One chief editor of the most famous industrial magazine in Iran. This interviewee had 
more than 25 years of experience in the industry press. This person was chosen for the 
purposes of data cross-checking and having another outlook on the matter. 
 
All of the interviews were conducted in Persian and translated into English by the 
author of this thesis. After that the data was summarized and categorized according to 
the key propositions. Data analysis was performed according to the theories and data 
that were collected in the earlier chapters. It also involved triangulation among a 
variety of different sources of data including analysis of stock exchange reports, 
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press, politics, annual reports and the conducting some informal interviews with 
government officials.  
 
From the 22 companies that have been interviewed: 
 
• 3 had environmental reports. 
• 8 had posted a quality certificate such as ISO on their website. 
• 5 had ethical codes. 
• None published annual reports, neither on their website nor on paper for public view. 
• Only 1 company published financial reports on its website. However, these reports 
were not regular and the last one was from two years ago. 
• None mentioned CSR in any of their published reports or on their website. 
 
The structure of the board of these 22 companies included: 
 
• 1 CEO 
• 1 Chair 
• 1 Deputy Chair 
• 2-4 board members. It was not mentioned whether they are executive or non-
executive members. From the observations of the interviewer, many board members 
do not participate in their company’s meetings and affairs at all. Being a board 
member is simply a title and is given to individuals in order to use their connection 
and power for the benefit of the company. 
• From the 22 companies, only 1 had 3 inspectors and another one had external 
auditors.
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